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Chapter 1
Introduction
Electricity markets are different! They significantly differ from common markets, since
technical and economical aspects fundamentally differ. There exists an uncountable num-
ber of special technical and economical features on electricity markets. However, at least
the following five central aspects can be identified as main drivers for the special market
structure of most electricity markets.
Large investments are necessary to generate electricity, which leads to economies of
scale and a oligopolistic structure on the electricity market. Moreover, investments de-
cisions, for example, about generation capacities or the structure of the electricity grid
mostly have a very long time horizon. This combination of large investments with long
term time horizons leads to large uncertainties.
To manage these uncertainties precise forecasts are of major importance for the elec-
tricity market. Based on these forecasts market participants can engage in financial deriva-
tives. On liberalized electricity markets the most popular financial derivatives are forward
and futures contracts. Market volumes of these contracts often exceed the spot market
volumes.
Electricity supply always has to match electricity consumption exactly. Whenever feed-
in of electricity exceeds consumption or feed-in of electricity is below consumption, seri-
ous technical problems occur for the electricity network. In extremal cases blackouts may
occur.
Developed economies heavily rely on electrical power! The economic costs associated
with a blackout lasting for one hour are estimated by Simon Piaszeck (2013, p.23). A
1
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blackout, that is taking place at 12:00 pm noon leads to costs of 22.74 million euros in
the city area of Berlin, 19.10 million euros in the city area of Hamburg and 16.00 million
euros in the city area of Munich. These estimations clearly illustrate the importance
of balancing electricity generation and consumption as well as the high dependence of
households and industry on electrical power in developed economies.
Distribution networks are highly relevant for electricity markets. They can be seen as
natural monopolies, since competition between different networks would be much too
costly and the existing network is the only way to deliver electricity to consumers. There-
fore, investment decisions into the distribution networks play a crucial role for the total
electricity market.
In particular the combination of a distribution network, the technological need of bal-
ancing demand and supply in every second and oligopolistic firms leads to various exter-
nalities and strategic interactions. The aim of the presented thesis is to analyze strategic
effects of forward trading on the German electricity market. By doing so it adds to eco-
nomic research in three different ways:
Firstly, Chapter 2 gives an empirical analysis of the German electricity market. This
analysis of the German power market consists of an overview about market structure
and conditions for electricity trading, an empirical evaluation of stochastic renewable
energies feed-in, and an empirical evaluation of the demand for electricity generated by
conventional power plants.
Secondly, in Chapter 3 a theoretical model based on the market characteristics of the
German electricity market is presented. This model contributes to economic research,
since it adds volatile market conditions to the existing literature about forward trading and
collusive behavior of firms. It is shown that for power-generating firms a large incentive
exists to collude on a price far above marginal costs.
Thirdly, in Chapter 4 a theoretical model, which helps to analyze the strategic ef-
fect of forward trading on investment incentives, is presented. A multi-stage game, in
which firms face an investment decision followed by a decision about forward trading,
is compared to a multi-stage game, in which firms face a decision about forward trading
followed by an investment decision. It is shown that, depending on the time horizon of an
3investment, the incentive to invest fundamentally differs. Finally, Chapter 5 gives a brief
summary of the most important findings of this thesis and concludes it.
Analysis of the German Electricity Market
Chapter 2 is dedicated to a detailed analysis of the German electricity market. Until
electricity generated in a power plant flows out of the socket of a consumer three dif-
ferent market stages with totally different competitive settings can be identified. Firstly,
the market for electricity generation, which is dominated by four electricity generators
(E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall, EnBW and Vattenfall) and which can be seen as an oligopolistic
market with strategic interaction. Secondly, the transmission of electricity from plants to
regional suppliers, which is organized in a regulated regional monopoly. These regulated
regional monopolies are operated by the following four Transmission System Operators:
Tennet, 50 Hertz, Amprion and TransnetBW. Thirdly, the market for electricity supplied
to households and industrial consumers, which is characterized by interaction of many
electricity sellers and buyers and quite effective competition.
In principle, electricity can either be traded on an electricity exchange or by bilat-
eral contracts. Trading electricity on bilateral contracts, which is often called over-the-
counter-trading (OTC), is not based on standardized rules, whereas for trading electricity
on an exchange clear rules have to be applied. An overview about the most important
contracts traded on the European Energy Exchange (EEX) as well as one about the most
important contracts traded over-the-counter bilaterally is given. The four most important
markets are the day-ahead spot market, the futures market, the intraday spot market and
the options market. For each of these markets the most important participants, trading
rules, trading volumes, and prices are presented.
In Germany electricity is generated mainly out of one of the following five energy
sources: Soft coal, hard coal, nuclear energy, natural gas, and renewable energies. The
composition of this electricity generating mix is shown for all the years between 1990 and
2013 and explanations for fundamental changes in the generating mix are given. Electric-
ity generated by renewable energy sources is subsidized by feed-in tariffs, which lead to a
compensation for the supplier. This compensation is calculated in the way that a constant
amount of money is earned by a supplier. Thus, electricity generated by solar power and
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wind power feeds power into the German grid independent of market conditions. Renew-
able energies feed-in data is collected by the four German Transmission Operators and
provided by the European Energy Exchange. I will use it to quantify feed-in fluctuations.
More precisely, fluctuations of solar power and wind power as well as fluctuations coming
from simultaneous feed-in of wind and solar power are quantified.
Demand for electricity is fluctuating, too. Data provided by the European Network of
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) is used to account for demand
fluctuations. Demand for electricity shows a clear pattern. During nights and morning
hours demand for electricity is rather small. Demand for electricity increases until noon.
After a decrease during the afternoon an increase occurs in the early evening hours. Then
demand for electricity decreases until next morning. This pattern is generally the same for
all weekdays, even though on business days total demand is larger than on Saturdays or
on Sundays. Differences between working days, Saturdays and Sundays shift this pattern,
but do not lead to fundamental changes of the corresponding pattern.
In order to estimate the amount of electricity that has to be generated by conventional
power plants, the demand data set provided by ENTSO-E is combined with the renew-
able energy supply data set provided by the European Energy Exchange. More precisely,
renewable energy supply is deducted from demand for electricity to find the necessary
conventionally generated load for Germany in 2013. This necessary conventional load
can be seen as the total amount of electricity that has to be supplied by all electricity
providers. Again a clear daily pattern emerges, since during night and in the early morn-
ing hours demand is rather low. However, the former demand peak at noon is normally
compensated by an increasing solar feed-in. Thus, the necessary conventional load has a
peak in the afternoon, since during the afternoon the supply of solar energy is decreasing
much faster than the demand for electricity.
In order to show the effect of the necessary conventional load on day-ahead spot prices
scatter plots are illustrated. For most combinations of day-ahead spot prices and necessary
conventional load a clear linear relationship emerges. However, for extremely low or high
realizations of the necessary conventional load this linear relationship breaks down.
5Forward Trading and Competitive Pressure
On the basis of the analysis of the German electricity market a micro-economic model
is presented. It investigates the relationship between forward contracts and competitive
pressure. It adds to the economic research about forward trading and (anti-)competitive
behavior, since (up to my very best knowledge) it is the first theoretical model that allows
for a simultaneous analysis of forward-trading, (anti-) competitive behavior and volatile
market conditions.
Each firm serving a certain market has to take two sources of profits into account: Cur-
rent profits as well as future profits. For oligopolistic firms this rather trivial fact leads to
more complicated consequences, since for any price that exceeds marginal costs a clear
trade-off between undercutting or adapting prices emerges. Undercutting the market price
leads to a significant increase of short term profits. In turn this may induce a price war
between competitors, which leads to a significant decrease of long-term profits. Indeed,
there is a coordination problem of firms, since a firm that matches a (tacitly) fixed price
has to rely on identical behavior of its competitor. Firms are not allowed to agree on prices
and are under the supervision of antitrust authorities. In Germany three government in-
stitutions (Bundeskartellamt, Bundesnetzagentur and Monopolkommission) have a close
look on the electricity market. Thus, firms cannot easily fix a certain price. However,
they can try to balance collusive and competitive profits in such a way that collusive profit
exceeds profit gained by undercutting the tacitly fixed price.
The analytical model shows that trading forward contracts increases incentives for price
matching behavior and decreases incentives to undercut a certain price under volatile mar-
ket conditions. It is shown, that firms theoretically can collude for any discount factor on
a price above marginal costs. Firms can do so by selling a very large amount in forward
contracts while setting a price between monopoly prices and marginal costs during booms.
However, under volatile market conditions firms that rely on stabilizing a collusive agree-
ment by forward trading face another problem. They never know the profit-maximizing
quantity in advance and always have a threat of involuntarily having traded forward more
than the optimal quantity. Thus, profitability of a collusive agreement is reduced by (ex-
cessive) forward trading.
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Forward Trading and Strategic Investment
On commodity markets and especially on the electricity market investment decisions play
a crucial role in strategic competition. There are long-lasting investments such as con-
structing a plant or introducing a cost-reducing new technology. Other investments such
as building up capacities in an existing plant, distributing, or advertising the product have
a shorter time horizon. The importance of investment decisions can particularly be il-
lustrated by estimations for the German "Energiewende". The annual investment costs
for this ongoing turnaround to a sustainable energy supply are estimated by The German
Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) (Blazejczak, Diekmann, Edler, Kemfert,
Neuhoff, and Schill, 2013) for up to 38 billion euros. From this total amount of 38 billion
euros approximately 26 billion euros are needed for investments in power and heating
supply and 7 billion euros for investments in the electricity network.
A theoretical model is presented that incorporates two important strategic decisions
simultaneously: The decisions on investment and on forward trading. As mentioned be-
fore, for investment decisions different time horizons matter. Thus, long-term investment
decisions and short-term investment decisions are modeled separately. A long-term in-
vestment decision is modeled by a three-stage game, in which firms firstly decide about
their investments, secondly decide about the forward-traded amount, and thirdly compete
on a spot market. A mid-term investment decision is modeled by a three-stage game, in
which firms firstly decide about their forward-traded amount, secondly decide about their
investments and thirdly compete on a spot market.
From a welfare point of view the desirability of forward trading critically depends on
the time horizon of an investment decision. For investment decisions that have a rather
short time horizon forward trading strongly increases social welfare, since in equilibrium
a high forward-traded volume, moderate investments, and rather low prices evolve. For
investment decisions that have a rather long time horizon forward trading decreases social
welfare, since in equilibrium a small forward-traded volume, moderate investments and
higher prices evolve. This is bad news for the efficiency of electricity markets, since a lot
of investment decisions on the electricity market have a rather long time horizon.
Chapter 2
Analysis of the German Electricity
Market
There have been fundamental changes on the German electricity market during the last
15 years. These changes were mostly driven by political decisions. Two main objectives
of these political decisions can be identified. Firstly, the objective of making the German
electricity market more efficient and decreasing electricity prices. Secondly, the objective
of transforming electricity generation currently based on fossil fuels and nuclear energy
into electricity generation based on renewable energies.
In order to increase competition on the German electricity market a law, which is called
"Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts", came into force in 1998. This law
made an end to the regional monopolies for electricity supply and liberalized the German
electricity market. Another important step for the liberalization of the electricity market
was made in 2009: Energy supply companies were forced by a common directive of the
European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council (European-
Union, 2009) to unbundle electricity generation from electricity distribution.
In order to phase out electricity generation based on nuclear power the federal gov-
ernment of Germany negotiated with German energy supply companies. These negotia-
tions led to a common solution in the year 2000, which is called "Vereinbarung zwischen
der Bundesregierung und den Energieversorgungsunternehmen vom 14. Juni 2000." In
order to replace these capacities and to support electricity generation from renewable
energy sources a law, which is called "Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien
(Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz - EEG) sowie zur Änderung des Energiewirtschaftsgeset-
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zes und des Mineralölsteuergesetzes", came into force at the same time. The main tool
of this law is the introduction of a feed-in tariff for electricity generated from renewable
energy sources. This law has been quite successful in increasing electricity generated by
renewable energy sources. Another important tool for cleaner electricity is the European
Union Emissions Trading System, which tries to assign a price to the emission of CO2
and came into force in 2005.
The upcoming analysis of the German electricity market focuses more on the objective
of market efficiency and less on the objective of increasing electricity generation from
renewable energy sources. However, market efficiency provides the essential element
for an affordable transformation of the German electricity market. Therefore, the focus
on market efficiency should not be seen as a disregard of the importance of sustainable
electricity generation, but rather as a step to control its costs.
The analysis of the German electricity market consists of three parts. The first part gives
a comprehensive analysis of conditions for electricity supply in Germany. The second part
illustrates fluctuations of renewable energies feed-in and quantifies important stochastic
properties of renewable energy supply. The third part analyzes the weekly pattern of
demand for electricity and presents calculations for the amount of electricity that has
to be generated by conventional power plants. Following this, scatter plots are used to
determine a relationship between conventionally generated electricity and day-ahead spot
prices on the European Energy Exchange (EEX).
Additionally, economic literature that may help to explain strategic aspects of forward
trading on the German electricity market is presented. Unfortunately all presented models
have at least one black spot, which means they are not suitable to explain strategic aspects
of forward trading on the German electricity market in detail. Models that are presented
in chapter 3 and chapter 4 try to fill this gap.
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2.1 Electricity Supply in Germany
In order to get an overview about important aspects of the supply side of the German
electricity market three different properties of electricity supply are analyzed in a more
detailed way: Firstly, the vertical and horizontal market structure of electricity supply.
Secondly, the organization of electricity trading either on the European Energy Exchange
(EEX) or by bilateral negotiation and trading of over-the-counter (OTC) contracts. Thirdly,
the composition of energy sources used for electricity generation in Germany (energy
mix).
2.1.1 Market Structure
Vertical Structure of the electricity market: From the Plant to the Socket
In general the supply chain of electricity from a plant to the socket of a consumer can be
separated into following three different stages:
1. Generation of Electricity
2. Transmission of Electricity
3. Distribution of Electricity
In a first step the market structure of Power Generation is analyzed more deeply. Then the
economic situation on the second stage of Network Transmission is considered. Finally,
the degree of competition on the third stage of Power Distribution is figured out.
Generation of Electricity
Figure 2.1 illustrates the net electricity generation of the main operators in Germany for
the years 2008 and 2013. Net electricity generation is found by deducting the electric-
ity being necessary to operate a plant from its gross electricity production. This data is
provided by RWE (2014a) and based on information coming from the "Bundesverband
der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW)" as well as data coming directly from the
operators.
RWE has been the operator with the largest electricity generation in Germany in 2008
(179.7 TWh) as well as in 2013 (151.1 TWH). E.ON is the operator with the second
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Figure 2.1: Net Electricity Generation by Operator (2008 and 2013)
largest electricity generation. The decrease of its electricity generation from 122.3 TWh
in 2008 to 84.2 TWh in 2013 can mainly be explained by the sale of generation capacity
due to an arrangement with the EU Commission. Vattenfall (abbreviated as Vat. in figure
2.1) is the third largest operator in Germany. It generated 67.5 TWh electricity in 2008
and 68.8 TWh electricity in 2013. It is followed by EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg,
which generated 66.8 TWh in 2008 and 58,5 TWh in 2013. The decrease of 8.3 TWh
electricity generation can mainly be explained by the shut-down of the nuclear plants
Neckarwestheim 1, with a capacity of 840 MW and Philippsburg 1, with a capacity of
890 MW, in 2011. Due to their large common share in electricity generation, these four
operators are sometimes called "the big four", since in 2008 they generated about 78%
and in 2013 65% of the electricity traded on the German power market. Additionally,
there exist three other minor electricity producers in Germany. First, there is Statkraft
(abbreviated as Stat. in figure 2.1), which is a Norwegian electricity operator and focuses
on renewable energies. In Germany statkraft holds plant capacities for gas, water and
biomass. Second, there is Stadtwerke München (abbreviated as SWM. in figure 2.1),
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which holds an 25% interest in the nuclear power plants "Isar 1 and Isar 2". Additionally
SWM owns hydrolelectric power stations as well as combined heat and power plants.
Third, there is GDF Suez (abbreviated as GDF in figure 2.1) purchased hard coal as well
as water electricity generation capacities from E.ON in 2009. The political promotion
of renewable energy sources in Germany led to a growing contribution of rather small
operators in German electricity generation (others in figure 2.1), since in 2008 103.2 TWh
and in 2013 174.2 TWh of electricity were generated by "other" operators.
As shown above there exists an oligopolistic market structure on the wholesale elec-
tricity market. The strategic interaction of the four largest firms seems to be very relevant
for the electricity market. Even though they are asymmetric in terms of generation capac-
ity, market shares and regional focus, they are able to exercise at least together a certain
level of market power and to affect wholesale electricity prices. However, it should be
mentioned that the market shares of the big four electricity operators have decreased and
will probably keep decreasing in the next years.
Transmission of Electricity
There exist four Transmission System Operators (TSO) in Germany. Each operator is as a
regional (regulated) monopolist and is therefore responsible for transmission in a clearly
defined control area.
1. Tennet TSO GmbH: Operates in Schleswig Holstein, Lower Saxony, Hamburg as
well as broad areas of Hesse and Bavaria.
2. 50 Hertz Transmission GmbH: Operates in the former East Germany federal states
Mecklenburg Western Pomerania, Brandenburg, Berlin, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia,
Saxonia as well as in Bremen.
3. Amprion GmbH: Operates in broad areas of North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland
Palatinate, Saarland as well as in few areas of Hesse and Bavaria.
4. TransnetBW GmbH: Operates solely in the federal state of Baden-Württemberg.
Figure 2.2, which has been provided by the "Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (BpB)",
shows control areas for each Transmission System Operator. In order to unbundle the
electricity production from the electricity transmission the European Commission, the
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Figure 2.2: Control Areas of German Transmission System Operators
European Parliament, and the European Council passed a Directive in 2009 (European-
Union, 2009). This Directive forced plant operators with integrated electricity transmis-
sion to significantly reduce their control on the transmission of electricity. As motivation
and justification for this EU directive in particular non-discriminatory market access is
given ("Without effective separation of networks from activities of generation and supply
(effective unbundling), there is an inherent risk of discrimination not only in the oper-
ation of the network but also in the incentives for vertically integrated undertakings to
invest adequately in their networks" (European-Union, 2009, p.56)). Avoidance of social
unfavorable (investment) incentives is given as another reason for this directive ("Own-
ership unbundling, which implies the appointment of the network owner as the system
operator and its independence from any supply and production interests, is clearly an ef-
fective and stable way to solve the inherent conflict of interests and to ensure security of
supply."’ (European-Union, 2009, (p.56))). The big four German plant operators, all of
which owned transmission units, implemented this EU Directive in different ways.
E.ON sold its entire subsidiary transpower stromübertragungs GmbH (transpower) to
the Dutch transmission system operator TenneT holding B.V.. For this German Transmis-
sion System Operator the TenneT Holding founded the Tennet TSO GmbH, which can
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be seen as a completely independent Transmission System Operator, since its owner nei-
ther runs power plants in Germany nor distributes electricity to consumers. See the press
release of E.ON (2010) for further details.
Vattenfall firstly renamed its subsidiary Vattenfall Europe Transmission as "50Hertz
Transmission" and two months later sold 60% of this subsidiary to the Belgian Trans-
mission System Operator ELIA, which already operated the entire Transmission System
in Belgium. The remaining 40% were sold to the Australian infrastructure fund "Indus-
try Funds Management (IFM)". 50Hertz can be also seen as a completely independent
Transmission System Operator, since both owners do not own power plants or distribute
electricity to consumers in Germany. See the press release of Vattenfall Europe (2010)
for further details.
RWE owned the subsidiary RWE Transportnetz Strom GmbH, which worked as Trans-
mission System Operator. In 2009 the subsidiary was renamed as Amprion GmbH. In
2011 the Commerz Real, which is a subsidiary of the Commerzbank, bought 74,9% of
Amprion GmbH and set up an infrastructure fund for institutional investors. Known in-
stitutional investors of this fund are MEAG (Munich ERGO Assetmanagement GmbH),
which is controlled by the German Reinsurance company Munich Re and its subsidiary
ERGO Versicherungsgruppe Aktiengesellschaft, the insurance company Swiss Life, the
insurance company Talanx, as well as the pension funds for medical doctors of Westphalia-
Lippe and Brandenburg (Ärzteversorgung Westfalen-Lippe and Ärzteversorgung Land
Brandenburg). RWE still holds a participation of 25,1% in Amprion. The answer to what
extent RWE uses this participation to influence decisions of Amprion to its own advantage
cannot be answered easily. However, a full ownership unbundling did not take place. See
the press releases of CommerzReal (2011) and CommerzReal (2012) for further details.
EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG owned the Transmission System Operator
EnBW Transportnetze AG. In March 2012 it renamed it as TransnetBW GmbH. There
have been several organizational changes to both firms to satisfy the unbundling rules.
However, EnBW still holds 100% of Transnet BW. Therefore, for EnBW and TransnetBW
the highest economic interdependence exists. See the press release of EnBW (2012) for
further details.
The German Transmission System Operators are regulated by the Bundesnetzagentur
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(BNetzA). BNetzA regulates transmission fees as well as investments in the network of
the Transmission System Operators for a regulation period of five years. Price regulation
is done by a revenue cap. The investment regulation is done by setting efficiency targets.
The way a network operator fulfills an efficiency target is not prescribed. If a network
operator beats an efficiency target, it can retain additional profits in the corresponding
five-year regulation period. If a network operator fails to fulfill an efficiency target, it
suffers a loss. For a detailed overview about regulation of the German Transmission
System Operators and a first evaluation see Bundesnetzagentur (2015).
Summarizing the analysis, it can be stated that transmission is organized via regional
(regulated) monopolists, which in general work independently from plant operators as
well as electricity distributors. However, the level of effective independence of Amprion
and TransnetBW might be doubted.
Distribution of Electricity
The Bundesnetzagentur is the German regulatory authority for the network-related mar-
kets for electricity, gas, telecommunication, postal services and railway services. The
Bundeskartellamt, which is the general German competition protection office, publishes
together with the Bundesnetzagentur an annual report about the German electricity and
gas markets, which is called Monitoringbericht. The aim of this report is to analyze the
competitiveness of the corresponding markets and if necessary to propose legislative mea-
sures.
Their Monitoringbericht counted more than 50 active providers for more than 75% of
the service areas (Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt, 2013, p.124). The services
areas with a large amount of service providers have significantly increased over the last
years, since in 2007 more than 50 active providers were counted only in about 25% of the
service areas. This vast number of providers can be seen as a high degree of competition.
However, the Bundesnetzagentur and the Bundeskartellamt (2013) point out that some
providers can only be seen as formally active, since they supply only very few households
in some service areas.
As a competition restraining factor the lacking willingness of consumers to change
their providers is often mentioned. Therefore, data for end-consumers that changed their
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suppliers has been collected by the Bundesnetzagentur and the Bundeskartellamt (2013,
p.125). In table 2.1 the amount of electricity that changed supplier in 2012 is shown,
whereas table 2.2 shows the number of end-consumers that changed their suppliers in
2012. The category " ≤ 10 MWh/Year " refers to households as end-consumers, the
category " > 10 MWh/Year ≤ 2 GWh/Year " mainly refers to trade, commerce and
small industry as consumers and the category " > 2 GWh/Year " refers to big industry
as consumers. Classical household consumers show the least willingness to change their
electricity suppliers, since only 7.8% of the electricity amount in this category changed
suppliers and only 5.7% of consumers in this category changed their suppliers in 2012.
Trade, commerce and small industry show a higher willingness to change their suppliers.
This is reflected in 11.6% of the total electricity amount that changed suppliers in this
category and 8.2% of consumers which changed their suppliers in this category in 2012.
Category of
End-Consumer
Electricity
Extraction from
TSO and DSO in
TWh
Supplier Change in
TWh
Supplier Changed
Electricity as
Percentage of
Extracted
Electricity
≤ 10 MWh/Year 124.5 9.7 7.8 %
> 10 MWh/Year
134.8 15.6 11.6 %
≤ 2 GWh/Year
> 2 GWh/Year 242.4 27 11.1%
Total 501.7 52.3 10.4%
Table 2.1: Quantity of Electricity that Changed Suppliers in 2012
Large industrial companies show the highest willingness to change their suppliers,
since 14.7% of consumers changed their suppliers. Even though for this category the
largest number of consumers changed supplier the amount of electricity that changed sup-
plier was with 11.1% a bit smaller than for trade commerce and small industry in 2012. A
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Category of
End-Consumer
Number of
Consumers of TSO
and DSO
Number of Supplier
Changes
Supplier Changes
as Percentage of
End-Consumers
≤ 10 MWh/Year 46 221 649 2 617 745 5.7%
> 10 MWh/Year
2 474 295 204 092 8.2%
≤ 2 GWh/Year
> 2 GWh/Year 18 707 2 743 14.7%
Total 48 714 651 2 824 589 5.8%
Table 2.2: Number of Consumers that Changed Suppliers in 2012
reason for this result might be that the largest consumers in this category (e.g. Deutsche
Bahn) either cannot easily change their suppliers from a technical perspective or already
get favorable contracts without changing the suppliers.
The heterogeneity of households and industrial consumers is additionally reflected
in contracts they choose. Therefore, the Bundesnetzagentur and the Bundeskartellamt
(2013) provide data for the type of contract for households and industrial consumers.
Figure 2.3 shows purchased electricity for households and industrial consumers de-
pending on whether they have a basic contract with the regional provider (Basic contract),
a special contract with the base provider (Special Contract with Base Provider) or a spe-
cial contract with another provider (Other Provider). The highest amount of electricity is
purchased by industrial consumers from other providers (184.9 TWh). The second high-
est amount of electricity is purchased by industrial consumers from their base providers
in a special contract (124.1). Only 6.6 TWh of electricity are purchased by industrial
consumers from their base providers in a basic contract.
The data base for households looks a bit different. Most electricity is purchased from
base providers in special contracts (55.7 TWh). More households purchase electricity
from their base providers in a basic contract than from other providers. 47.3 TWh were
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Figure 2.3: Type of Electricity Contracts of Households and Industrial Consumers
purchased from base providers at basic conditions and only 25.9TWh were purchased
from other providers in 2012. This clearly illustrates that the willingness to change the
contract or even providers for households is lower than for industrial consumers. Probably
this comes from the effect that households estimate the changing costs due to bureaucratic
procedures, the fear of being potentially unplugged etc. as rather large, whereas the sav-
ings from a more favorable contract are estimated to be rather small. In general firms
focus more on costs issues. For a lot of firms energy costs are an important item on their
balance sheet and consequently cutting energy costs is (compared to other cost-cutting
measures) a rather easy way to increase competitiveness.
From this data one can conclude that the willingness (and the ability) to change sup-
pliers exist for large groups of consumers. However, consumers differ in their required
amount and their short-run as well as long-run elasticity. Another important consumer
characteristic especially for large electricity consumers is the time when electricity is
needed. See section 2.3 for details about the time patterns of demand and the resulting
load profile for Germany.
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Due to consumers’ possibility to change suppliers and the large number of suppliers on
the end-consumer market one can conclude that no serious deficits in competition exist
on this last stage of the market. From a theoretical point of view, competing price-setting
firms that supply heterogeneous consumers seem to be the adequate model for the end-
consumer market. However, as shown above many consumers do not use the possibility
to change their supplier.
Stage Supply Demand Market Structure
1) Generation Plant Operators Electricity Trader Oligopoly with
Strategic
Interaction
2) Transmission Transmission
System
Operators
Electricity
Provider
Regulated
Regional
Monopoly
3) Distribution Electricity
Provider
End-Consumers Polypoly with
Heterogenous
Consumers
Table 2.3: Form of Competition on the Three Stages of the Electricity Market
For each stage of the German electricity market table 2.3 summarizes the main actors
and its competitive structure.
From a strategic perspective the first stage of the German electricity market is most
relevant, since only four considerable plant operators compete and strategic interaction
occurs. Thus, the focus of the following analysis is on the electricity wholesale market.
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2.1.2 Electricity Trading
In principle two different distribution channels for power-generating firms in Germany
exist: Firstly, trading electricity on the European Energy Exchange (EEX). Secondly,
trading electricity contracts bilaterally. Bilateral contracts that are traded without involve-
ment of an exchange are called over-the-counter contracts (OTC). These OTC contracts
have the advantage of being precisely tailored to people’s own requirements. However,
they have the disadvantage of counterpart risk and a lack of liquidity.
The following pages about electricity trading takes a look at the most important market
participants, the most important contracts on the electricity market and prices of these
contracts.
Registered Market Participants at the European Energy Exchange
In 2008 POWERNEXT, which had been the energy exchange foremost for the French
market, started a cooperation with with the European Energy Exchange (EEX), which
had been the energy exchange for the German and Austrian market. Both exchanges
founded the European Power Exchange (EPEX SPOT) to organize the spot markets for
Germany/Austria, for Switzerland and for French. Future contracts for all three market
areas can be traded on the European Energy Exchange (EEX).
EPEX SPOT and EEX put market participants into the following 5 categories:
1. Electricity Producers and Electricity Traders (P&T)
2. Municipal and Regional Supplier (MS&RS)
3. Financial Service Providers and Financial Institutions (FSP&FI)
4. Commercial Costumers (CC)
5. Transmission System Operators (TSO)
Figure 2.4 illustrates the registered participants at the EPEX SPOT as well as at the EEX.
Registered participants at the EPEX SPOT can be seen as actors with spot market access,
whereas registered participants at the EEX can be seen as actors with futures market
access. Of course, simultaneous registration at both exchanges is possible and usual.
The presented data about registered market participants is taken from the report of the
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Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt (2014, p.117).
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Figure 2.4: Participants Registered at the Spot and Forward Market by Category (2013)
The largest number of registered market participants can be found in the category of
Electricity Producers and Electricity Traders (P&T). 89 participants have access to the
futures market and 125 participants have access to the spot market. The category with the
second largest number of registered participants refers to Municipal and Regional Suppli-
ers (MS&RS), where 33 suppliers have futures market access and 40 suppliers have spot
market access. Another important category of market participants are Financial Service
Providers and Financial Institutions (FSP&FI). About the same number of financial insti-
tutions as regional and municipal suppliers are trading on the futures market (33), whereas
on the spot market considerably less financial institutions are trading (11). This crucial
role on the futures, but not on the spot market, can be explained by the fact, that futures
contracts can be settled financially on the EEX, whereas spot market obligations are nor-
mally fulfilled physically. Only a few Commercial Costumers (CC) choose to register at
the energy exchanges (EEX 6, EPEX SPOT 8). It seems that even for large costumers
direct exchange trading is too impracticable and expensive in comparison to purchasing
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electricity from Distribution Operators. Of course, the German/Austrian Transmission
Operators are registered. One interesting detail is given by the fact that some of the
Transmission System Operators are not registered at the futures market. Therefore, only
2 TSO are registered at the EEX, whereas 6 TSO (50Hertz, Amprion, Tennet, TransnetBw,
Austrian Grid and Vorarlberger Übertragungsnetze GmbH) are registered at the spot mar-
ket. One explanation might be that for the aim of network stability foremost short-term
measures are important. Thus, futures contracts are not necessary for this aim.
P&T MS&RS FSP&FI CC TSO
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
63
5
29
8
0.2
64
9 11
1
15
Year
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
of
S
al
es
an
d
P
u
rc
h
as
e
V
ol
u
m
e
Proportion of Exchange Trading by Trader Category
EEX (Futures Contracts)
EPEX SPOT (Spot Market)
Figure 2.5: Proportion of Exchange Trading by Trader Category
Figure 2.5 illustrates the sales and purchases volume on the spot market (EPEX SPOT)
as well as on the futures market (EEX) by category of traders. This data is taken from
the report of the Bundesnetzagentur and the Bundeskartellamt (2014, p.131). The largest
volume is traded by Electricity Producers and Electricity Traders (P&T), since on the spot
market 64% and on the forward market 63% of the market volume is traded by Electricity
Producers and Electricity Traders. Financial Service Providers and Financial Institutions
(FSP&FI) follow at considerable distance with a proportion of 29% of the traded forward
market volume. However, on the spot market Financial Service Providers and Financial
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Institutions only play a minor role, since they only have a proportion of 11% of the spot
market volume. Probably they foremost trade on the spot market to equalize their forward
market positions, since Financial Service Providers and Financial Institutions take no di-
rect interest in physical electricity that is traded on the spot market. Thus, for the futures
market the 34 registered Financial Service Providers and Financial Institutions play an
important role, whereas their role on the spot market seem to be of less importance. The
opposite trading strategy applies for the registered Transmission System Operators (TSO),
since they account for the second largest spot market volume of 15%, whereas they ac-
count for less than 1% of the forward market volume. This strengthens the argumentation
that for network stability, which can be seen as the principal objective of Transmission
System Operators, long-term forward contracts are of minor importance. Even though
Municipal and Regional Supplier (MS&RS) account for the second largest category of
traders, the volume traded by suppliers is rather low. On the spot market Municipal and
Regional Supplier account only for 9% of the market volume and the proportional for-
ward volume with 5% is even lower. The difference between both proportional market
volumes might be explained by a principally physical need of electricity. This need can
be satisfied on the spot market. Commercial Costumers (CC) are in numbers as well as in
proportionally traded market volumes of lower significance on the electricity wholesale
market, since they only account for a proportion of 1% spot market volume and a pro-
portion of 3% forward market volume. The slightly higher participation on the forward
market might be explained by the hedging focus of Commercial Costumers. Hedging,
which is an financial motivation, can be ensured by forward market participation more
efficiently than by spot market participation.
The analysis of the registered market participants together with the analysis of the mar-
ket structure in section 2.1.1 leads to following conclusion: The most significant role
on the German electricity exchange is played by Electricity Producers and Electricity
Traders. The big four energy suppliers in Germany (RWE, EON, Vattenfall and ENBW)
have a dominant role in electricity generation. Unfortunately, for Electricity Traders no
data that shows proportional market shares is publicly available (up to my best knowl-
edge). However, it can be assumed that from the registered Electricity Producers and
Electricity Traders (89 at EEX and 125 at EPEX SPOT) a significant amount are pure
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trading firms, since compared to the electricity generation the barriers to electricity trad-
ing seem to be rather low. Therefore, in the group of Electricity Traders significant dom-
inance of certain traders seems to be unlikely. Hence, it is reasonable that the behavior of
Electricity Producers influences (at least when behaving the same way) the market out-
come of the wholesale market, since they play a dominant role in the group of Electricity
Producers and Electricity Traders, which in turn seems to be the most powerful group on
the wholesale market.
Important Contracts Traded on the European Energy Exchange
On the energy exchange the following four important markets, on which different products
for the German market zone exist, are traded:
1. Day-Ahead Spot Market
2. Intraday Spot Market
3. Futures on Phelix (Physical Electricity Index) Market
4. Derivatives Market (European Put and Call Options on Phelix Base)
Detailed conditions of the spot market products traded can be found in EPEX-SPOT
(2014) and detailed conditions of the future contracts traded at the EEX can be found
in the contract specifications of the European-Energy-Exchange (2015). The most impor-
tant conditions for trading on the exchanges are summarized at this point.
Important for the spot markets is the fact that physical delivery takes place. There-
fore, article 5.1 in EPEX-SPOT (2014, p.21) states: "The Contracts admitted to trading
on EPEX SPOT are commercial contracts on commodities for the physical Delivery (In-
jection or Withdrawal) of electrical power within the Austrian, French, German or Swiss
transmission systems". For this physical delivery a detailed time and date is defined and
no right to withdraw from the contract exists, since article 5.2 in EPEX-SPOT (2014,
p.21) states: "The execution of an Order in the market entails the firm and irrevocable
commitment at a set date and time: [This means] for the buyer to take Delivery of (With-
draw) and to settle the Underlying at the set Price [and] for the seller to deliver (Inject)
and to receive settlement of the Underlying at the set Price".
The conditions for intraday and day-ahead trading are quite similar. However, some
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Contract Type Delivery Hour Days
Base 0 to 24 Monday to Sunday
Peak 8 to 20 Monday to Friday
Peak Weekend 8 to 20 Saturday to Sunday
Oﬀ Peak 0 to 8 and 20 to 24 Monday to Friday
0 to 24 Saturday to Sunday
Table 2.4: Delivery Hour and Delivery Days of Future Contracts on the EEX
important differences exist. Table 2.5 shows these similarities and differences of the in-
traday and the day-ahead spot markets. A first difference is given by the detail that on the
intraday spot market electricity is traded for intervals of 15 min, whereas on the day-ahead
spot market electricity is traded in blocks of 1 hour. The smallest trading volume for both
spot markets is given by 0.1 MW, which means that a seller commits to feed in at least 0.1
MW for the corresponding time interval. Therefore, on the intraday spot market a volume
per bid of at least 0.025 MWh is sold, whereas on the day-ahead spot market a volume per
bid of at least 0.1 MWh is sold. The range of prices that can be set is larger for the intraday
market and extends from -9999 e /MWh to + 9999 e /MWh, whereas on the day-ahead
spot market negative prices are not allowed to fall below -500 e /MWh and positive price
peaks cannot exceed 3000 e /MWh. The place of delivery is defined as either one of
the five TSOs zones of the German/Austrian Market Zone, which means more precisely
feed-in in one of the transmission zones of Amprion, Tennet TSO, 50Hertz Transmission,
TransnetBW or Austrian Power Grid. The most important difference is given by the dead-
line for trading. For the intraday spot market trading can take place until 45min before
delivery. For the day-ahead spot market all bids have to be submitted until 12 p.m. (noon)
the day before delivery.
For the futures market it depends on the market area whether physical and/or finan-
cial settlement is possible, since article 2.1.2.1 and article 2.1.2.2 of European-Energy-
Exchange (2015, p.5) state: "Futures with physical fulfillment within the respective con-
trol area can be traded for the following market areas: Belgium, France, and The Nether-
lands. Futures with financial fulfillment can be traded for the following market areas:
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Intraday Spot Market Day-Ahead Spot Market
Underlying Electricity traded the
same or following day in
15 min Periods
Electricity traded for
delivery the following day
in 24 hour intervals
Size Min. volume of 0.1MW Min. volume of 0.1MW
Price Range -9999 to 9999 e /MWh -500 to 3000 e /MWh
Place of Delivery One TSO Zone in the
German/Austrian Market
Zone
One TSO Zone in the
German/Austrian Market
Zone
Latest Trading 45 min before delivery 12 pm at the day before
delivery
Table 2.5: Properties of the Intraday and Day-Ahead Spot Market
Germany/Austria, France, and Italy." Thus, for the German market zone futures cannot
be settled physically and therefore all futures contracts have to be settled financially.
The underlying of a financially settled power futures contract is the Physical Electricity
Index (Phelix). The pay-off for this futures contract is given by the difference of the price
fixed in the futures contract and the Phelix in the corresponding period. Strictly speaking,
there exist two indices, which are called Phelix Base and Phelix Peak. Phelix Base and
Phelix Peak are calculated on a daily as well as on a monthly basis. Phelix Base and Phelix
Peak are simply calculated by on average prices. For the Phelix base all hours of a day
are taken into account, since article 2.2 of European-Energy-Exchange (2012, p.4) states:
"Phelix Day Base is the average price of the hours 1 to 24 for electricity traded on the spot
market. The PHELIX is calculated for all calendar days of the year as the simple average
of the auction prices for the hours 1 to 24 in the market area Germany/Austria disregarding
power transmission bottlenecks". For the Phelix peak solely the time between 8 a.m. and
8 p.m. is taken into account, since article 2.3 of European-Energy-Exchange (2012, p.4)
says: "Phelix Day Peak is the average price of the hours 9 to 20 for electricity traded on
the spot market. It is calculated for all calendar days of the year as the simple average of
the auction prices for the hours 1 to 20 in the market area Germany/Austria disregarding
power transmission bottlenecks". A peak-weekend futures-contract as well as an off-peak
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futures-contract can be traded additionally since 2012. Table 2.4 gives an overview for
the delivery hour and day for futures contracts of types Base, Peak, Peak Weekend and
Off Peak.
A (physical) futures contract is defined by article 1.1.1 of the European-Energy-Exchange
(2015, p.6) as "delivery or acceptance of delivery of electricity with a constant output of
1 MW into the maximum voltage level of the respective market area during the delivery
time on every delivery day during the delivery period". Thus, the 1 MW year base load
futures contract binds the owner to purchase for every hour in the next year 1 MW of elec-
tricity, which implies purchasing 8760 MWh of total electricity in the corresponding year
(365 days times 24 h times 1 MW). This is in contrast to other commodity exchanges,
where e.g. a 1 ton year wheat futures contract binds the owner to purchase 1 ton wheat in
August, when the year futures had been bought in August the year before.
Delivery Period of Futures Tradable Maturities
Day Futures The respective next 34 days
Weekend Futures The respective next 5 weekends
Week Futures The current and the next 4 weeks
Month Futures The current and the next 9 months
Quarter Futures The respective 7 full quarters
Year Futures The respective next 6 full years
Table 2.6: Delivery Periods and Tradable Maturities for EEX Futures
Table 2.6 shows the different tradable futures contracts with their corresponding matu-
rities. At a certain day, day-futures can be traded for each of the next 34 days, weekend-
futures can be traded for the next 5 weekends, week-futures for the next 4 weeks, month-
futures for the next 9 months, quarter-futures for the respective 7 full quarters and year-
futures for the respective next 6 full years. Thus, with a combination of futures a trader
can purchase or sell electricity individually for each and every day in the next month, but
not in the current year. However, it is possible to purchase or sell electricity futures over
a longer period by monthly, quarterly or yearly contracts.
2.1. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IN GERMANY 27
Article 4.1 in the European-Energy-Exchange (2015, p.14) defines the rights associated
with the acquisition of a Put and Call Option at the EEX. All options at the EEX are Euro-
pean Put or Call Options with financial fulfillment, since they can only be excised on the
last trading day and give a right to purchase or sell the corresponding financially fulfilled
futures contract, since article 4.1 of European-Energy-Exchange (2015, p.14) states: "The
buyer of a call option (call) is entitled to receive a long position in the corresponding fu-
ture at the exercise price of the option on the last trading day". There has been a increase
in volume for Phelix options. However, the futures and the day-ahead spot market show
significantly higher trade volumes for the years 2009 to 2013.
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Figure 2.6: Futures, Day-Ahead and Intraday Volumes from 2009 to 2013
Figure 2.6 illustrates market shares for futures, day-ahead and intraday trading for the
years 2009 to 2013. The data is taken from the report of the Bundesnetzagentur and the
Bundeskartellamt (2014, p.119 and p.125). All three markets have been growing since
2009. However, the market volumes for the different markets significantly differ. The
largest volumes are traded for all years on the EEX futures market. In 2009 257 TWh and
in 2013 629 TWh electricity were traded forward. The second largest market volume is
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traded at the day-ahead spot market. In 2009 136 TWh and in 2013 246TWh were traded
forward. The intraday spot market is of minor relevance for the electricity wholesale
market. In 2009 only 6 TWh and in 2013 20 TWh were traded forward. Market volumes
increased for all three markets from 2009 to 2013.
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Figure 2.7: Market Shares of the 5 Largest Buyers and Sellers on the Day-Ahead-Market
For the years 2009 to 2013 figure 2.7 shows the proportions sold and purchased on the
day-ahead spot market by the 5 largest traders. For all the years about 50% or more of the
electricity has been sold on the day-ahead market by the 5 largest traders. Due to the large
capacities of RWE, E.ON, Vattenfall, and ENBW for electricity generation, this volume
mainly comes from the German big four supply firms. For all the years about 30% or
more of the electricity has been purchased by the 5 largest traders. This corresponds to
the guess above that a larger number of traders purchases electricity from these suppliers.
Figure 2.8 presents the proportions sold and purchased for the years 2009 and 2013 for
the 5 largest traders on the futures market. Similar to the spot market a high proportion of
sold and purchased market volume is traded by those 5 largest traders. However, in con-
trast to the spot market market concentration seems to be similar for sold and purchased
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Figure 2.8: Market Share of the 5 Revenue largest Buyers and Sellers for Phelix Futures
volume, since for both between 40% and 60% of the market volume is traded by the 5
largest traders. One explanation might be that positions taken in futures are either settled
by cash or by other contracts. If a trader settles his long position in a futures contract, he
has to take a short position in another contract. This effect could explain the effect that
the group of the 5 largest traders purchase and sell approximately equal volumes.
Figure 2.9 shows the histogram of the EPEX SPOT Day-Ahead Spot Market Price in
2013. The mean of the day-ahead spot price was 37.78 e /MWh and the standard devia-
tion of the day-ahead spot price was 16.46e /MWh in 2013. A normal distribution, which
parameters are chosen to match these first two empirical moments (µ = 37.78 e /MWh,
σ = 16.46 e /MWh) approximately describes the distribution of the EEX day-ahead spot
market price. However, the real distribution of the EEX day-ahead spot market price is
more leptokurtic, since prices between 25 e /MWh and 40 e /MWh are more often real-
ized than a normal distribution would suggest, whereas prices between 15 e /MWh and
25 e /MWh and prices between 40 e /MWh and 55 e /MWh are realized less often. Neg-
ative day-ahead spot market prices are an existing but rare phenomenon, since it occurred
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Figure 2.9: Histogram of the EPEXSPOT Day-Ahead Spot Market Price in 2013
only in 0.74 % of the trading blocks or in 65 h in 2013.
Another interesting detail about the EPEX SPOT spot market is mentioned by report of
the Bundesnetzagentur and the Bundeskartellamt (2014, p.120). On the demand as well
as on the supply side price-inelastic orders dominate bidding behavior, since 72% of the
EPEX SPOT spot market volume in 2013 was ordered by price-inelastic bids. Interest-
ingly this exactly holds true for demand and supply side. Therefore, only 28% of the
market volume has been traded by price-elastic bids. This leads to the interesting effect
that only a very small amount of bids actually sets the price, since in the end the high-
est supply meeting demand, sets the market-clearing price for all bids. From a strategic
perspective this detail is very interesting for collusive behavior. If a firm undercuts this
market-clearing price, it does not serve the total demand, since price-inelastic bids from
this firm as well as from all competitors are firstly served. Therefore, the additional profit
by undercutting a given market clearing price is rather small. This weakens the incen-
tive for aggressive pricing strategies in the electricity wholesale market and makes profits
from tacit collusion easier to sustain.
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Figure 2.10: Histogram of the EPEXSPOT Intraday Spot Market Price 2013
Figure 2.10 illustrates the distribution of the EPEX SPOT intraday spot market price
in 2013. Therefore, a histogram with a class size of 5 e /MWh and a normal distribution
with the average intraday spot market price in 2013 (µ = 38.58e /MWh) and the standard
deviation of the intraday spot market price in 2013 (σ = 17.48 e /MWh) as parameters is
drawn. In general, this histogram is similar to that of the day-ahead spot market price and
the normal distribution seems to approximately fit the data. Nevertheless real distribution
seems to be more leptokurtic, since prices between 25e /MWh and 40e /MWh seem to
be overrepresented, whereas spot market prices between 40 e /MWh and 60e /MWh are
less often realized than a normal distribution would suggest.
Figure 2.11 shows the market volume of futures contracts with different maturities
in 2013. The data is provided by the the Bundesnetzagentur and the Bundeskartellamt
(2014, p.126), which additionally show that the market volumes for different maturities
were quite similar in the years 2010, 2011 and 2012. The 1-year-futures contract has been
traded most, since 362 TWh of electricity were traded with maturity in 2014, whereas the
market volume of contracts with maturity in 2015 has only been about one third (119
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Figure 2.11: Trade Volume of Future Contracts in 2013 by Time to Maturity
TWh). Futures contracts that became due in 2013 account for the third-largest market
volume of 114 TWh. Futures contracts that mature in 2016 and 2017 are from less rele-
vance for the futures market, since they only account for a market volume of 57 TWh and
17 TWh of electricity.
Figure 2.12 illustrates the price of the Phelix with maturity in 2014. As mentioned
before with a 1-year-futures contract electricity is sold or purchased "for the delivery time
on every delivery day during the delivery period" (European-Energy-Exchange, 2015,
p.6). Therefore, with a Phelix 2014 Base futures electricity for every hour of the 8760
hours in 2014 was traded. With a Phelix 2014 Peak futures electricity for every peak hour
(trading blocks 9 to 20, which means from 08.00 to 20.00 hours) in 2014 was sold or
purchased. Thus, electricity for 4380 hours (12 hours a day times 365 days) was sold or
purchased. With a Phelix 2014 Off Peak futures contract electricity for every off-peak
hour during the week (20.00 to 24 hours and 0.00 to 08.00 hours) and during the weekend
(00.00 to 24.00 hours) was sold or purchased. Thus, electricity for 5628 hours (12 hours
a week day times 261 week days and 48 hours a weekend times 52 weekends) was sold or
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Figure 2.12: Price for Phelix 2014 Base, Peak and Oﬀ Peak Futures in 2013
purchased. However, the futures price presented at EEX is not given by the sum of prices
for all hourly deliveries, but it is presented as the associated mean price in e /MWh. The
trading days marked on the x-axis are the fist trading days of each month.
Most expensive was electricity between 08.00 and 20.00 hours. This was reflected
in the Phelix 2014 Peak futures price between 57.01 e /MWh on the first trading day
(02. January) and 46.63 e /MWh on trading day 150 (05.August) in 2013. The price of
the Phelix 2014 Base futures was between 45.26 e /MWh on the first trading day and
36.25 e /MWh on trading day 150. The price of the Phelix 2014 Off Peak futures was
between 38.72 e /MWh on the first trading day and 30.49 e /MWh on trading day 149
(02.August). The prices of all three futures on the Phelix followed a very similar pattern,
had rather constant prices and show only little volatility. For an excellent analysis of
electricity forward prices traded on the German electricity see Mueller-Merbach (2009).
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Over-the-Counter Electricity Trading
Contracts that are traded directly and bilaterally between two contracting parties without
involvement of an exchange are called over-the-counter (OTC) trades. Over the-counter-
traded contracts have a significant relevance for the wholesale electricity market. To get an
rough overview about these transactions the Bundesnetzagentur and the Bundeskartellamt
(2014) implemented a survey of OTC clearing. Therefore several market participants and
broker platforms as well as the European Commodity Clearing AG (ECC), which works
as clearing house for all exchange traded contracts as well as for voluntarily registered
over the counter contracts, were interviewed.
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Figure 2.13: Over the Counter Traded Volume by Maturity (2013)
For different maturities figure 2.13 shows contract volumes of OTC trades in 2013.
The original data of this survey is presented on page 134 of the Bundesnetzagentur and
the Bundeskartellamt (2014). In general the OTC market volumes for different maturities
are quite similar to that presented above for EEX. The highest market volume results
for contracts that expire in 2014 (around 200 TWh for sales and purchases). Forward
contracts with maturity in 2013 and 2015 have a rather low market volume and longer
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lasting contracts that mature in 2016 or latter are traded less often (about 420 TWh). For
the intraday as wells as for the day-ahead spot market OTC traded contracts have a low
relevance. This is reasonable, since the time for all necessary trade processes (contract,
payment and especially delivery) cannot be handled that easily under time pressure that
necessarily exists for contracts that expire the same or the next day. Hence, it can be
concluded that the general structure of OTC trading does not systematically differ from
the trading structure on the exchange.
From the analysis of the different products traded on energy exchanges as well as over-
the-counter two contracts show a particularly relevance for the wholesale market: The
day-ahead contracts and the futures contracts with a maturity of exactly one year, since
both account by far for the largest market volume. For both contracts for short as well as
long positions, a high market concentration exists.
Prices for 1-year-futures contracts have a rather small volatility, since their price is
given by the average price for electricity sold for the entire year. This contract specifi-
cation additionally leads to the effect that a 1-year-futures contract reduces the market
volume for the spot market for the total year. As theoretical considerations will show, this
leads to strategic important implications for firms incentives to relax prices and compet-
itive pressure. In contrast the day-ahead spot price shows a much higher volatility, since
its price directly corresponds to hourly trading blocks.
2.1.3 Important Energy Sources in Germany
In general electricity can be generated from a lot of different energy sources. Each coun-
try in the world uses a different composition of energy sources to generate electricity. The
following pages are dedicated to the composition of energy sources used for electricity
generation in Germany from 1990 until 2013. Then, cost estimates for electricity gener-
ation from different energy sources, which are provided by literature about the German
electricity market, are combined with my own calculation of the probability distribution
function for day-ahead spot prices in 2013. This leads to an estimation for the amount of
hours in 2013, in which each energy source could profitable supply electricity on the Ger-
man day-ahead spot market. There has been a discussion about effects of German feed-in
tariffs for renewable energies on electricity imports and exports of Germany. Therefore,
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the development of German electricity exports and imports from 1990 until 2013 is pre-
sented.
Energy Sources used for Electricity Generation in Germany
The time series of gross electricity production of the reunified Germany is illustrated in
figure 2.14. This data has been published by Energiebilanzen (2014) for the years 1990
to 2014. The contribution of each energy source to gross electricity production can be
summarized as follows:
1) Soft Coal: Soft coal had a decreasing contribution to the gross electricity production
from 170.9 TWh in 1990 to 136 TWh in 1999. At the beginning of the century coal
again became a more important energy source and in 2004 158 TWh of electricity were
generated by soft coal power plants. After a period of a decreasing contribution soft coal
filled the supply gap that came from the sudden shut-down of 6 nuclear power plants in
2011. Additionally soft coal profited from the price erosion of CO2 certificates. This led
to a comeback of soft coal resulting in a gross electricity production of 160.9 TWh in
2013. Thus, after the decision to close down nuclear power generation soft coal became
the largest contributor to the German energy mix. This development has led to an ongoing
political controversy, since it increases CO2 emissions and Germany is likely to miss its
Kyoto CO2 reduction target.
2) Nuclear Energy: Nuclear energy had a fluctuating but rather stable contribution to
the German electricity production. The sharp decrease from 160.4 TWh in 2006 to 140.5
TWh in 2007 can be mainly explained by technical problems of two plants (Brunsbüttel
and Krümmel) as well as a plant being offline due to regulatory issues (Biblis A). The next
considerable decrease from 140.6 TWh in 2010 to 108.0 TWh in 2011 can be explained by
the political decision to close 6 of the 17 German nuclear plants after the nuclear disaster
of Fukushima. Electricity generation from nuclear power will decline further and the last
German nuclear plants will be shut down in 2022.
3) Hard Coal: Hard coal had a steady contribution to the German electricity production
until 2007. In 2008 a sharp increase of the hard coal price led to a decreasing contribution
of hard coal to the German energy mix. Therefore, the gross electricity production of hard
coal decreased from 142.0 TWh in 2007 to 107.9 TWh in 2009. At this level the gross
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Figure 2.14: Gross Electricity Production of Germany per Source of Energy (1990-2014)
production of electricity generated by hard coal was stabilized and in 2014 109.9 TWh
were contributed.
4) Natural Gas: Natural gas plants are seen as the perfect complement to fluctuating
renewable energies due to their fast adaptability to the load profile. Therefore natural gas
had a increasing contribution to the gross electricity production until 2008. In 2008 the
price ofCO2 certificates dropped as a consequence of the world financial crisis. This price
drop and an additional price drop in 2011 significantly decreased the price of coal power
generation. Therefore, the large existing capacities of coal-based electricity generation
are crowding out gas-based electricity generation at the moment.
5) Petroleum Products: Petroleum-based products have a small, but constant, contri-
bution to the German electricity production of about 10 TWh. Petroleum products are
mainly used in combined heat and power plants to generate electricity. However, elec-
tricity production from petroleum products does not play a significant role in the German
energy mix and decreased from 14.8 TWh in 1991 to 5.0 TWh in 2014.
6) Renewable Energy Sources: Renewable energies have a rising contribution to the
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German electricity production. In 1990 renewable energies had a very small contribu-
tion of only 19.7 TWh, coming completely from hydropower. In the following years the
contribution of renewable energies grew constantly. In 2014 157.4 TWh of renewable
energies were fed-in and renewable energies became the second largest contributor to
the German energy mix. The increased contribution of renewable energy sources leads
to an increased volatility of electricity supply, since electricity cannot easily be stored
and especially feed-in of wind and solar power depends on stochastic weather conditions.
Therefore in section 2.2 timely patterns and stochastic effects of renewable energies feed-
in will be analyzed in a more detailed way.
Renewable Energy Sources used for Electricity Generation in Germany
In figure 2.15 renewable energies gross electricity production is decomposed into the
several sources of energy for the years 1990 to 2013. This data was also published by
Energiebilanzen (2014).
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Figure 2.15: Gross Electricity Production of Renewable Energies in Germany (1990-2013)
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1)Wind: For a long time wind had no significant contribution to the German electricity
production. The "Stromeinspeisungsgesetz" that placed an obligation on the network op-
erators to feed in all electricity from renewable energies entered into force in 1991. This
law led only to a small increase from 0.1 TWh renewably-generated electricity in 1991 to
5.5 TWh in 1999, since a rather low compensation for supplying renewable energies had
been fixed. In 2000 the "Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG)" passed the German Bun-
destag which fixed higher prices and differentiated between the renewable energy sources.
In the following years an almost exponential increase occured and in 2014 52.4 TWh of
electricity were generated by wind power. Onshore wind generation clearly dominates
the total wind generation, since offshore wind generation only contributed 0.9 TWh in
2014 and 1.2 TWh in 2014 to the annual wind-generated electricity. Wind has become
the largest contributor to electricity generation of all renewable energies.
2) Hydropower: Hydropower benefited most from the "Stromeinspeisungsgesetz".
However, this did not lead to a significant increase in electricity generation from hy-
dropower, since most attractive locations for hydropower generation had already been
used. Therefore, the "Stromeinspeisungsgesetz" led foremost to windfall profits for hy-
dropower instead of an expansion of hydropower. This led to a rather constant electricity
generation of hydropower of about 20 TWh per year with cyclical fluctuations.
3) Biomass: Until the "Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz" biomass had a rather small con-
tribution to the German electricity generation, since e.g. in 1999 it only contributed 1.6
TWh to the German electricity production. In the following years an almost exponential
increase occured and in 2014 42.8 TWh electricity were generated by biomass. Biomass
is the second-largest contributor to electricity generation of all renewable energies.
4) Solar Energy: Until the "Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG)" solar energy had no
contribution to German electricity generation at all, since with the fixed price from the
"Stromeinspeisungsgesetz" the costs of electricity generation by solar energy could not
be covered. The feed-in tariff of the EEG supported electricity generation massively. It
increased from 2000 to 2014 almost exponentially and in 2014 35.2 TWh electricity were
generated by solar cells. Thus, solar energy is the third-largest contributor to electricity
generation from renewable energies at the moment.
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5) Domestic Waste: A rather small contribution to the gross electricity in Germany
comes from domestic waste or more precisely from the biogenic proportion of domestic
waste. The electricity is mainly generated by garbage incineration plants with power heat
coupling. In 1991 1.2 TWh of electricity were generated by (the biogenic proportion) of
domestic waste. The electricity generated by (the biogenic proportion) of domestic waste
was increased to 6.1 TWh in 2014.
Estimation of Costs for Diﬀerent Energy Sources
Table 2.7 presents estimated electricity generation costs and marginal costs for differ-
ent energy sources. The data for estimated electricity generation costs is provided by
Kost, Mayer, and Thomsen (2013), the data for estimated marginal costs is provided by
Graichen (2014), and the rather complicated calculation for the electricity generation costs
for a nuclear plant comes from Panos (2013).
For all conventional energy sources electricity generation from nuclear power has the
lowest marginal costs (about 20 e /MWh or 0.02 e /KWh). However, even without full
internalization of all external costs the total cost of electricity production is estimated
by Panos (2013) for a newly-built nuclear power plant by 74e /MWh or 0.074 e /KWh.
However, it is reasonable that for the existing nuclear power plants in Germany total
electricity generation are considerably lower, since e.g. the capital service, which is the
largest cost block of the estimated electricity generation costs (about 67%), has already
been done.
Power plants operated by soft coal have marginal costs comparable to nuclear power
plants (about 20 e /MWh or 0.02 e /KWh). These marginal costs mainly depend on coal
prices as well as prices for CO2 certificates and therefore are at the moment on a rather
low level. Total generation costs are estimated to be between 38e /MWh and 53e /MWh.
Power plants operated by hard coal have higher marginal costs than power plants operated
by soft coal, since hard coal is a more expensive fuel and this price difference is not com-
pensated by the reduced costs of CO2 emission rights at the moment. Total generation
costs are estimated to be between 63 e /MWh and 80 e /MWh. The highest marginal and
total costs of conventional electricity generation can be made out for power plants oper-
ated with natural gas. The cost structure of a natural gas plant is mainly determined by
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Energy Source Estimated Total Generation
Costs (TGC)
Estimated Marginal Costs
(MC)
Nuclear Power 74 e /MWh 20 e /MWh
Soft coal 38 to 53 e /MWh 18 to 21 e /MWh
Hard Coal 63 to 80 e /MWh 35 to 41 e /MWh
Natural Gas 75 to 98 e /MWh 53 to 65 e /MWh
Solar (South) 98 to 121 e /MWh 0 e /MWh
Solar (North) 115 to 142 e /MWh 0 e /MWh
Wind (On-shore) 45 to 107 e /MWh 0 e /MWh
Wind (Oﬀ-shore) 119 to 194 e /MWh 0 e /MWh
Table 2.7: Cost of Electricity Production for Diﬀerent Energy Sources
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fuel costs and marginal costs are estimated to be between 53 e /MWh and 65 e /MWh.
Investment costs are comparatively low and total costs of electricity production are esti-
mated to be between 75 e /MWh and 98e /MWh.
For wind and solar energy, marginal costs are very close to zero, since solely additional
abrasion, depreciation and maintenance charges that can be directly linked to (additional)
energy generation could be taken into account. However, normally these costs can be
neglected. In Germany on-shore wind generation is the cheapest renewable energy source
and it is at least in windy locations competitive with hard coal, since its total costs of
electricity generation are estimated to be between 45 e /MWh and 107e /MWh. Solar
energy in southern Germany is estimated to have total electricity generation costs of be-
tween 98e /MWh and 121e /MWh, whereas for northern Germany costs of solar electric-
ity generation are estimated to be between 115 e /MWh and 142e /MWh. At the moment
the most expensive way to generate electricity is given by using off-shore wind, since total
generation costs of off-shore wind power plants are estimated to be between 119 e /MWh
and 194 e /MWh. They are roughly twice as high as on-shore total generation costs.
Figure 2.16: General Order of Costs for Diﬀerent Energy Soruces
Figure 2.16 summarizes the analysis of generation costs for different energy sources
graphically. Therefore it presents the ascending order of total generation costs (TGC) and
marginal generation costs (MC). The lowest TGC is associated with electricity generation
from soft coal. It is followed by electricity generation from hard coal, nuclear power, wind
energy (on-shore), natural gas, solar energy and wind energy (off-shore). The lowest MC
can be found for wind and solar energy, since they are very close to zero. It is followed
by nuclear power, soft coal, hard coal and natural gas.
Figure 2.17 shows an estimation for the merit order curve of electricity generation in
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Figure 2.17: Merit Order Curve of Electricity Generation in Germany
Germany, that has been calculated by Haller, Hermann, and Loreck (2013, p.45). The
merit order curve is very important for the electricity market. It determines the wholesale
market price. All power plants, which are able to cover their marginal costs, will generate
electricity. The marginal costs of the last power plant, that is necessary to meet current
demand, sets the price for all market participants. Figure 2.17 illustrates the convex shape
of marginal costs of electricity production in Germany. There are two main drivers for this
convexity. The most obvious driver is given by the different marginal costs of different
energy sources. Thus, electricity is generated in following order to meet demand: Firstly
by renewable energies, secondly by nuclear power plants, thirdly by soft coal, fourthly by
hard coal and fifthly by natural gas. Another driver for the convexity is, that power plants
have to some extent different marginal costs when using the same energy sources. This
can be explained by constructional differences or age differences of the German power
plants.
It should be noticed, that Haller, Hermann, and Loreck (2013) assume a price for CO2
certificates of 3 euros per ton, which is rather low. Thus, prices for electricity generated
by brown coal are rather low, since their financial compensations for their rather large
CO2 emissions are (assumed to be) low. If the price for CO2 certificates was (assumed
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to be) higher, two main effects could be identified. Firstly, generation becomes more
expensive for all energy sources that emit CO2. Secondly, the differences in marginal
costs between power plants using soft coal, hard coal and natural gas decrease, since the
higher fuel costs of hard coal or natural gas are compensated by higher savings for CO2
certificates. Thus, ceteris paribus a higher (lower) price for CO2 certificates leads to a
more flat (more steep) merit order curve. It should be noticed additionally that Haller,
Hermann, and Loreck (2013) estimate the marginal costs of nuclear power plants lower
than Graichen (2014).
Perhaps from a cost perspective the integration of the renewable energy sources into
the German grid seems to be a solvable task. However, the lack of dispatchability, which
means that especially for renewable energy sources it is scarcely possible to increase
and/or decrease their generation quickly, leads to severe problems for the German elec-
tricity grid.
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Estimation of Proﬁtable Feed-in of Diﬀerent Energy Sources in 2013
PDay−Ahead > TGC PDay−Ahead > MC
Energy
Source
In Percent Hours In Percent Hours
Nuclear
Power
1.5 % 135 h 87.7 % 7683 h
Soft coal 37.9 % 3322 h 87.7 % 7683 h
Hard Coal 6.7 % 413 h 53.6 % 4697 h
Natural Gas 1.5 % 135 h 15.3 % 1339 h
Solar
(South)
0 % 0 h 99.3 % 8695 h
Solar
(North)
0 % 0 h 99.3 % 8695 h
Wind
(On-shore)
28.7 % 2507 h 99.3 % 8695 h
Wind
(Oﬀshore)
0 % 0 h 99.3 % 8695 h
Table 2.8: Estimation of Proﬁtable Feed-in of Diﬀerent Energy Sources in 2013
Table 2.8 gives my own estimation for the (proportional) time in 2013, at which the
day-ahead spot price exceeded the cost of electricity generation based on total electric-
ity generation costs and marginal electricity generation costs. This estimation is found
by combining the distribution of the 2013 EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot prices, which is
illustrated in figure 2.10 with the cost estimates that have been presented in table 2.7.
For this purpose the second column with the headline PDay−Ahead > TGC presents my
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own estimation for the proportional time (in %) as well as for the trading hours (Hours)
in 2013, when estimated total electricity generation costs for a certain energy source were
below the EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot price. The third column of table 2.7 with the head-
line PDay−Ahead > MC gives my own estimation for the proportional time (In Percent) as
well as for the trading hours (Hours) in 2013, at which the day-ahead spot price exceeded
the estimated marginal costs of electricity generation for a certain energy source.
This is done by summing up all histogram classes of the EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot
price that strictly exceed the lower bound of estimated electricity generation costs or the
lower bound of estimated marginal electricity generation costs respectively. For instance,
a nuclear power plant may have estimated total generation costs of 74e /Mwh. Therefore,
the first class of the spot price histogram that exceeds 74e /MWh is the class between
75e /MWh and 80e /MWh. Summing up the class frequencies of all classes exceeding
75e /MWh leads to a frequency of 1.5%. This means, that nuclear plants could only
finance their estimated total electricity generation costs in 1.5% of all cases or about
131h in 2013 (1.5% of 24 hours times 365 days). However, for the existing nuclear
power plants it is reasonable that they could cover their total costs more often, since
Panos (2013) estimated total costs for a nuclear power plant that is built nowadays. For
instance for existing nuclear power plants most of the capital service, which is the largest
cost block of the estimated electricity generation costs (about 67%), has already been
done. Therefore, the total profitability for existing nuclear power plants seems to be much
higher. For the short-run market outcome marginal electricity costs are more important,
since the decision whether to generate electricity or not depends foremost on the marginal
costs of each power plant. The marginal costs of electricity generated by nuclear plants
are about 20e /MWh and are rather low. Therefore, nuclear plants generated positive
contribution margins in about 88.6 % of trading blocks or in approximately 7762 hours of
the 8760 hours in 2013.
Soft coal power plants have lower fix costs than nuclear power plants. This leads to
total cost of electricity generation of between 38e /MWh and 53e /MWh. Therefore,
total electricity generation costs were covered for soft coal plants in 37.9 % of the trad-
ing blocks or in 3322h in 2013. The marginal costs of a soft coal plant of 20e /MWh
are approximately the same ones as for nuclear power plants. Therefore, soft coal plants
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generated positive contribution margins also in about 88.6 % of trading blocks or in ap-
proximately 7762 hours of the 8760 hours in 2013, too.
Hard coal plants have, due to their technology, higher investment costs than soft coal
plants. Additionally the fuel costs of hard coal are higher than that of soft coal, but there is
lowerCO2 emission. At the moment the costs of lowerCO2 emissions do not compensate
the higher investment and fuel cost, due to the rather low price of CO2 certificates. In
2013 the EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot price exceeded total generation costs of hard coal
plants only in 6.7 % of the trading blocks or 413 hours. Positive contribution margins
were generated in 53.6 % of trading blocks or in 4697 hours by hard coal plants.
Natural gas plants are often seen as the perfect complement of renewable energies,
since they can easily be dispatched. However, they have severe problems to cover their
costs at the moment. Total generation costs have only been covered in 1.5 % of the trading
blocks or 135 hours. Marginal costs of electricity production have been covered in 15.3
% of the trading blocks or in 1339 hours respectively.
For electricity generation by wind and solar power marginal costs are very close to zero.
Therefore, even without the subsidies of the feed-in tariff electricity generation would lead
to positive contribution margins as long as the EPEX SPOT price is not negative. This
has been the case in 99.3 % of the trading blocks or in 8695 hours respectively. On-shore
wind generation is the only one, that would be able to cover its total electricity costs in
2013 for 29.7 % of the trading blocks and 2507 hours. However, as for wind and solar
electricity generation there exists a guaranteed and fixed premium per MWh they do not
have to cover total or marginal costs by day-ahead spot market prices. Therefore, all
electricity from solar and wind generation is fed into the German grid irrespective of the
spot market price.
It can be summarized that for most trading hours the day-ahead spot price is high
enough to cover the marginal costs for most sources of electricity generation. Only plants
generating electricity from hard coal or gas have problems to cover their marginal costs,
since for hard coal in 46.4% and for natural gas in 84.7% of trading blocks the day-ahead
spot price is below their estimated marginal costs. However, except for soft coal plants
the day-ahead spot market price is not sufficient to cover total production costs. This
effect can mainly be attributed to the capacities of renewable energies that entered into
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the market. This has led to excess generation capacities in the German market, since the
conventional capacities, which could satisfy German electricity demand event without
renewable energies, are still present. Due to the fixed feed-in tariff for every MWh of
renewably-generated electricity, renewable energies do not have the pressure to finance
their total costs on the spot market, but they decrease the electricity demand that has to
be met by conventional energy sources. Therefore, conventional power plants have prob-
lems to cover their total electricity generation costs. However, this effect cannot easily be
taken as an argument for high competitiveness, since the exogenous shock of additional
renewable capacities could as well lead to a spot market price even closer to marginal
costs. Therefore, the high concentration on the wholesale market still raises the ques-
tion whether strategic interaction between the big suppliers leads to price increasing and
competition softening effects.
German Electricity Exports and Imports
The problems associated with the lack of dispatchability are partly "solved" by electricity
imports and exports. German electricity net-exports and net-imports are illustrated in
figure 2.18. Data is provided by the German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Energy (BMWi, 2014b).
From 1990 to 2002 annually about 40 TWh of electricity were exported and imported
and the net export of electricity was rather small. The expansion of renewable energy
sources led to an increase in electricity net export since 2002. This development remained
even when 6 nuclear power plants were shut down in 2011. Therefore, one might argue
that the shut-down of conventional capacities is more than compensated by renewable
energies and everything is fine. However, a more detailed analysis of the German exports
with each bordering country is necessary, to get the complete picture.
For this purpose figure 2.19 illustrates the exported and imported electricity production
of Germany and its bordering countries for 2013 (Energiebilanzen, 2014). Analyzing the
decomposed export and import data the increase of net exported electricity can be mainly
explained as follows: The expansion of renewable capacities came on top of the existing
power generating capacities. In times of high wind or solar feed-in and a rather low
demand the German electricity grid cannot absorb all of this power due to rather inflexible
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Figure 2.18: Electricity Imports and Exports of Germany(1990-2013)
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nuclear and coal power plants. Therefore, electricity has to be exported for example to the
Netherlands. In the Netherlands an important source of electricity are gas plants, which
can be immediately shut down. Austria and Switzerland are other attractive countries for
electricity exports, since they have a lot of pump storage hydro power stations, which can
use the power to fill their upper reservoirs. Therefore, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and
Austria can absorb a lot of the German voltage peaks.
The electricity imports of Germany mainly come from France and Czechia, where nu-
clear plants and coal plants (Czechia) deliver reliable electricity at low marginal costs.
When electricity generation is not sufficient to meet demand in Germany, their nuclear
and coal plants firstly step in due to the low marginal costs (merit-order-effect). In con-
clusion it can be stated that Germany exports parts of the non-dispatchable electricity
mainly from subsidized renewable energy sources but imports rather cheap load coming
from conventional power plants, which in total leads to a net-export of electricity. In sec-
tion 2.2 the direct effect of renewable energy feed-in on German electricity exports and
imports is analyzed more deeply.
In a nutshell the actual German energy mix can be characterized as follows: It is mainly
based on soft coal, renewable energy sources and nuclear power. The energy mix of re-
newable energies is mainly based on wind power, solar power and biomass. This leads
to a volatile supply of electricity, since except for biomass all of the mainly used energy
sources cannot be easily dispatched, and additionally the feed-in of solar power and wind
power depends on (stochastic) weather conditions. Problems for the energy grid associ-
ated with this actual energy mix are partly "solved" by electricity exports and imports.
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2.2 Electricity Supply from Renewable Energies
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Figure 2.20: Installed Capacity for Solar Energy in Germany
There has been an enormous political will to increase electricity generation by renew-
able energies. Therefore in the year 2002 the German Bundestag passed the "Erneuerbare
Energien Gesetz" (EEG) to increase the feed-in of electricity generated by solar and wind
energy. The main policy instrument is given by a constant price for electricity from re-
newable energies that are fed into the German grid. Whenever the wholesale market price
is below this a priori fixed price, the so-called EEG apportionment compensates for the
price difference. To cover costs associated with EEG apportionment a charge on the end-
consumer price for electricity is set conjointly by all four Transmission System Operators
for each year.
This highly significant effect of the EEG can be be seen by looking at the installed
capacity for electricity generation by renewable energy sources. Figure 2.20 illustrates
the exponential growth of capacity for electricity generated by solar energy from the year
2000 to 2013. Figure 2.21 illustrates the linear but nevertheless enormous growth of
capacity for electricity generated by wind energy from the year 2000 to 2013. However,
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Figure 2.21: Installed Capacity for Wind Energy in Germany
for the electricity market the generated electricity not the installed capacity is of relevance,
since electricity and not capacity is traded. At night or on cloudy days no electricity can
be generated by solar energy, whereas on a windless day no electricity can be generated
by wind energy. Even on windy days the total wind capacity cannot be exploited, since
this would mean that each wind mill in Germany is exactly exposed to the maximum
wind stream it is designed for, and even on a sunny day total solar capacity can hardly be
exploited. Therefore, the capacity gives - if at all - only an approximation of the electricity
generated by solar or wind energy.
The enormous difference between capacity for solar energy and electricity generation
can be seen, when calculating the theoretically extractable electricity from solar and wind
energy. If the total of all the installed solar energy capacity of 35.948 GW in 2013 had
been used for electricity generation 24 hours and 365 days, 314,9 TWh electricity could
have been generated by solar energy (35.948 GW x 24h x 365= 314904.48 GWh). This
would be more than half of the total German electricity generation in 2013, given by
633.2TWh. However, only 31.00 TWh of electricity were generated by solar energy. If
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analogously all the installed wind energy capacity of 33.730 GW in 2013 had been used
for electricity generation 24 hours and 365 days, 295.47 TWh electricity could have been
generated by wind energy (33.730 GW x 24h x 365= 295474.8 GWh). This would be a
bit less than half of the total German electricity generation in 2013, given by 633.2TWh.
Even though the installed wind capacity is below installed capacity for solar energy wind
accounts for 51.7 TWh of electricity in 2013.
Large capacities for electricity generation depending on weather conditions lead to
volatile conditions for all market participants. The following pages are dedicated to a
detailed analysis of fluctuations of renewable energy supply. To increase market trans-
parency Transmission System Operators are obliged to publish a day-ahead forecast for
electricity generated by wind and solar energy. These forecasts are available on the home-
page for market transparency of the EEX (www.eex-transparency.com) and are provided
for the transmission zones of each operator on a daily basis. In order to analyze the feed-
in of renewable energies in Germany data for day-ahead forecast and actually feed-in of
wind and solar energy into the grid of each Transmission System operator is used. All
this data is integrated within one large data file.
2.2.1 Feed-in of Solar Power
In order to give an overview of the extent of volatility coming from solar energy, the
histogram of the day-ahead forecast of electricity generated by solar energy in 2013, the
week profile of the day-ahead forecast, the histogram of the electricity actually generated
by solar energy, the week profile of the electricity actually generated by solar energy, and
a histogram of the forecast error of day-ahead forecast errors are presented.
Day-Ahead-Forecast of Solar Energy Feed-in
In figure 2.22 a histogram with a range of 1 GW, an exponential distribution with the mean
solar feed-in of 5.8963 GW is plotted. Whenever day-ahead forecast of solar feed-in as
well as the realized solar feed-in is zero, the observation is skipped, since then observation
(most likely) refers to night and is consequently not stochastic. The parameter of the ex-
ponential distribution (λe), that describes its expectation as well as its standard deviation
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Figure 2.22: Histogram of Day-Ahead-Forecast of Solar Feed-in 2013
(λe =
1
E(x)
= 1√
V ar(x)
), is found by equalizing the expectation of the distribution and the
empirical mean of solar energy feed-in in 2013.
f(x) = λe e
−λex , ∀x ≥ 0, f(x) = 0 ∀x < 0
λe =
1
E(x)
=
1
5.8963
= 0.17
(2.1)
At a first glance one can see, that an exponential distribution fits the feed-in data of solar
power quite well. Choosing the scale parameter to match average solar power feed-in, a
value of 0.17 is found for the scale parameter λe. Taking this value to calculate the corre-
sponding variance, a value for the variance of 34.77
(
V ar(x) = 1
λ2e
= 11
5.89632
= 34.7663
)
can be found. This calculation shows, that the degree of dispersion is approximately the
same for the exponential distribution and the original data set, since the variance of the
fitted exponential distribution differs by only about 3% from the variance of the feed-in
data
(
34.7663
35.8576
= 0.9696
)
. A log-normal distribution was fitted to the data, too. It is not
shown in 2.22, since its fit was very poor.
In 28.23% of the cases the solar feed-in lies in the class between 0 GW and 1 GW. The
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next class, which is between 1 GW and 2 GW, only accounts for 8.83% of the cases. For
all upcoming histogram classes the percentage is constantly decreasing. The highest solar
energy feed-in of 24.101 GW had been forecasted for the 21.07.2013 at 13:15hrs, which
means that even at the highest peak of solar energy feed-in German capacity of 35,95 GW
was only exploited for two-thirds (24.101
35.95
⇒ 67%).
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Figure 2.23: Forecasted Solar Feed-in in 2013 as Week Proﬁle
Figure 2.23 shows the weekly pattern of solar energy feed-in in 2013. The red upper
curve illustrates the threshold for the highest 5% of forecasted solar feed-in, the blue curve
in the middle illustrates the mean forecasted solar feed-in and the red lower curve illus-
trates the threshold for the lowest 5% of forecasted solar feed-in. The x-axis represents
the hour on a weekly basis, which means that for example hour 60 represents Wednesday
12 noon. The principal pattern for all three curves is very similar. Before sunrise, whose
exact time depends on the season, no solar energy is fed in. From sunrise (between 6 hrs
and 8 hrs) until noon (between 12 hrs and 13 hrs) the solar feed-in rises, afterwards it
falls until sunset (between 18 hrs and 20hrs). Repetition of this daily pattern leads to the
weekly pattern presented in figure 2.23. Interesting is the range of possible values, since
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e.g on Monday noon in 90% of the cases a solar feed-in between 1.46 GW and 22.94 GW
has been forecasted. This means that the mean forecasted solar feed-in of 11.31GW does
not always provide a good approximation of forecasted solar feed-in. In 90% of the cases
it could either be doubled (22.94 GW) or reduced to a tenth (1.46 GW). Thus, there is
some volatility associated with the feed-in of solar energy. However, a clear pattern of
solar feed-in exists and day-ahead forecasts are important for all market participants.
Realized Solar Energy Feed-in
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Figure 2.24: Histogram of Realized Solar Feed-in 2013
In figure 2.24 a histogram with a range of 1 GW, an exponential distribution with the
mean realized solar feed-in of 5.77 GW (λe = 15.77 ) is plotted. This histogram of realized
solar feed-in (figure 2.24) is quite similar to the histogram for forecasted solar feed-in
(figure 2.22), since in 29.74 % of the cases the solar feed-in lies in the class between 0
GW and 1 GW. The next class, which is between 1 GW and 2 GW, only accounts for
8.61 % of the cases. For all upcoming histogram classes the percentage is constantly
decreasing (with the exception of the class between 19 GW and 20 GW). The highest
solar energy feed-in of 24.00 GW was realized on 21.07.2013 at 13:30hrs.
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Figure 2.25 shows the weekly pattern of solar energy feed-in in 2013. Again, the red
upper curve illustrates the threshold for the highest 5% of the realized solar feed-in, the
blue curve in the middle illustrates the mean realized solar feed-in and the red lower curve
illustrates the threshold for the lowest 5% of realized solar feed-in. The x-axis represents
the hour on a weekly basis, which means that, for example, hour 60 represents Wednesday
12 noon. The principal pattern for all three curves again is very similar. Before sunrise,
whose exact time depends on the season, no solar energy is fed in. From sunrise (between
6 hrs and 8 hrs) until noon (between 12 hrs and 13 hrs) the solar feed-in rises, afterwards
it falls until sunset (between 18 hrs and 20hrs). Repetition of this daily pattern leads to the
weekly pattern presented in figure 2.25. Interesting is the range of possible values, since
e.g on Monday noon in 90% of the cases a solar feed-in between 1.44 GW and 22.71
GW was realized. This means that the mean realized solar feed-in of 11.20 GW does not
provide a good approximation of the realized solar feed-in, since in 90% of the cases it is
either doubled (22.72 GW) or almost reduced to a tenth (1.44 GW). Thus, there is a high
volatility associated with the feed-in of solar energy even if in general a clear pattern of
solar feed-in exists.
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Figure 2.25: Realized Solar Feed-in in 2013 as Week Proﬁle
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Forecasting Quality
Comparing the histogram and the week profile for realized and forecasted solar feed-in
there seems to be no big difference between both. However, when directly comparing
day-ahead forecasted and realized solar feed-in, one can see that even for the short length
of one day, larger differences between both do exist.
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Figure 2.26: Day-Ahead Forecast Error of Solar Feed-in 2013
Figure 2.26 presents a histogram of the difference between the day-ahead forecast and
the realized solar feed-in in 2013. Positive values are associated with electricity from solar
energy that was forecasted but not realized. Negative values are associated with electricity
from solar energy that was realized but not forecasted. Additionally, a normal distribution
with the mean day-ahead forecast error of 0.12 GW and the standard deviation of the day-
ahead forecast of 1.21 GW is plotted and a class size of 0.5 GW is chosen. In principle
the day-ahead forecast estimates the solar feed-in quite well, since in 56% of the cases the
day-ahead forecast is, according to amount, below 0.5 GW. This good forecasting quality
leads to a more leptokurtic shape than a normal distribution would suggest. However, in
few cases forecast errors that are according to amount larger than 3 GW can occur.
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2.2.2 Feed-in of Wind Power
The scope of the next pages is to find a suitable distribution for wind energy feed-in. This
is done by firstly looking at the physical process of converting kinetic energy from wind
into electricity. This process can be found in engineers standard reference works such as
Hau (2014). Therefore the next pages give a short summary how to derive, for a certain
windmill, the electrical power that can be extracted from the wind. Using the resulting
formula for power generation my own calculations to find a stochastic distribution for
wind energy supply will follow. Then the empirical histogram of wind energy supply in
2013 is compared to a log normal distribution, a Weibull distribution and the wind energy
distribution that has been derived before. The presented overview on the energy supply
of a wind converter mainly refers to the standard engineer reference work of Hau (2014).
Physical Background of Wind Power
The kinetic energy of a certain air mass (m), that moves with a steady speed (v), is given
by:
Ewind =
1
2
mv2
(
W =
kg m2
s2
)
(2.2)
The volume (V ) which passes a certain cross sectional area with a steady velocity (v) per
unit of time is called volume stream (V˙ ). This volume stream is given by the velocity of
the air multiplied by the cross sectional area (A),
V˙ = vA
(
m3
s
)
(2.3)
The mass (m) which passes a certain cross sectional area with a steady velocity v per unit
of time is called mass stream (m˙). This mass stream is given by multiplying the volume
stream with the density of air (ρ)
m˙ = ρvA
(
kg
s
)
(2.4)
With the general formula of kinetic energy and the mass stream (m˙) one can calculate the
kinetic energy that passes the cross sectional area per unit of time, which physically is
equivalent to the power of the wind stream(Pwind).
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Note: The velocity is assumed to be constant and therefore to be independent of time.
Pwind =
∂Ewind
∂t
=
1
2
m˙v2 =
1
2
ρAv3
(
W =
kg m2
s2
)
(2.5)
The kinetic energy that passes the cross sectional area per unit of time (Pwind = ∂Ewind∂t )
gives a good starting point. However, the aim is to calculate the power that can be ex-
tracted by the energy converter (in our case a wind mill). Extracting mechanical power
necessarily reduces the kinetic energy that is contained by the stream of wind, which
leads to a reduction of the wind velocity behind the energy converter. For a constant mass
stream this leads to an expansion of the cross sectional area. To find the extractable power,
the state in front of the converter should be compared to the state behind the converter.
The mechanical power that the converter extracts from the mass stream is equal to the
difference of the power that the air stream contains in front and behind the converter. The
wind velocity in front of the converter is denoted by v1, whereas the wind velocity behind
the converter is denoted by v2. The cross sectional area that is passed by the wind stream
in front of the converter is denoted by A1, and the cross sectional area that is passed by
the wind stream behind the converter is denoted by A2. This leads to:
P1 =
1
2
ρA1v
3
1 −
1
2
ρA2v
3
2 =
1
2
ρ
(
A1v
3
1 − A2v32
)
(W ) (2.6)
The mass stream cannot change. Therefore,
ρv1A1
!
= ρv2A2
(
kg
s
)
(2.7)
Using this relationship leads to following expression for the mechanical energy that can
be extracted by the converter:
P1 =
1
2
ρ
(
A1v1v
2
1 − A1v1v22
)
(W )
=
1
2
ρA1v1(v
2
1 − v22) (W )
=
1
2
m˙
(
v21 − v22
)
(W ) (2.8)
This relationship leads to the conclusion that from a theoretical point of view the extracted
power is maximized when the air stream is totally decelerated, since then the speed behind
the converter equals zero (v2 = 0). However, from a physical point of view this cannot
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be the solution. When the wind speed behind the converter is zero the speed in front of
the converter has to be zero, too, and as a consequence there would be no stream at all.
Thus, the search is for the relationship between the velocity in front (v1) and behind the
converter (v2) that maximizes the extractable power.
There exists another way to derive the mechanical power of the converter. The force
that is exerted by the wind to the converter can be found by the conservation of momen-
tum.
T = m˙1v1 − m˙2v2 = m˙(v1 − v2)
(
N =
kg m
s2
)
(2.9)
It can be said that this force, more specifically this thrust, moves the volume of air with
the velocity, which appears in the stream level of the converter (v′). The power that is
needed for this (P2) can be calculated by multiplying the force that is exerted by the wind
to the converter (equation 2.9) with the flow velocity at the converter (v′).
P2 = Tv
′ = m˙(v1 − v2)v′
(
W = N
m
s
)
(2.10)
There are two ways of calculating the mechanical power that is extracted from the air
stream. Firstly, by calculating the difference of the power in front and behind the con-
verter. Secondly, by calculating the thrust and the flow velocity at the converter. In order
to find a relationship between the flow velocity in front of the converter, through the con-
verter, and behind the converter, both expressions for the extracted mechanical power are
equalized:
P1
!
= P2 (W )
1
2
m˙
(
v21 − v22
)
= m˙(v1 − v2)v′ (W )
v′ =
1
2
(v1 + v2)
(m
s
)
(2.11)
Consequently, the flow velocity through the converter is given by the mean of the the ve-
locity in front and behind the converter. The cross sectional area is given by A. Therefore
the mass stream at the converter can be calculated as:
m˙ = ρAv′ =
1
2
ρA(v1 + v2)
(
kg
s
)
(2.12)
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The mechanical power really extracted by the converter can be stated as:
PExt =
1
2
m˙(v21 − v22) =
1
4
ρA(v1 + v2)(v
2
1 − v22) (W ) (2.13)
This real mechanical power extracted by the converter is compared to the power of the air
stream when no mechanical power is extracted (Pwind). The coefficient of the mechan-
ical power of the converter and the mechanical power of the air stream is called power
coefficient (cp) and is given by:
cp :=
Pext
Pwind
=
1
4
ρA(v1 + v2)(v
2
1 − v22)
1
2
ρAv3
(−)
=
1
2
(v1 + v2) (v
2
1 − v22)
v31
(−) (2.14)
In order to find the optimal relationship between the wind velocity in front and behind
the converter the power coefficient is stated as a function of the coefficient of velocities
(v˜ = v2
v1
)
cp =
1
2
v1
(
1 + v2
v1
)
(v21 − v22)
v31
(−)
=
1
2
(
1−
(
v2
v1
)2)(
1 +
v2
v1
)
(−)
=
1
2
(
1− v˜2) (1 + v˜) (−) (2.15)
The power coefficient (cp), which gives the relationship between the extractable mechan-
ical power and the total mechanical power that is contained in an air stream is solely
dependent on the velocity in front of the converter and the velocity behind the converter.
The maximum of the power coefficient is found by maximizing the power coefficient with
respect to the coefficient of velocities (v˜ = v2
v1
)
∂cp
∂v˜
=
1
2
(−2v˜ (1 + v˜) + (1− v˜2)) != 0, ∂c2p
∂v˜2
= −2− 4v˜ − 2v˜ < 0
v˜1,2 =
−2±√4 + 4 ∗ 3 ∗ 1
6
v˜1 = −1 v˜2 = 1
3
(2.16)
The coefficient of velocities is maximized for v˜ = 1
3
. Thus, the wind velocity behind the
converter has to be a third of the wind velocity in front of the converter (v2 = 13v1). This
2.2. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY FROM RENEWABLE ENERGIES 63
leads to an optimal power coefficient of:
cp
(
v˜ =
1
3
)
:= ηBetz (−)
=
1
2
(
1−
(
1
3
)2)(
1 +
1
3
)
=
16
27
= 0, 593 (−) (2.17)
This relationship of the wind velocities of a converter was first found by Albert Betz in
1926. Therefore the optimal power coefficient is often called coefficient of Betz (ηBetz).
For further details see the reprint of his book "Wind-Energie und ihre Ausnutzung durch
Windmühlen" (Betz, 1982). The flow velocity at the converter is given by:
v′ =
1
2
(
v1 +
1
3
v1
)
=
2
3
v1
(m
s
)
(2.18)
Thus, the highest mechanical power, that can be theoretically extracted from a wind
stream is given by:
PExt = ηBetz ∗ P0 = ηBetz 1
2
ρ A v3 (W ) (2.19)
Any wind mill has additional losses of efficiency. Flow losses coming from the friction
part of the Navier-Stokes-equation, mechanical losses coming from friction in the trans-
mission units as well as cable losses. Therefore the mechanical power that really can be
extracted from a windmill (Preal) is given by the theoretically extractable power multi-
plied by the efficiency factors resulting from the flow losses ηflow, from the mechanical
losses ηmec as well as from the cable losses ηelectr:
Preal = Pextr.ηflowηmecηelectr (W )
= ηflowηmecηelectr.ηBetz
1
2
ρ A v3 (W ) (2.20)
If the wind velocity is constant for a time interval ∆t, the energy supplied by a windmill
in this time interval is solely given by the power resulting from the wind velocity (v)
the cross sectional area (A) the efficiency factors(ηflowηmecηelectr.ηBetz) multiplied by the
time interval (∆t)
Ereal = Preal ∗∆t = ηflowηmecηelectr.ηBetz 1
2
ρ A v3∆t (Wh) (2.21)
Whenever wind speed exceeds the maximum wind speed, for which a certain wind power
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plant is designed for, electricity generation has to be stopped. This can be done by three
different ways: Firstly, a wind power plant can be constructed so that the air flow sep-
arates whenever wind speed exceeds a certain threshold (stall). Secondly, all rotor can
be turned (pitch). Thirdly, by turning the nacelle of the generator away from the wind.
Neglecting this shutdown for very high wind speeds does not seem to be critical, since,
as the evaluation of wind power feed-in will show, no severe differences for tail values
occur.
There are three important findings resulting from this short physical explanation. Firstly,
the power as well as the energy that can be converted from a wind stream varies with the
cube of the wind speed (v3). Secondly, the power as well as the energy that can be con-
verted from a wind stream are linearly raised by the cross sectional area (A) and logically
raised to the second power by the the length of a rotor blade (A = pir2). Last but not least,
even a perfectly engineered windmill cannot extract more than about 60 % of the energy
of the wind stream it is exposed to.
Deriving a Distribution for Wind Energy
Electricity is traded at the European Energy Exchange in trading blocks of quarter of
an hour. Under the assumption of a constant wind velocity during each quarter of an
hour a distribution for power supplied by all German windmills can be found by using
the derived power supply function of a certain wind turbine and summarizing efficiency
factors (ηBetzηreibηmecηelectr) as well as other deterministic factors (12ρA) in a common
variable θ.
Preal = ηflowηmecηelectr.ηBetz
1
2
ρ A v3 (W )
PTotal = θv
3 (W ) (2.22)
Of course, all wind converters in Germany differ from each other in cross sectional areas
(A), in their efficiency factors (η), and, depending on their locations, they additionally
differ in air density (ρ) as well as in the exact wind velocity (v) they are exposed. How-
ever, to analyze stochastic properties of wind energy supply in Germany all these factors
are summarized in the variable θ, which can be seen as the product off all factors for
something like a "representative windmill". In general velocity of wind is said to follow
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a Weibull distribution. Therefore, the cumulative distribution function of the velocity of
wind (FV ) and the corresponding density function (fV ) look as follows:
FV = 1− e−(λv)k fV = λkkvk−1e(−λW v)k (2.23)
Using equation 2.22 and the property of wind velocity being Weibull distributed, the
distribution function of stochastic supply of wind energy can be derived. The energy
supplied to the market is given by the energy of the representative windmill Emarket =
θv3. Two steps have to be taken to derive the distribution for this stochastic variable θv3.
The first step is to determine the distribution of the random variable y = v3, where the
velocity v follows a Weibull distribution. The second step is to determine the distribution
for the random variable x = θy.
Proposition 2.2.1. For any exponent larger than zero (τ > 0) the distribution of a
continuous random variable V with FV (0) = 0 and Y := V
1/τ the corresponding cu-
mulative distribution function FY (y) and the corresponding density function fY (y) are
given by:
FY (y) = FV (y
τ ) and fY (y) = τy
τ−1fV (yτ ) ∀ y > 0
Proof:
FY (y) = P (Y ≤ y) = P (V ≤ yτ ) = FV (yτ )
fY (y) =
∂FY (y)
∂y
=
∂FV (y
τ )
∂y
= τyτ−1fV (yτ )
(2.24)
Using Proposition 2.2.1 for the underlying Weibull distribution leads to:
FY (y) = 1− e−λky
k
3
fY (y) =
1
3
k y
k
3
−1 λk e−λ
ky
k
3
(2.25)
Proposition 2.2.2. For any multiplicand larger than zero (θ > 0) the distribution of a
continuous random variable X := θY the corresponding cumulative distribution function
FX(x) and the corresponding density function fX(x) are given by:
FX(x) = FY (
X
θ
) and fX(x) =
1
θ
fY (
x
θ
)
Proof:
FX(x) = P (X ≤ x) = P (θY ≤ x) = P (Y ≤ x
θ
) = FY (
x
θ
) (2.26)
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Using Proposition 2.2.2 for the underlying transformed distribution leads to:
FX(x) = 1− e−λk(xθ )
k
3
fX(x) =
1
3
k x
k
3
−1 λk θ−
1
3
ke−λ
k(x
θ
)
k
3
(2.27)
The original scale parameter λ and the multiplicand θ can be summarized in a new scale
parameter γ = λ
θ
1
3
, since they influence the cumulative distribution and the corresponding
density function the same structural way. In the upcoming analysis the shape parameter
of this modified Weibull distribution is henceforth denoted by κ to avoid confusion with
the shape parameter of the classical Weibull distribution.
FX(x) = 1− e−
(
λ
θ1/3
)k
x
k
3
= 1− e−γκx
κ
3
fX(x) =
1
3
k x
k
3
−1
(
λ
θ1/3
)k
e
−
(
λ
θ1/3
)k
x
k
3
=
1
3
κ x
κ
3
−1γκe−γ
κx
κ
3
(2.28)
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Figure 2.27: Histogram of Day-Ahead-Forecast of Wind Feed-in 2013
Figure 2.27 shows the empirical histogram of the day-ahead forecast of wind power
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feed-in in 2013. Additionally, a log normal distribution, a Weibull distribution as well as
the modified Weibull distribution, that has been derived on the pages before, are plotted.
A class size of 1 GW is chosen. The mean of wind power feed-in in 2013 was 5.5849
GW, whereas variance of wind power feed-in was 22.6314 GW 2. The parameters of the
log normal distribution (µLN , σ2LN) are found by equalizing theoretical and empirical
moments.
f(x) =
1√
2piσLN
e
− (ln(x)−µLN )
2
2σLN ∀x ≥ 0, f(x) = 0 ∀x < 0
µLN = ln
(
E2
√
1
V ar + E2
)
= 1.45, E
!
= 5.5849 GW
σ2LN = ln
(
1 +
V ar
E2
)
= 0.74, V ar
!
= 22.6314 GW 2
(2.29)
Parameters of the log normal distribution are chosen to reflect the values of empirical
mean and are given by µLN = 1.45 and σ2LN = 0.74. Parameters of the Weibull distri-
bution are chosen to reflect mean and variance of wind feed-in by numerically equalizing
theoretical and empirical moments.
E(x) =
1
λW
Γ
(
1 +
1
k
)
!
= 5.5849 GW
V (x) =
1
λ2W
[
Γ
(
1 +
2
k
)
− Γ2
(
1 +
1
k
)]
!
= 22.6314 GW 2
=⇒ k = 1.18, λW = 0.17
(2.30)
Parameters of the modified Weibull distribution are chosen to reflect mean and variance
of wind feed-in, too. However, this is done by fitting the distribution as well as possible
to the empirical 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 quantile, since no closed form solution for mean
and variance of the modified Weibull distribution is known. This is done by choosing
parameters so that the sum of mean square errors for all five quantiles is minimized. This
minimum is found by a grid search for all values of γ and κwith two digits. The minimum
sum of mean square error is found for γ = 0.56 and k = 3.83.
A wind power feed-in forecast of less than 1 GW is realized in only 5.9% of the cases.
The interval with highest frequency of wind feed-in is the interval between 1 GW and 2
GW (16.8%). For all forecasts of wind feed-in larger than 2 GW the frequency is strictly
decreasing until a maximum forecasted wind feed-in of 26.35 GW.
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Figure 2.28: Forecasted Wind Feed-in in 2013 as Week Proﬁle
Figure 2.28 illustrates the weekly pattern of forecasted wind feed-in in 2013. For all
168 hours of the week the mean, the highest 5% and the lowest 5% forecasted wind
feed-in are plotted. The mean forecasted wind feed-in is fluctuating around 5.6 GW,
with a maximum mean forecasted wind feed-in of 7.1 GW and a minimum forecasted
wind feed-in of 4.6 GW. Even though the mean forecasted wind feed-in is not perfectly
stable, fluctuations seem to be rather stochastic without any trend, structure or pattern.
The lowest 5% of forecasted wind feed-in is fluctuating around 0.8 GW with an absolute
(relative) lower (higher) amplitude. The minimum is given by a forecasted wind feed-
in of 0.4 GW and the maximum is given by 1.4 GW. The highest 5% of the forecasted
wind feed-in are fluctuating around 15.6 GW, with a rather high amplitude in absolute
terms, since the minimum of 5% highest forecasted wind feed-in is given by 10.6 GW
and the maximum 5% of the forecasted wind feed-in is given by 21.2 GW. For all three
plots fluctuation seem to be stochastic without a clear trend, structure or pattern. This is
not surprising, since wind velocity, which is the main determinant of wind power feed-in,
does not follow a daily or weekly pattern.
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Figure 2.29: Histogram of Realized Wind Feed-in 2013
Figure 2.29 presents the empirical histogram of the actually realized wind power feed-
in in 2013. Again, a log normal distribution, a Weibull distribution as well as the modified
Weibull distribution are plotted additionally. As class size of 1 GW is chosen. The mean
of the realized wind power feed-in was 5.39 GW and the variance of wind power feed-in
was 23.67 GW 2 in 2013. Parameters of the log normal distribution are chosen to reflect
the values of the empirical mean and variance, analogue to the procedure in equation 2.29,
and are given by µLN = 1.38 and σ2LN = 0.77. Shape and scale parameter of the Weibull
distribution are chosen to reflect the mean and variance of wind feed-in by numerically
equalizing theoretical and empirical moments and are given by λW = 0.18 and k = 1.11.
For the modified Weibull distribution parameters are found by a grid search, which leads
to γ = 0.57 and κ = 3.46. All parameter values for realized wind power feed-in do not
fundamentally differ from the estimates for the forecasted wind power feed-in. This leads
to basically similar histograms and distributions. The histogram class with the highest
frequency of realization is given by class between 1 GW and 2 GW (16.2 %). For all
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histogram classes above 2 GW the frequency of realization is strictly decreasing.
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Figure 2.30: Realized Wind Feed-in in 2013 as Week Proﬁle
Figure 2.30 illustrates the weekly pattern of realized wind power feed-in in 2013.
Again, for all 168 hours of a week mean, the highest 5% and lowest 5% realized wind
power feed-in is plotted. The mean realized wind power feed-in is fluctuating around 5.4
GW, with a maximum mean realized wind-feed-in of 7.2 GW and a minimum realized
wind power feed-in of 4.2 GW. The lowest 5% of realized wind feed-in is fluctuating
around 0.6 GW with an absolute lower amplitude, since the minimum is given by a re-
alized wind feed-in of 0.2 GW and the maximum is given by 1.2 GW. The highest 5%
of the forecasted wind feed-in are fluctuating around 15.7 GW, with, in absolute terms,
a rather high amplitude. On a weekly basis, the minimum 5% of the highest forecasted
wind feed-in is given by 10.5 GW and the maximum 5% of the forecasted wind feed-in is
given by 21.9 GW. Similar to fluctuations of forecasted wind power feed-in fluctuations
of realized wind power feed-in seem to be stochastic without a clear trend, structure or
pattern.
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Figure 2.31: Day-Ahead Forecast Error of Wind Feed-in 2013
Figure 2.31 illustrates the empirical histogram of day-ahead forecast error of wind
power feed-in. The actually realized wind power feed-in is deducted from its day-ahead
forecast. Thus, a positive value is associated with a day-ahead forecast of wind power
feed-in that is exceeding its realization. A negative value is associated with a day-ahead
forecast of wind power feed-in that falls behind its realization. Additionally, the mean
day-ahead forecast error of wind power feed-in of 0.20 GW in 2013 and the standard de-
viation of day-ahead forecast error of wind power feed-in of 1.11 GW in 2013 are taken
as parameters for a normal distribution. In general, day-ahead forecasts help to estimate
realizations of wind power feed-in quite well, since 44.1% of day-ahead forecast errors
fall into histogram classes between -0.5 GW and 0.5 GW. This high forecast quality leads
to a more leptokurtic shape of day-ahead forecast errors than a normal distribution would
suggest. However, some bias towards positive forecast error with (forecasts exceeding)
realization can be seen. Large forecast errors that, according to amount, are above 2 GW
account for 8.01 % of realizations, since in 3.64 % of the cases forecast error is below -2
GW and in 4.37 % of the cases forecast error exceeds 2 GW.
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2.2.3 Feed-in of Renewable Energies
Even though some interesting insights can be gained by analyzing solar power feed-in
and wind power feed-in separately, common feed-in effects are more relevant for the
German electricity grid. Therefore, solar power feed-in and wind power feed-in should
be analyzed simultaneously, too. For further analysis this feed-in is referred to as re-
newable energies feed-in. This means renewable electricity generation from biomass or
hydropower are neglected, which is in some way semantically imprecise. However, to
analyze volatility that is associated with the feed-in of electricity from renewable energy
sources, this does not seem to be a critical point, since power feed-in from other renew-
able energy sources like hydropower, biomass or biogenic waste can be controlled and
dispatched without larger problems.
Fluctuations of renewable energies feed-in are often accused of large electricity exports
and imports. The argumentation of this criticism is as follows: Whenever feed-in of
renewable energy sources is small, Germany has to import electricity. This imported
electricity is often generated by nuclear power plants or soft coal power plants. Thus,
renewable energies feed-in indirectly leads to a support of fossil fuels in other countries.
Whenever feed-in of renewable energy sources is large, Germany has to export electricity.
These exports lead to problems for the grid of neighbouring countries and a crowding-out
flexible gas plants. In contrast countries such as Austria and Switzerland benefit from
peaks, since the renewable energy, which was highly subsidized in Germany, can be used
to fill pump storage lakes cheaply. Whenever a negative electricity price occurs even a
direct payment is received by filling a pump storage plant.
Data for German exports and imports of electricity, that is provided by ENTSO-E are
combined with data for renewable energy feed-in. This gives the possibility to evaluate
effects of renewable energies feed-in on German exports and imports of electricity.
Day-Ahead Forecast of Renewable Energies Feed-in
Figure 2.32 shows the histogram of forecasted common feed-in of solar and wind power
into the German electricity grid. Additionally a logarithmic normal distribution, a clas-
sical Weibull distribution as well as modified Weibull distribution, which was originally
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derived for wind power feed-in, is plotted. All three distributions are parameterized to
have an expectation as close as possible to 9.04 GW and a variance as close as possible to
44.49 GW 2, which are the empirical moments of renewable energies feed-in. All param-
eters for renewable power feed-in are calculated analogous to the parameters derived for
wind power feed-in. Parameters for logarithmic normal distribution are estimated to be
µLN = 1.99 and to be σLN = 0.66. For Weibull distribution shape parameter is estimated
to be k = 1, 37 and scale parameter is estimated to be λ = 0.10. For modified Weibull
distribution shape parameter is estimated to be κ = 3.81 and scale parameter is estimated
to be γ = 0.47.
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Figure 2.32: Histogram of Day-Ahead-Forecast of Renewable Energies Feed-in 2013
A renewable energies feed-in of less than 1 GW was forecasted for only 1.8 % of cases
in 2013. A renewable energies feed-in between 1 GW and 2 GW was forecasted for 8.3%
of realizations in 2013. A renewable energies feed-in between 2 GW and 3 GW has been
most frequent and has been forecasted for 10.2 % of cases. The frequency is falling for all
larger histogram classes in direction with some histogram classes having a slightly higher
frequency than smaller histogram classes. Therefore, the frequency of realization can
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be said to fall in tendency until the maximum forecasted power feed-in from renewable
energies of 33.8 GW that was realized on 18.04.2013 at 13:15 hrs.
All three distributions have some problems to fit the histogram data properly. The
biggest problems exist for a logarithmic normal distribution, since it heavily underesti-
mates realizations between 1 GW and GW 3 and heavily overestimates realizations be-
tween 3 GW and 13 GW. Additionally it underestimates frequency for extremal realiza-
tions, since it does not have enough mass in its tail. A normal Weibull distribution as well
as a modified normal distribution have a better, but not at all perfect, fit to the data. They
underestimate forecasts between 1 GW and 3 GW and overestimate forecasts between 6
GW and 14 GW. Both distributions slightly underestimate extremal forecasts between 17
GW and 25 GW. Even though a modified Weibull distribution is not able to perfectly fit
the data it seems to be most appropriate to describe the distribution of renewable energy
forecasts in 2013.
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Figure 2.33: Forecasted Renewable Energies Feed-in in 2013 as Week Proﬁle
Figure 2.33 shows the weekly pattern of forecasted power feed-in of renewable energy
sources. Therefore for each of the 168 week hours mean feed-in from renewable energy
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sources, the highest 5% of the forecasted feed-in from renewable energy sources as well
as the lowest 5% of the forecasted feed-in from renewable energy sources, is plotted. The
general pattern can mainly by explained by overlapping the profile for solar energy feed-
in with the profile for wind energy feed-in. Wind energy feed-in, which basically has
a time-stable pattern during the entire week, on average leads to a feed-in of about 5.5
GW. During sunshine hours that occur approximately between 06 00 hrs and 18 00 hrs
(depending on seasons), on top of this solar energy is fed into the German grid. Thus,
a strong hourly pattern can be identified. For a whole-year the correlation coefficient of
feed-in of wind and solar energy is very close to zero (0.01). However, due to the hourly
pattern of solar energy feed-in it seems to be appropriate to determine the coefficient of
correlation for distinct hours of a day separately. Then the coefficient of correlation lies
between -0.31 at 7:00 hrs and -0.39 at 9:00 hrs. High realizations of wind and solar feed-
in are rather unlikely to occur simultaneously, since sunny, but windy, days are less likely,
which is reflected in these calculated negative correlations. Looking at maximum values
supports this negative correlation, since maximum forecast of feed-in of renewable ener-
gies was 33.8 GW, whereas maximum forecast of feed-in from wind power was 26.4 GW
and maximum forecast of feed-in of solar power was 24.1 GW, which would theoretically
amount to 50.5 GW. 5 % of the smallest values fluctuate between a feed-in of round about
1 GW for night hours and round about 5 GW at noon.
Realized Renewable Energies Feed-in
Figure 2.34 shows the empirical histogram of common feed-in of solar and wind power
into the German grid in 2013. Again a logarithmic normal distribution, a classical Weibull
distribution as well as a modified Weibull distribution, which was originally derived to
describe wind power feed-in, is plotted. All three distributions are parameterized to have
an expectation as close as possible to 8.77 GW and a variance as close as possible to 46.27
GW 2, which are the empirical moments of the renewable energies feed-in. Parameters for
logarithmic normal distribution are estimated to be µLN = 1.94 and to be σLN = 0.69. For
Weibull distribution shape parameter is estimated to be k = 1.11 and scale parameter is
estimated to be λ = 0.11. For modified Weibull distribution shape parameter is estimated
to be κ = 3.53 and scale parameter is estimated to be γ = 0.47.
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Figure 2.34: Histogram of Realized Renewable Energies Feed-in 2013
A renewable energies feed-in of less than 1 GW was realized for only 3.8 % of cases in
2013. A renewable energies feed-in between 1 GW and 2 GW was realized for 9.1% of
cases in 2013. A renewable energies feed-in between 2 GW and 3 GW was most frequent
and was realized for 9.5 % of cases. The frequency is falling for all larger histogram
classes in direction with some histogram classes having a slightly higher frequency than
smaller histogram classes. Therefore, frequency of realization can be said to fall in ten-
dency until the maximum realized power feed-in from renewable energies of 36.1 GW,
which was realized on 18.04.2013 at 14:15 hrs.
Again, all three distributions have some problems to fit the histogram data properly.
The biggest problems exist for a logarithmic normal distribution, since it heavily under-
estimates realizations between 1 GW and GW 3 and heavily overestimates realizations
between 3 GW and 13 GW. Additionally it underestimates frequency for extremal real-
izations, since it has too little mass in its tail. A normal Weibull distribution as well as a
modified normal distribution have a better fit to the data. The modified Weibull distribu-
tion fits to the data, especially for realizations between 6 GW and 16 GW.
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Figure 2.35: Realized Renewable Energies Feed-in in 2013 as Week Proﬁle
Figure 2.35 shows the weekly pattern of realized power feed-in from renewable energy
sources. Again, for each of the 168 week hours mean feed-in from renewable energy
sources, the highest 5% forecasted feed-in from renewable energy sources as well as the
lowest 5% forecasted feed-in from renewable energy sources, is plotted. The general
pattern can mainly by explained by overlapping the profile for solar energy feed-in with
the profile for wind energy feed-in. Wind energy feed-in, which basically has a time-
stable pattern during the entire week, on average leads to a feed-in of about 5.5 GW.
During sunshine hours that occur approximately between 6 hrs and 18:00 hrs (depending
on seasons), on top of this solar energy is fed into the German grid. Thus, a strong hourly
pattern can be identified. The whole-year correlation coefficient of feed-in for wind and
solar energy is given by -0.12. However, due to the hourly pattern of solar energy feed-in
it seems to be appropriate to determine the coefficient of correlation for distinct hours of
a day separately. Then, the coefficient of correlation lies between -0.23 at 14:00 hrs and -
0.37 at 9:00 hrs. Looking at maximum values supports this negative correlation, since the
maximum realized feed-in of renewable energies was 36.1 GW, whereas the maximum
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realized feed-in from wind power was 26.3 GW and the maximum realized feed-in of
solar power was 24.0 GW, which would theoretically amount to 50.3 GW.
Forecasting Quality
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Figure 2.36: Histogram of Day-Ahead Forecast Error of Renewable Energies Feed-in
2013
Figure 2.36 shows the empirical histogram of renewable energies day-ahead forecast
error in 2013. For a positive value day-ahead forecasted feed-in is exceeding realized
feed-in, whereas for a negative value realized feed-in exceeds its day-ahead forecast. On
average day-ahead forecast of renewable energies feed-in exceeds realized renewable en-
ergies feed-in, since on average day-ahead forecast error in 2013 was given by 0.26 GW.
Standard deviation of day-ahead forecast error is given by 1.44 GW. This empirical mo-
ments are used as parameters for normal distribution plotted in figure 2.36. Day-ahead
forecast quality seems to be good, since 36.5% day-ahead forecast errors lie in a histogram
class between -0.5 GW and 0.5 GW. The highest frequency is given for a day-ahead fore-
cast error between 0 GW and 0.5 GW (21.3 %). Day-ahead forecast bias can additionally
be demonstrated by the fact, that positive day-ahead forecast errors account for 61.5 %
2.2. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY FROM RENEWABLE ENERGIES 79
of realizations. The highest negative forecast error of -7.1 GW was made for 29.06.2013
12:45 hrs and the highest positive forecast error of 8.3 GW was made for 03.04.2013
13.16 hrs. The high forecast quality leads to a more leptokurtic shape than a normal
distribution would suggest. However, drastic forecast error may occur.
Eﬀect of Renewable Energy Feed-in on Electricity Exports
To determine the degree of volatility on the German electricity market associated with
feed-in of renewable energies electricity, exports and imports should be taken into ac-
count. For this purpose, cross-border physical flow data, which is provided by the Euro-
pean Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E) for all European countries
are used. For each hour in 2013 the flow from Germany into each border country and
the flow from each border country into Germany can be taken from this data. Using this
information a net cross-border physical flow for Germany and each border-country can be
calculated.
In order to get an overview to what extent feed-in of solar, wind and renewable ener-
gies are exported, table 2.9 presents for each country Pearson’s (column Pears.) product-
moment correlation coefficient and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (column Spear.)
for solar (column Solar), wind (column Wind) and renewable energies (column Renew)
feed-in for Germany and each of its border countries.
On the one hand the net-exports and energy feed-in will not necessarily follow a linear
relationship, which provides a serious argument for using rank correlation to analyze the
data. On the other hand for the relationship between energy feed-in and exports mag-
nitudes and not only ranks are of importance, which gives a justification for analyzing
Pearson’s correlation. Thus, using each of these correlation coefficients has its own justi-
fication.
First column of table 2.9 gives Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation coefficients for en-
ergy feed-in from solar energy and net-exports. For the feed-in of solar energy and net-
export to all countries except for Switzerland a positive Pearson’s correlation coefficient
is found. Thus, in general higher feed-in of solar energy leads c.p. to higher net-exports.
However, correlation coefficients between 0.09 (Czechia and France) and 0.13 (Poland
and Total) should be interpreted as a rather small relationship. Looking at the rang correla-
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tion according to Spearman draws a slightly different picture, since correlation, according
to amount. is smaller and for five countries (Austria, Switzerland, France, Netherlands
and Sweden) correlation becomes negative, whereas for three countries (Czechia, Den-
mark and Poland) a small positive value occurs. In total a small negative correlation is
found. Thus, according to Spearman’s correlation no monotone relationship can be found.
One explanation might by that the feed-in of solar energy takes place between 10:00hrs
and 17:00hrs, when demand is high. Therefore, to the most extent solar energy feed-in
can be used in the German grid.
The second column of table 2.9 gives Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation coefficients
for energy feed-in from wind energy and net-exports. For the feed-in of wind energy
and net-export to all countries a positive correlation coefficient according to Pearson and
Spearman is found. A rather small Pearson correlation is found for exports to France,
Czechia, Netherlands and Sweden (between 0.01 and 0.14). For exports to Switzerland,
Austria and Poland larger pearson correlations are realized (between 0.24 and 0.60). For
total net-export a correlation of 0.39 is found, which indicates a weak or moderate linear
relationship between net exports and feed-in of wind energy. Comparable values of the
correlation coefficient according to Spearman are calculated. This indicates a weak or
moderate monotone relationship for net-exports and wind energy feed-in.
The third column of table 2.9 gives Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation coefficients
for energy feed-in from solar as well as from wind energy and net-exports. Comparable
to the pattern of wind energy feed-in and net-exports linear correlation according to Pear-
son and rank correlation according to Spearman lie close together. For France, Czechia,
Switzerland and Netherlands a rather small correlation is found (between 0.04 and 0.12).
For Sweden, Denmark, Austria and Poland higher correlations are found (between 0.19
and 0.53). For the feed-in of wind and solar energy and total net exports a Pearson cor-
relation of 0.39 is found, which indicates a small or moderate linear positive relationship.
A Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.36 is determined, which indicates again a small
or moderate relationship.
Summarizing it can be said that there exists a positive relationship between electricity
net-exports and renewable energies feed-in. However, according to the analysis of Pear-
son’s and Spearman’s correlations coefficients, any direct linear or monotone relationship
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Solar Wind Renew
Net Exports to Pears. Spear. Pears. Spear Pears. Spear
Austria 0.09 -0.08 0.46 0.42 0.41 0.38
Switzerland -0.10 -0.16 0.24 0.20 0.10 0.06
Czechia 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.14
Denmark 0.12 0.003 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.21
France 0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.04
Netherlands 0.11 -0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.11
Poland 0.13 0.04 0.60 0.55 0.53 0.53
Sweden 0.12 -0.05 0.14 0.23 0.19 0.19
Total Net Export 0.13 -0.09 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.36
Table 2.9: Correlation According to Spearman and Pearson for Net-Export and Feed-in
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between electricity exports and renewable energies feed-in seems to be rather small. Thus,
electricity generated by renewable energy sources is mainly fed into the German grid and
used by German consumers.
2.3 Electricity Demand in Germany
Fluctuations on the German electricity market cannot solely be attributed to fluctuations
coming from renewable electricity supply. Therefore the next pages are dedicated to
fluctuations in electricity demand.
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) pro-
vides data for day-ahead forecast of demand for electricity as well as for realized demand
for electricity. Day-ahead forecasts of demand for electricity are very important, since
power station schedules are made the day before delivery. Consequently the day-ahead
spot market has a dominant role for electricity allocation. Using this data weekly patterns
of forecasted and realized demand for electricity are illustrated. Furthermore day-ahead
forecast error of demand for electricity is evaluated.
Conventional load that is necessary to meet demand is computed by deducting data
of renewable energies supply from demand data. Weekly pattern and day-ahead forecast
errors are illustrated again. Furthermore serial correlation of necessary conventional load
as well as effects of necessary conventional load on the day-ahead spot price are evaluated.
For the years 2011, 2012, 2013 figure 2.37 shows electricity consumption separated
into following four sectors: Industry, households, commerce trade and services, and trans-
portation. Data is provided by RWE (2014b). The highest demand for electricity comes
from industrial consumers. For the last three years industrial demand was decreasing
from 249.6 TWh in 2011 to 240.09 TWh in 2013. By a clear margin households and
commerce, trade and services have the second highest demand for electricity. In 2011
households consumed 136.8 TWh, in 2012 136.1TWh and in 2013 136.5 TWh of elec-
tricity. Commerce, trade and services in 2011 consumed 136.8 TWh, in 2012 136.1 TWh
and in 2013 136.5 TWh of electricity. Transportation in general and railways in particular
consumed a stable amount of 12.2 TWh in 2011, 12.1 TWh in 2012 and 12.1 TWh in
2013.
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Figure 2.37: Electricity Consumption in Germany by Industry Branches
In a nutshell a stable electricity consumption for Germany that is mainly driven by
industry, households and trade, commerce and services can be seen as the main insight
of figure 2.37. Having these different groups of electricity consumers in mind, lots of
features of the German electricity demand, such as the weekly load profile, can be easily
explained.
2.3.1 Weekly Load Proﬁle
To analyze demand for electrical load a time factor has to be considered, since electrical
load cannot directly be stored. For all possible storage technologies electricity firstly has
to be converted into other forms of energy and when electricity is needed this energy has
to be reconverted into electricity. At the moment this energy conversion leads to high
energy losses, a lack of efficiency and henceforth cannot be offered in a cost-covering
manner. Pump storage power plants give the only exception. However, pump storage
is heavily restricted by geographic factors. Even if respective geographical factors are
given, political problems in landscape transformation often occur. Thus, no profitable
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storage of large amounts of electricity is possible. From a technical perspective electricity
generation and consumption have to be equal at every single moment. From an economic
perspective electricity sold and bought has to be equal at every single moment. Thus, the
timely pattern of demand is of particularly importance.
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Figure 2.38: Day-Ahead-Forecast of Week Load Proﬁle 2013
Figure 2.38 gives for each of the 168 hours of a week the load profile for demand for
electricity in 2013. The mean demand for load is plotted as a blue line, whereas the
highest 5% of demand and the lowest 5% of demand are plotted as a red line. In general
the pattern for each weekday is very similar.
On average the lowest demand for load is given by round about 41 GW between 02:00
hrs and 05:00 hrs. Then the average demand for electricity increases considerably to its
maximum of round about 65 GW between 12:00 hrs and 14:00 hrs. Afterwards the de-
mand for electricity decreases (interrupted by a smaller increase to about 62 GW between
17:00 hrs and 19:00 hrs) until the next daily minimum between 02:00 hrs and 05:00 hrs.
Having in mind the four main consumers of electricity (industry, households, commerce,
trade and services) this pattern can be easily explained. During night hours only industry
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with production based on shift work demands electricity, which adds to basic consump-
tion. In the morning between 06:00 hrs and 08:00 hrs production is started and households
demand for electricity additionally. Afterwards commerce, trade and services start their
work, which implies additional desire for electricity. The peak between between 12:00 hrs
and 14:00 hrs can be explained by food preparation of staff restaurants and households,
which implies additional demand for electricity. After this peak demand for electricity
decreases, since economic activity for many branches decreases. The small increase be-
tween 17.00 hrs and 19:00 hrs is mainly explained by household activities that mainly
take place after work, such as washing and drying clothes, food preparation and washing
dishes etc. After this local peak of electricity consumption demand for electricity falls
sharply, since neither households nor commerce, trade and services nor industry that does
not rely on shift work asks for electricity apart from basic consumption.
On Saturdays a lot of industrial producers as well as a lot of branches of the commerce,
trade and service sector do not operate their business activities. This leads to a significant
shift of demand for electricity. On Sundays additional companies of the service sector
(e.g. stores) do not ask for electricity. This leads to a further decrease in demand for
electricity.
The pattern for extremal values, which are visualized in figure 2.38 by a line for the
highest and lowest 5 % of demand for each hour, generally follows the same trend. How-
ever, the interval that results from this upper and lower boundary is rather large. The
highest difference can be made out for week hour 67 (Wednesday 18:00 hrs to 19:00 hrs),
where both boundaries have a difference of 17.5 GW. The lowest difference results for
week hour 129 (Saturday 08:00 hrs to 09:00 hrs), where both boundaries have a differ-
ence of 8.4 GW. This is nevertheless rather a large difference of about 17 % of mean
demand at this time (49.7 GW). Thus, it can be stated that demand fluctuations are of
particular importance.
Figure 2.39 shows the realized demand as load profile for all 168 hours of a week in
2013. This profile of actually realized demand does not fundamentally differ from its
forecast illustrated in figure 2.38, since the daily pattern for realized electricity demand
is generally quite similar. However, all demand values are mean or 5% boundary values.
Thus, to analyze forecast qualities direct differences of day-ahead forecast of demand and
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Figure 2.39: Realized Week Load Proﬁle 2013
actually realized demand for every hour and day in 2013 have to be computed. The quali-
ties of day-ahead forecasts is evaluated by analyzing histograms for weekdays, weekends
and total weeks separately, since due to heterogeneous demand levels a separate evalua-
tion might be necessary.
Figure 2.40 gives a histogram of day-ahead forecast error of load for all weekdays
in 2013. Mean day-ahead forecast error was 0.34 GW, which means that on average
day-ahead forecasted demand exceeded realized demand in 2013. Standard deviation of
day-ahead forecast error was 2.21 GW. A normal distribution that uses these values as
parameters is plotted additionally. Day-ahead-forecast error seems to be (approximately)
normally distributed, since no fundamental differences of the histogram and a normal
distribution can be found. Nevertheless, two interesting points can be seen: Firstly, there
are more realizations between -0.5 GW and 0.5 GW than a normal distribution would
suggest, which could be seen as a consequence of good forecast quality. However, day-
ahead forecast error of demand has rather a large standard deviation, which for 4.5% of
all the observations leads to a day-ahead forecast error of more than 4 GW and for 1.5%
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Figure 2.40: Day-Ahead Forecast Error of Load (Mon.-Sun.) 2013
for a day-ahead forecast error of more than -4 GW. Compared to the day-ahead forecast
errors of feed-in from renewable energies extremal forecast errors rather often emerge.
Figure 2.41 presents the histogram of weekday day-ahead forecast error in 2013. On
average day-ahead forecast error was 0.09 GW and standard deviation was 2.07 GW. This
means, day-ahead forecast was better for weekdays than for a total week, since mean and
standard deviation of day-ahead forecast error were lower for weekdays than for all days
of the week. Again a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation of day-ahead
forecast error is plotted additionally. Large positive day-ahead forecast errors exceeding
4 GW were realized for 4.1% of all observations, while large negative day-ahead forecast
errors, exceeding -4 GW in amount, were realized for only 1.0% of all observations.
Realizations between -0.5 GW and 0.5 GW more often occurred than a normal distribution
would suggest. This leads to a more leptokurtic shape of the distribution for day-ahead
forecast error.
Figure 2.42 shows the histogram of day-ahead forecast error for weekend days in 2013.
On average day-ahead forecast error was 0.84 GW and standard deviation was 2.39 GW.
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Figure 2.41: Day-Ahead Forecast Error of Load (Mon.-Fri.) 2013
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Figure 2.42: Day-Ahead Forecast Error of Load for Weekends 2013
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Again normal distribution with the corresponding mean and standard deviation is plot-
ted. Large positive day-ahead forecast errors exceeding 4 GW were realized for 8.1%
of observations, while large negative day-ahead forecast errors exceeding in amount -4
GW occurred for 2.5% of realizations. All this shows that day-ahead forecast quality
for demand on weekends was rather low compared to forecasts for workdays. Its mean
forecast and standard deviation exceeded corresponding values calculated for workdays.
Day-ahead forecast errors, which exceeded in amount 4 GW, were realized more often,
too.
The analysis of the load profile for demand on a weekly basis mainly leads to two
insights: Firstly, for each workday on average a similar pattern of demand is realized,
with an increase of demand in the morning and a decrease of demand in the evening. On
weekends the similar pattern is realized on a lower level. Secondly, on average day-ahead
forecasts of demand may give a good estimation of actually realized demand. However,
relatively large forecast errors can occur for individual forecasts.
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2.3.2 Weekly Demand for Conventional Load
Electricity generated by solar and wind energy is fed into the German grid irrespective
of the wholesale price, since according to the "Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz" subsidies
for renewable energies lead to a total remuneration for suppliers, which is completely in-
dependent of the wholesale price. Thus, demand that has to be served on the wholesale
market is reduced by exactly the same amount of wind and solar feed-in into the German
grid. The difference of electricity demand and feed-in of renewable energies can be seen
as the load, which has to be generated by conventional power plants. It determines the
wholesale electricity price by meeting its supply curve. This necessary conventional load
is calculated by deducting feed-in data for renewable energies provided by German trans-
mission system operators and European Energy Exchange from demand data provided by
ENTSO-E.
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Figure 2.43: Day-Ahead-Forecast of Necessary Conventional Load 2013
Figure 2.43 shows day-ahead forecast of necessary conventional load in 2013, which is
calculated by deducting day-ahead forecast of renewable energies supply from day-ahead
forecast of electricity demand. Comparing this forecast for necessary conventional load
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to the demand profile plotted in figure 2.38 three important findings should be pointed
out:
Firstly, on average feed-in of renewable energies leads to a down-shift of necessary
conventional load compared to the classical demand profile. As shown in figure 2.28
for example feed-in of electricity generated by wind turbines does not follow any time
pattern. On average this leads to a constant downshift of necessary conventional load of
round about 5.5 GW.
Secondly, the daily pattern of necessary conventional load is different from a classical
demand profile, since feed-in of electricity generated by solar energy does follow a clear
pattern as has been shown for example in figure 2.23. This pattern eliminates noon de-
mand peak between 12:00 hrs and 14:00 hrs, since at this time the feed-in of solar energy
has its maximum. However, this pattern of solar energy feed-in leads to two new daily
peaks for necessary conventional load, which occur in the morning between 09:00 hrs and
10:00 hrs as well as in the evening between 19:00 hrs and 20:00 hrs. The explanation can
easily be given, since in the early morning hours feed-in of solar energy is increasing more
slowly than demand for electricity. Thus, the former noon peak is shifted for round about
3 hrs. In the evening between 19:00 hrs and 20:00 hrs solar feed-in does not significantly
contribute to renewable energy feed-in. Thus, solar feed-in does not significantly reduce
the evening peak and only (time independent) the feed-in of wind energy reduces the nec-
essary conventional load. This leads to a daily maximum of necessary conventional load
between 19:00 hrs and 20:00 hrs.
Thirdly, the interval, which is stretched by maximum 5 % and minimum 5 % necessary
conventional load, is considerably increased. In order to explain the pattern of these
extremal values it is very helpful to keep the weekly pattern of renewable energy feed-in
presented in figure 2.33 in mind. For 5 % of observations calm and windless night hours
lead to a renewable energies feed-in of round about 1 GW only. At noon renewable energy
feed-in for 5 % of observations results in round about 5 GW or less. Thus, the 5 % upper
bound of necessary conventional load is time-dependent shifting between 1 GW and 5
GW. In contrast, during windy nights for 5 % of the observations a renewable energy
feed-in of between 12 GW and 20 GW can be found. At noon, common feed-in for 5 %
of the observations leads to a renewable energy feed-in of between 25 GW and 30 GW.
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Thus, the 5 % lower bound of necessary conventional load is time-dependent shifting by
between 12 GW and 30 GW. The interval stretched by the maximum and minimum 5%
of necessary conventional load is enlarged asymmetrically.
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Figure 2.44: Realized Necessary Conventional Load 2013
Figure 2.44 shows the actually realized necessary conventional load in 2013, which
is calculated by deducting realized renewable energies supply from realized demand for
electricity. This profile of the actually realized necessary conventional load does not fun-
damentally differ from its forecast illustrated in figure 2.43. However, all values for neces-
sary conventional load are mean or 5% boundary values. Thus, to analyze forecast quality
direct differences of day-ahead forecast of necessary conventional load and the actually
realized conventional load for every hour and day in 2013 have to be computed. The
quality of day-ahead forecast is evaluated by analyzing histograms for weekdays, week-
end and a total week separately, since due to heterogeneous demand levels separating
evaluation might be necessary.
Figure 2.45 shows the empirical histogram of day-ahead forecast error for necessary
conventional load, which is found by deducting realized necessary conventional load from
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day-ahead forecast of necessary conventional load. Data for all days of a week is taken
into account. In 2013 the mean day-ahead-forecast error was close to zero (-0.005 GW)
and standard deviation of day-ahead forecast error has been 2.50 GW. Thus, on average
forecast of conventional necessary load is good. However, high forecast errors of more
than 4 GW account for 4.8 % and high forecast errors leading to less than -4 GW account
for 5.1%. The highest positive day-ahead forecast error in 2013 was 17.6 GW and the
highest negative forecast error was -12.3 GW. Hence, in few cases forecasted and realized
necessary conventional load differ distinctly. A normal distribution that has a mean and
standard deviation according to values estimated in 2013 is plotted. Comparing the em-
pirical histogram to this normal distribution suggests a more leptokurtik distribution for
day-ahead forecast errors, since day-ahead forecast errors between -1 GW and 1 GW are
more often realized than a normal distribution would suggest.
−10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Day-Ahead Forecast Error in GW
P
ro
p
or
ti
on
of
F
or
ec
as
t
E
rr
or
p
er
G
W
Day-Ahead Forecast Error of Necessary Conventional Load (Mon.-Sun.) 2013
Emp. Histogram
Norm. Distr.
Figure 2.45: Day-Ahead Forecast Error of Necessary Conventional Load (Mon.-Sun.)
2013
Figure 2.46 shows the empirical histogram of day-ahead forecast error for necessary
conventional load, which is found by deducting realized necessary conventional load from
day-ahead forecast of necessary conventional load. Only data for working days (Mon.
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-Fri.) is taken into account. In 2013 mean day-ahead forecast error has been negative (-
0.22 GW) and standard deviation of day-ahead forecast error has been 2.46 GW for work
days. Thus, on average the forecast of necessary conventional load was below actual
realization of necessary conventional load. Large positive day-ahead forecast errors of
more than 4 GW are realized for 4.0 % of observations and large negative day-ahead
forecast errors are realized for 5.8% of observations. The highest positive day-ahead
forecast error was 17.57 GW and the highest negative day-ahead forecast error was -
12.3 GW. Again, large differences of day-ahead forecast error and realized necessary
conventional load can occur.
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Figure 2.46: Day-Ahead Forecast Error of Necessary Conventional Load (Mon.-Fri.)
2013
Figure 2.47 shows the empirical histogram of day-ahead forecast error for necessary
conventional load. This is found by deducting realized necessary conventional load from
day-ahead forecast of necessary conventional load. Only data for weekend days (Sat. -
Sun.) is taken into account. In 2013 the mean day-ahead forecast error was positive (0.5
GW) and standard deviation of day-ahead forecast error has been 2.522 GW for work
days. Thus, on average forecast of necessary conventional load was above actual real-
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ization of necessary conventional load. Large positive day-ahead forecast errors of more
than 4 GW are realized for 3.5 % and large negative day-ahead forecast errors are realized
for 6.6 % of all observations. The highest positive day-ahead forecast error was 16.6 GW
and the highest negative day-ahead forecast error was -10.3 GW. Again, large differences
of day-ahead forecast error and realized necessary conventional load can occur.
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Figure 2.47: Day-Ahead Forecast Error of Necessary Conventional Load for Weekend
2013
The analysis of day-ahead forecast errors of necessary conventional load can be sum-
marized as follows: On average day-ahead forecasts give a good estimation of electricity
demand that has to be generated by conventional (coal, nuclear or gas) power plants.
However, even on preceding days this necessary conventional load cannot be estimated
exactly, which for few days leads to severe coordination problems. Transmission system
operators approach this problem by using control energy. If the feed-in of electricity is too
high, transmission operators forbid suppliers to deliver electricity and compensate their
losses by market prices. If on the other hand feed-in of electricity is too low, e.g. gas
plants are forced to supply electricity and are compensated for their costs. The costs for
controlling feed-in fluctuations are financed by a levy that is added to the price paid by
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the end-consumers.
Serial Correlation of Demand for Conventional Load
When analyzing strategic pricing on the German electricity market, it is important to keep
in mind the three most important properties of demand for electricity. Firstly, demand for
electricity shows a clear daily pattern. Secondly, demand for electricity differs signifi-
cantly for working days and weekends. Thirdly, due to weather conditions and consumer
behavior demand for electricity is likely to be serially correlated over time.
To answer the question to what extent demand for electricity is serially correlated over
time, one must remember the trading rules of the day-ahead auction on the EPEX SPOT.
As presented in table 2.5 prices and quantities offered for trading have to be registered un-
til 12:00 (noon) for each trading block of the next day into the EPEX SPOT order system.
After that EPEX SPOT sets up for each trading block a day-ahead spot market price to
clear the market and the highest price bid, which is just suitable to meet demand, is taken
as the market price for the corresponding trading block. Thus, market participants have to
give their offer for a vector of 24 prices and quantities until 12:00 (noon) of the previous
day. Thus, for strategic price decisions on the day-ahead spot market implications of daily
patterns are less important than implications coming from serial correlation for different
days.
The time series of demand for conventional electricity is taken to analyze serial corre-
lation, since renewable energy feed-in does decrease demand for electricity available for
price setting firms. For each of the 24 trading blocks a separate time series for 2013 is
computed, since otherwise calculations of correlation would be misleading due to the de-
terministic daily pattern. This is done for day-ahead forecasted demand for conventional
load, which is given by ENTSO-E day-ahead forecast for demand less EEX day-ahead
forecast of renewable energies feed-in. This is done for the actually realized demand for
conventional load, which is given by ENTSO-E realized demand less realized feed-in of
renewable energies additionally. For each of the 48 time series of demand for conven-
tional serial correlation for the first three lags is computed. For example, correlation of
the first lag means the correlation for a realization in t and t − 1 for all t (except for first
day and last day due to missing predecessor and successor). Correlation of second lag
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means the correlation for a realization in t and t− 2 for all t (except for first two days and
last two days due to missing predecessors and successors).
Table 2.10 shows serial correlation for morning hours on a weekday as well as the
mean of all correlations of the morning, whereas table 2.11 shows serial correlation for
weekday evening hours. For the first lag of the forecasted necessary conventional load
time series serial correlation for hours one to six, when due to the daily pattern demand
for electricity is low, is about 0.55. After that, serial correlation is increasing from 0.61
at hour 7 to 0.71 at hour 12. On average first lag serial correlation for morning hours is
given by 0.62. For the second lag of forecasted necessary conventional load time series
serial correlation is increasing from 0.27 at hour 1 to 0.58 at hour 12. On average second
lag serial correlation for morning hours is given by 0.41. For the third lag of forecasted
necessary conventional load time series serial correlation is increasing from 0.19 at hour
1 to 0.53 at hour 12. On average third lag serial correlation for morning hours is given by
0.35.
For the first lag of the realized necessary conventional load time series serial correlation
for hours one to six, is about 0.65. After that, serial correlation is increasing up to 0.70
at hour 12. On average first lag serial correlation for morning hours is given by 0.66.
For the second lag of realized necessary conventional load time series serial correlation is
increasing from 0.42 at hour 1 to 0.59 at hour 12. On average second lag serial correlation
for morning hours is given by 0.49. For the third lag of realized necessary conventional
load time series serial correlation is increasing from -0.06(!) at hour 1 to 0.52 at hour 12.
On average third lag serial correlation for morning hours is given by 0.38.
For the first lag of the forecasted necessary conventional load time series serial corre-
lation for hours thirteen to nineteen is about 0.70 and rather stable. For hours 20 to 24,
where demand is smaller than at noon, serial correlation is decreased to about 0.60. On
average first lag serial correlation for midday and evening is given by 0.66. For the second
lag of the forecasted necessary conventional load time series serial correlation for hours
thirteen to nineteen is about 0.57 and rather stable. For hours 20 to 24, when demand
is smaller than at noon, serial correlation is decreased to about 0.35. On average second
lag serial correlation for midday and evening is given by 0.48. For the third lag of the
forecasted necessary conventional load time series serial correlation for hours thirteen to
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Forecasted Load Realized Load
Trading Block Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3
1 0.53 0.27 0.19 0.64 0.42 -0.06
2 0.54 0.28 0.20 0.63 0.43 0.32
3 0.55 0.30 0.21 0.63 0.43 0.33
4 0.55 0.30 0.21 0.62 0.42 0.33
5 0.55 0.30 0.22 0.62 0.42 0.33
6 0.56 0.31 0.24 0.65 0.44 0.35
7 0.61 0.38 0.32 0.68 0.49 0.41
8 0.67 0.48 0.43 0.70 0.53 0.48
9 0.71 0.55 0.53 0.70 0.55 0.52
10 0.73 0.59 0.56 0.70 0.58 0.54
11 0.72 0.58 0.56 0.69 0.59 0.54
12 0.71 0.58 0.53 0.70 0.59 0.52
Mean 0.62 0.41 0.35 0.66 0.49 0.38
Table 2.10: Serial Correlation of Demand for Conventional Load on Weekdays (0-12 hrs)
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Forecasted Load Realized Load
Trading Block Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3
13 0.72 0.57 0.54 0.71 0.58 0.54
14 0.71 0.57 0.54 0.69 0.58 0.53
15 0.72 0.57 0.55 0.71 0.59 0.55
16 0.70 0.57 0.53 0.71 0.60 0.55
17 0.69 0.56 0.52 0.70 0.60 0.55
18 0.71 0.58 0.54 0.72 0.60 0.57
19 0.68 0.53 0.47 0.70 0.57 0.52
20 0.62 0.42 0.36 0.65 0.48 0.42
21 0.58 0.34 0.26 0.62 0.42 0.36
22 0.57 0.34 0.26 0.63 0.43 0.34
23 0.59 0.36 0.31 0.68 0.49 0.41
24 0.60 0.38 0.33 0.70 0.53 0.44
Mean 0.66 0.48 0.43 0.68 0.54 0.48
Table 2.11: Serial Correlation of Demand for Conventional Load on Weekdays (13-24
hrs)
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nineteen is about 0.55 and rather stable. For hours 20 to 24, when demand is smaller
than at noon, serial correlation is decreased to about 0.30. On average third lag serial
correlation for midday and evening is given by 0.43.
For the first lag of the realized necessary conventional load time series serial correla-
tion for hours thirteen to nineteen is about 0.70 and rather stable. For hours 20 to 24 serial
correlation is decreased to about 0.65. On average first lag serial correlation for midday
and evening is given by 0.68. For the second lag of the realized necessary conventional
load time series serial correlation for hours thirteen to nineteen is about 0.60 and rather
stable. For hours 20 to 24, when demand is smaller than at noon, second lag serial corre-
lation is decreased to about 0.35. On average second lag serial correlation for midday and
evening is given by 0.54. For the third lag of the forecasted necessary conventional load
time series serial correlation for hours thirteen to nineteen is about 0.55 and rather stable.
For hours 20 to 24, when demand is smaller than at noon, serial correlation is decreased
to about 0.37. On average third lag serial correlation for midday and evening is given by
0.48.
Table 2.12 shows serial correlation for the time series of forecasted and realized neces-
sary conventional load for morning hours on weekend days (Saturday and Sunday) as well
as the mean of all correlations of the morning, whereas table 2.13 shows serial correlation
for the time series of forecasted and realized necessary conventional load for weekend
evening hours.
For the time series of forecasted necessary conventional load the first lag serial corre-
lation is about 0.30 for hours 1 to 5. It decreases to 0.17 for hour 8 and then increases
to 0.50 for hour 12. The mean first lag serial correlation for hours 1 to 12 is given by
0.30. The second lag serial correlation is larger, since for trading hours 1 to 7 second
lag serial correlation is about 0.45 and then increases to about 0.63 for hours 9 to 12 and
mean second lag serial correlation is given by 0.51. At first glance this seems to be rather
strange. At second glance this result becomes clear, since weekend time series consists
of Saturday and Sundays, with different patterns of demand for electricity. A serial cor-
relation being higher for the second lag compared to the first lag just means that the daily
component is larger than the weekly component of demand for electricity. The third lag
serial correlation is rather small for most trading hours, which means that e.g. forecasted
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Forecasted Load Realized Load
Trading Block Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3
1 0.30 0.46 0.12 0.39 0.46 0.11
2 0.31 0.44 0.10 0.37 0.44 0.07
3 0.31 0.43 0.09 0.38 0.44 0.06
4 0.29 0.43 0.09 0.37 0.47 0.06
5 0.28 0.40 0.10 0.36 0.47 0.05
6 0.25 0.40 0.09 0.36 0.49 0.08
7 0.17 0.46 0.03 0.25 0.54 0.01
8 0.17 0.57 0.07 0.25 0.61 0.06
9 0.23 0.64 0.14 0.31 0.67 0.19
10 0.32 0.65 0.22 0.40 0.68 0.30
11 0.40 0.64 0.28 0.45 0.67 0.33
12 0.50 0.62 0.36 0.50 0.64 0.37
Mean 0.30 0.51 0.14 0.37 0.55 0.14
Table 2.12: Serial Correlation of Demand for Conventional Load on Weekends (0-12 hrs)
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Forecasted Load Realized Load
Trading Block Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3
13 0.55 0.61 0.41 0.53 0.65 0.40
14 0.54 0.59 0.40 0.52 0.65 0.42
15 0.53 0.58 0.39 0.52 0.66 0.42
16 0.51 0.60 0.40 0.53 0.68 0.44
17 0.51 0.61 0.43 0.54 0.72 0.47
18 0.53 0.64 0.45 0.55 0.74 0.51
19 0.51 0.59 0.39 0.53 0.69 0.49
20 0.44 0.44 0.26 0.45 0.58 0.39
21 0.44 0.32 0.18 0.45 0.48 0.31
22 0.46 0.30 0.18 0.49 0.47 0.33
23 0.51 0.37 0.27 0.52 0.06 0.39
24 0.51 0.38 0.30 0.56 0.53 0.45
Mean 0.50 0.50 0.34 0.51 0.57 0.42
Table 2.13: Serial Correlation of Demand for Conventional Load on Weekends (13-24
hrs)
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demand for conventional electricity on Saturday of week 1 is almost uncorrelated with
forecasted demand for conventional electricity in week 2 .
For the time series of realized necessary conventional load a similar pattern of serial
correlation can be seen. The first lag serial correlation for realized necessary conventional
load is about 0.37 for hours 1 to 5. After a decrease to 0.25 at hour 8 serial correlation
increases to 0.50 at hour 12. On average serial correlation is given by 0.37. Again, the
second lag serial correlation is larger than first lag serial correlation, since it is about 0.45
for hours 1 to 5 and about 0.65 for hours 8 to 12 and on average second serial correlation
is about 0.55. The third lag serial correlation is rather small, which again means that
necessary conventional load on morning hours is almost unrelated for a Saturday and
Sunday not belonging to the same weekend.
Serial correlation of necessary conventional load for weekend evening hours shows a
slightly different pattern. The first lag serial correlation of forecasted necessary conven-
tional load is about 0.52 for hour 13 to 19. After a decrease to 0.44 for hour 21 serial
correlation increases to 0.51 at hour 24 again. The average first lag serial correlation is
0.50. The second lag serial correlation is about 0.60 for hour 13 to 19 and decreases to
0.38 at hour 24. The average serial correlation is given by 0.50. The third lag serial cor-
relation is about 0.40 for hours 13 to 19. It decreases to 0.18 for hour 22 and increases to
0.30 for hour 24. The average third lag serial correlation is given by 0.34.
The first lag serial correlation of realized necessary conventional load is about 0.53 for
hour 13 to 19. After a decrease to 0.45 for hour 21 serial correlation increases to 0.56
at hour 24 again. The average first lag serial correlation is 0.51. The second lag serial
correlation is about 0.68 for hour 13 to 19 and decreases to 0.53 at hour 24. For hour 23
it is 0.06, which means there is no correlation. The average second lag serial correlation
is given by 0.57. The third lag serial correlation is about 0.45 for hours 13 to 19. It
decreases to 0.31 for hour 21 and increases to 0.45 for hour 24. The average third lag
serial correlation is given by 0.42.
In general serial correlation seems to be higher for times of strong demand for elec-
tricity. The serial correlation of weekday time series is decreasing with a higher lag. For
the weekend time series the second lag is very important, since serial correlation is rather
strong. This is due to different demand patterns on Saturdays and Sundays, which espe-
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cially for morning hours seem to be stronger than the weekly pattern. Another interesting
point is that serial correlation of forecasted necessary conventional load is usually below
serial correlation of realized necessary conventional load. Both time series show up a
clear mean reversion, since even the highest calculated values of serial correlation do not
exceed 0.75. Thus, the time series of demand for conventional electricity can computed
by statistical standard methods and procedures such as cointegration have not to be ap-
plied. The serial correlation is decreasing rather fast. This means fluctuations can be seen
as rather transitory instead of persistent.
2.3.3 Conventional Load and Day-Ahead Spot Prices
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Figure 2.48: Forecasted Necessary Conventional Load and EPEX SPOT Day-Ahead Spot
Price
In order to analyze the relationship between necessary conventional load and EPEX
SPOT day-ahead spot prices a scatter plot is used. More precisely speaking, a scatter
plot for forecasted necessary conventional load and the corresponding EPEX SPOT day-
ahead spot price as well as a scatter plot for realized necessary conventional load and the
corresponding EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot price is drawn.
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Figure 2.48 shows the relationship between forecasted necessary conventional load and
the EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot price. In general a linear relationship between forecasted
necessary load and the EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot price can be found. However, the
range of possible combinations is rather wide. For values of the forecasted necessary
conventional load below 30 GW there appear outliers from this linear relationship. This
can be seen by a minimal day-ahead price of -100.03 e/MWh that appears together with
a forecasted necessary conventional load of 19.08 GW. In contrast the minimal forecasted
necessary conventional load of 17.43 GW appears together with a day-ahead spot price of
9.77 e/MWh.
A slightly larger forecasted necessary conventional load of 17.89 GW has led to a price
of 20.19 e/MWh and a forecasted necessary conventional load of 18.24 GW has led to a
price of 29.41 e/GW. Especially for forecasts of the necessary conventional load below
20 GW, a simple (e.g. linear) relationship between day-ahead spot price and necessary
conventional load cannot be found. For a forecasted necessary conventional load be-
tween 30 GW and 45 GW the linear relationship does not show any real outliers. For
forecasts of necessary conventional load above 50 GW again several outliers occur. For
example, in 2013 the maximal price was 130.27 e/MWh. This price was realized for
a forecasted necessary conventional load of only 50.19 GW. In contrast the maximally
forecasted necessary conventional load was more than 20 GW above (71.61 GW) but has
led to a lower day-ahead price of 87.94 e/MWh. Outliers for large forecasts of necessary
conventional load deviate rather positively. This means that the EPEX SPOT day-ahead
spot price, compared to the value a linear relationship would suggest for the correspond-
ing forecasted necessary conventional load, is higher. On average forecasted necessary
conventional load in 2013 was 44.48 GW and on average EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot
price was 37.78 e/MWh.
For any forecasted necessary conventional load between 30 GW and 45 GW the linear
relationship does not show any real outliers. For forecasts of necessary conventional
load above 50 GW again several outliers occur. For example, in 2013 the maximal price
was 130.27 e/MWh. This price was realized for a forecasted necessary conventional
load of only 50.19 GW. In contrast the maximally forecasted necessary conventional load
was more than 20 GW above (71.61 GW), but has led to a lower day-ahead price of
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87.94 e/MWh. Outliers for large forecasts of necessary conventional load deviate rather
positively. This means that the EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot price, compared to the value a
linear relationship would suggest for the corresponding forecasted necessary conventional
load, lies above.
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Figure 2.49: Realized Necessary Conventional Load and EPEX SPOT Day-Ahead Spot
Price
Figure 2.49 shows the relationship between realized necessary conventional load and
the EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot price. For a necessary conventional load between 30 GW
and 50 GW a linear relationship describes the relationship between realized necessary
load and the EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot price very well. This relationship does not
fundamentally differ from the relationship between the EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot price
and forecasted necessary conventional load, since e.g.the range of possible combinations
is rather wide and especially for values of realized necessary conventional load below 25
GW outliers from this linear relationship appear.
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For the maximal EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot price in 2013 of 130.27 e/MWh a nec-
essary conventional load of 52.42 GW was realized. However, for the maximally realized
necessary conventional load of 72.28 GW EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot price was "only"
79.94 e/MWh. For the minimal EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot price of -100.03 e/MWh
a necessary conventional load of 18.17 GW was realized. However, for the minimally
realized necessary conventional load of 16.37 GW EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot price was
-0.03 e/MWh. These examples show again that especially for realized necessary conven-
tional load below 25 GW and above 50 GW outliers occur.
The analysis of the influence of necessary conventional load can be summarized as
follows: Firstly, in general a linear relationship of necessary conventional load and the
EPEX SPOT day-ahead spot price exists. Secondly, this relationship applies to forecasted
necessary conventional load as well as for realized necessary conventional load. Thirdly,
outliers, which cannot be easily described by this linear relationship, mainly occur for
small values of necessary conventional load below 25 GW or for larges values of neces-
sary conventional load above 50 GW.
Chapter 3
Forward Trading and Competitive
Pressure
3.1 Introduction
As shown above, for the German electricity market the following market characteristics
seem to be central: Few competitors due to high entry costs, a large market share that
is sold either on the futures market or on over-the-counter markets and a large volatility
on the demand as well as on the supply side. Stochastic influences play a central role in
the German power market and are one of the main reasons for forward trading. Thus, a
volatile market context is added to the existing economic literature (Liski and Montero,
2006) in order to gain a deeper insight into forward trading and collusion of firms. Of
course, there are important other reasons than collusive behavior for forward trading in
these markets, e.g. risk sharing. However, the common effect of large forward-traded
amounts, volatility and (tacit) collusion of firms deserves a closer look.
The intuition behind the effect of forward trading on collusion is as follows: Firms fix
a certain quantity at a certain price via forward trading. This induces two effects: On the
one hand it decreases the demand available for a deviating firm. Here, the consequence
of forward trading is pro-collusive. On the other hand, forward trading decreases the de-
mand available for collusive price-setting. Here, the consequence of forward trading is
contra-collusive. Liski and Montero (2006) and Green and Coq (2010) in a deterministic
model show that especially short-term forward contracts are suitable to stabilize collusive
agreements. As will be shown in the upcoming model, trading short-term forward con-
tracts strictly promotes collusion in volatile markets, too. However, as will be pointed
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out, trading more forward contracts than the respective monopoly quantity decreases the
profits of colluding firms. This is a problem for colluding firms in a volatile market, espe-
cially when demand and cost parameters are continuously distributed, since firms cannot
avoid having involuntarily contracted more than the corresponding monopoly quantity.
This "over-contracting" leads to a decrease of the spot and forward market price and of
the expected collusive profit.
The rest of this theoretical contribution is organized as follows:
Section 3.2 presents existing economic literature, that is suitable to describe strategic
behavior on the German electricity market. The focus of this literature overview is on
competition and collusive behavior as well as on economic consequences of forward trad-
ing. In section 3.3.1 the main assumptions of the model and some general remarks are
presented. Then in section 3.3.3 the effects of forward trading on a collusive agreement
are modeled for a volatile market structure. In section 3.3.4 each firm’s expected profit
is derived for any probability density function. Then an exponential distribution is used
to show the profit decreasing effect of forward trading. Section 3.3.5 incorporates the
possibility for firms to trade forward contracts while setting a price below the monopoly
price. The properties of such a semi-collusive strategy are modeled for a two state distri-
bution of cost and demand parameters. Section 3.3.6 analyzes the stability of a collusive
agreement, when firms take a long position on the forward market. This means that firms
are committed by forward contracts to buy their own production.Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Literature on Forward Trading and Competi-
tive Pressure
The Economic Analysis of Anti-Competitive Pricing
There exist several approaches to analyze the competitiveness of a certain industry. One
famous approach models the incentive to agree on a price above equilibrium price (tac-
itly). The main idea of such an agreement, which is referred to as collusion in economic
literature, is a trade-off for repeatedly competing firms: On the one hand, a large incentive
to set a price below the actual market price exists, since this can lead to additional demand
and profit. On the other hand, this is followed by a price decrease of all competitors, since
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they want to regain market shares and retaliate for deviation from the former market price.
An exceptional survey of theoretical and empirical literature about collusion is provided
by Feuerstein (2005).
The starting point for the discussion about collusive behavior of firms was the publi-
cation "A non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames" of Friedman (1971). In his pio-
neering work Friedman (1971) introduced the concept of a supergame, which was firstly
able to describe strategic behavior in an endless sequence of "ordinary" games. Whenever
a firm is undercutting a collusive price exceeding the competitive outcome, its opponent
chooses a price to match this competitive outcome (forever). This strategy is called grim
trigger strategy, since no return to the collusive outcome is possible. This basic concept of
none-cooperative firms that compete over and over again and therefore incorporate future
competitive pressure into the actual pricing decision, seems to describe the basic situation
on the German electricity market. As has been shown above, on the German electric-
ity market the demand for (conventional) electricity is fluctuating and shows a stochastic
component. Thus, using the supergame concept according to Friedman (1971) as a start-
ing point, seems promising, but has in any case to be augmented by demand fluctuations.
Green and Porter (1984) were the first to allow for changing market conditions in a
supergame setting. These changing market conditions are modeled by identically dis-
tributed independent demand shocks. Each (tacitly) colluding competitor has information
about its own price and market share. However, to what extent the actual market share
depends on a boom or on a recession that affects all competitors a firm does not know.
Firms cannot distinguish between a decrease in sales, which is triggered by a recession, or
by a competitor that is undercutting a certain market price. Grim trigger strategy cannot
be implemented and firms will have to decrease their common market price for a certain
period of time, whenever sales have decreased. This is necessary to ensure price matching
behavior, since otherwise undercutting any collusive market price would be too profitable.
Thus, each recession induces a price war for a certain period of time.
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) contributed to the economic literature by incorporat-
ing stochastic market conditions, too. The main difference to the work of Green and
Porter (1984) comes from their assumption about observability, since Rotemberg and Sa-
loner (1986) assume full observability of prices, marginal costs and the general economic
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situation. This eliminates the requirement of price wars after a recession. In a boom
temptation to undercut the market price is increased, since this would lead to a dispropor-
tionate increase in current profits. Long-term profitability of collusion is not altered, since
according to Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) demand shocks are (again) independent and
identically distributed. In contrast to Green and Porter (1984) price wars are induced by
booms. The different outcomes of both contributions led to a broad discussion, since for
both theories empirical evidence could be found. Aiginger (1991) provided a profound
survey about empirical literature on the question whether price wars occur in booms or
recessions. For most industries longer-lasting periods of boom or recession can be ob-
served. Thus, one crucial assumption of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) as well as Green
and Porter (1984) was that demand shocks are independent and identically distributed. A
first attempt of introducing business cycles instead of business fluctuations was made by
Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). They allow "the level of current demand and firms
expectations on future demand to change over time" (Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991,
p.89) and identify two effects: "First, the gain to deviation from the established pricing
rule varies over the cycle and is highest when demand is strongest. Second, the discounted
loss from such a deviation is also found to vary over the cycle and is lowest during a re-
cession as demand is anticipated to be falling in the immediate future" (Haltiwanger and
Harrington, 1991, p.102). At first glance these deterministic fluctuations seem to fit per-
fectly demand fluctuations on the German electricity market and one might conclude that
collusion is hardest to sustain after the peak during noon, since profit on deviation is high
and foregoing profits for the next hours are comparatively low. However, as described
above, electricity is mainly traded on the day-ahead spot market. On the day-ahead spot
market until 12 (noon) bids for all hours of the next day have to be submitted. Thus, each
firms has to submit a vector of prices and quantities and the strong daily demand pattern
becomes strategically less important. Kandori (1991) introduced serial correlated shocks
and confirms the theory of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), since the equilibrium exhibits
"the same counter-cyclical movement as in the i.i.d. case, if the discount factor and the
number of firms satisfy certain relationship". In contrast Bagwell and Staiger (1997) intro-
duced longer periods of recession with small or negative growth rates and of booms with
high growth rate using a markov process. Additionally they allow for transitory (in the
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sense of uncorrelated) shocks and show that Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) can be seen
as a special case of Bagwell and Staiger (1997), if only such transitory demand shocks
occur. Bagwell and Staiger (1997) show that for positive correlated demand shocks prices
are weakly procyclical and that c.p. shorter boom phases and longer recession phases
increase the amplitude of the collusive pricing cycle.
Fabra and Toro (2005) raised the question of competitiveness on the Spanish electricity
market. They present a theoretical framework to analyze pricing behavior and empirically
test for hypotheses of individual profit maximization and collusive prices. Evidence for
(tacitly) collusive behavior is found, since "the performance of the Spanish electricity
market during 1998 is not consistent with the predictions of models of individual profit
maximizing behavior" (Fabra and Toro, 2005, p.179).
For an analysis of the German electricity market these models about collusive pric-
ing and competitive pressure exhibit some similarities to the German electricity market.
However, one very important tool, which could be used strategically, is missing above all:
Forward Trading!
The Economic Analysis of Strategic Forward Trading
As the analysis of the German electricity market has shown, more than 70% of the total
market volume are traded forward. This is not only a special feature of the German
electricity market, but also holds true for other commodity markets, such as gas, steal, oil
and precious metals. These commodity markets are characterized by a substantial amount
traded in forward and futures contracts as well as only few oligopolisitc firms are able to
serve demand. However, there exists hardly any literature about the strategic aspects of
forward trading. To be successful on an oligopolistic market each firm has to incorporate
all actions and reactions of its competitors. Thus, strategic behavior becomes important
and the methods typically used in industrial organization are suitable to analyze firms’
behavior on commodity markets and to predict market results.
Economic literature about financial markets often assumes atomistic small traders, sell-
ers and buyers, not being able to have any influence on market prices. Thus, strategic
aspects are normally not modeled and firms’ motives of forward trading is risk hedging.
3.2. LITERATURE ON FORWARD TRADING AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 113
This strong focus on risk hedging motives for forward trading seems misleading for com-
modity markets. Moraga-González and van Eijkel (2010) fundamentally questions risk
hedging motives as the main reason for forward trading in a working paper about the
Dutch natural gas wholesale market. In this contribution the question whether forward
contracts are mainly used for strategic or risk-hedging motives is discussed theoretically
as well as empirically. They "find evidence that strategic reasons play an important role
at explaining the observed firms’ hedge ratios" (Moraga-González and van Eijkel, 2010,
p.34). In contrast they see little support for the risk hedging story, since "the data do not
support the idea that risk-hedging motives are an important aspect behind the observed
firms’ hedge ratios" (Moraga-González and van Eijkel, 2010, p.34). Thus, relying solely
on risk-hedging motives to explain large forward-traded amounts on commodity market,
would be a bit naive.
Ronald W. Anderson was one of the first to bridge this gap in discussing the two-way
effects of market imperfections and futures trading. On his initiative a conference called
"The industrial organization of future markets: structure and conduct" was organized in
1982 to discuss the effects of imperfect competition and futures markets. All papers of
this conference were collected and published by Anderson (1984) by the title "The In-
dustrial Organization of Futures Markets". Most of the papers focused on the possibility
of market manipulations with forward contracts (e.g. Newbery (1998) and Kyle (1984))
or disadvantageous self-regulation (Saloner, 1984). However, one contribution, made by
Anderson and Sundaresan (1984), directly addresses the problem of imperfect competi-
tion and market power on futures markets.
At the same time Greenstone (1981) described in detail how coffee-exporting countries
formed "pancafe and the bogota group" to collude on a higher world market coffee price.
One popular tool, which was used for their coordination, were forward contracts. How-
ever, it took more than twenty years, until Liski and Montero (2006) analyzed the effects
of forward trading on colluding firms within a theoretical framework. They model an in-
finitely repeated oligopoly game, in which firms are allowed to act on the spot as well as
on the forward market. They show under a deterministic demand and supply structure that
forward trading has a stabilizing effect on a collusive agreement. In addition Liski and
Montero (2006) show that the amount of forward contracts being sold does not influence
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the profit of colluding firms, as long as it does not exceed the monopoly quantity. Thus,
in a deterministic market structure forward contracts can be used to stabilize a collusive
agreement without any disadvantage for the involved firms. This analysis of collusive
incentives for firms that compete in prices as well as in quantities is based on one-period
forward contracts. Then, Green and Coq (2010) analyzed in a similar setting the collusive
effects of forwards with varying contract lengths.
Effects of forward trading on (imperfectly) competing firms, were modeled by Allaz
and Villa (1993) for quantity-setting firms and a homogenous product and by Mahenc and
Salanié (2004) for price-setting firms with a heterogeneous good. The welfare effects of
both models contradict each other, since for price competition and heterogenous products
(Mahenc and Salanié, 2004) forward trading leads to weaker competition, whereas for
homogenous products and quantity competition (Allaz and Villa, 1993) forward trading
leads to fiercer competition.
If one assumes for the German electricity market that firms compete in quantity com-
petition for a single period, forward trading leads to welfare gains. For commodities that
can be stored Thille (2003, p.652) shows in an "infinite horizon, discrete time dynamic
game of forward trading with storage" that the welfare enhancing effects found by Allaz
and Villa (1993) are still present. However, if forward contracts are used to stabilize a col-
lusive agreement under repeated competition (Liski and Montero, 2006), welfare losses
result from forward trading.
For an analysis of the German electricity market kind of few literature about strategic
aspects of forward trading exhibits similarities and the most important market character-
istic is always missing: Stochastic and fluctuating business cycles!
Modeling Forward Trading and Competitive Pressure
As shown above, for the analysis of the German electricity market theoretical models
have to be directly tailored, since central aspects are missing in the existing literature.
The next pages are dedicated to show how central aspects, that have been derived in the
empirical analysis of the German electricity market, are incorporated into the upcoming
micro-economic analysis.
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German Electricity Market Micro-Economic Model
1 Strategic Competition between 4
Asymmetric Firms
Strategic Competition between 2
Symmetric Firms
2 Forward Contracts with Diﬀerent
Maturities
Standardized One-Period Forward
Contracts
3 Day-Ahead Spot Market Day-Ahead Spot Market
4 Intraday Spot Market Only (Day-Ahead) Spot Market
5 Large Number of Electricity Traders No Strategic Inﬂuence of Traders
6 Heterogeneity of Consumers (Industry
and Households)
One Linear Demand Function for All
Consumers
7 Electricity Tariﬀs are Oﬀered "One Price Fits All"
8 Convex Marginal Costs Constant Marginal Costs
9 Stochastic Fluctuations of Demand
and Supply
Supply and Demand only Known in
Expectation
Table 3.1: Comparison of German Electricity Market and the Micro-Economic Model
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Table 3.1 shows central aspects of the German electricity market and the way they are
incorporated into the micro-economic model.
First, on the German electricity market the four largest electricity suppliers (E.ON,
RWE, ENBW, Vattenfall) have the most significant market shares, whereas market shares
of other electricity suppliers are hardly worth mentioning. For conventionally generated
electricity this effect is even stronger, since smaller electricity suppliers have mainly in-
vested in renewable energies. Feed-in of renewable energies are remunerated by a fixed
compensation and renewable energies are fed into the German grid independently of mar-
ket conditions. Thus, for an analysis of the electricity wholesale market conventional load
matters and strategic linkages between competitors are likely to occur. Strategic interac-
tion is incorporated by assuming only two symmetric firms. This can be done without
loss of generality, since directions of strategic effects are not changed.
Second, about 70 % of the total electricity is traded forward on the German electricity
market. The rest is mainly traded on the day-ahead spot market. A rather small amount
is traded on the intraday spot market. This market structure is reflected in the presented
model, by allowing firms to trade on a forward market as well as on a spot market. Firms
are only able to trade forward contracts with maturity of exactly one period in the model.
This seams to be justified, since to a great extent forward contracts with a maturity of one-
year are traded on the German electricity market. There is no such thing as an intraday
spot market in the micro-economic model. This negligence can be justified by the fact,
that market volumes on the intraday spot market are rather low in Germany.
Third, there is a large number of electricity traders on the German wholesale electricity
market. It is not likely that these electricity traders have a significant influence on market
outcomes or exercise market power. In the presented model this is reflected by a forward
price that equals the expected spot market price. This results from rational expectations
of electricity traders and their insignificant influence on the spot market price.
Fourth, electricity demand in Germany comes from round about 40 million households
and a vast number of commercial consumers. Thus, electricity demand comes from very
heterogeneous private and commercial consumers. As a consequence electricity tariffs are
offered to private and commercial consumers. Large (commercial) consumers can directly
negotiate their electricity contract with a utility company. In order to keep the micro-
3.2. LITERATURE ON FORWARD TRADING AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 117
economic analysis tractable all this sorts of heterogeneity are neglected and consumers
are assumed to be price takers.
Fifth, electricity demand and supply are very volatile. Fluctuations between 20 GW
and 70 GW could be found for conventionally generated electricity in 2013. This mar-
ket characteristic is reflected by allowing for fluctuations of demand and supply in the
model. However, one important characteristic of electricity markets is missing: Increas-
ing marginal costs and the merit order curve! In order to keep the model analytically
tractable constant marginal costs are assumed and the question to what extent convex
marginal costs influence forward trading and the market outcome is left for further re-
search.
Having this set of important characteristics of the German electricity market in mind,
adding volatile market conditions to the model of Liski and Montero (2006) seems to
be appropriate for the analysis of forward trading on competitive pressure. The literature
about collusion and business cycles proposes three ways of introducing these fluctuations:
Firstly, Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) are modeling business cycles of known
length. This would be the best way to incorporate the daily rather deterministic pattern of
electricity demand. On the German day-ahead spot market electricity is traded one day
in advance for all trading blocks. Thus, fluctuations coming from the daily pattern are
of minor strategic importance for electricity trading firms, since they do not change this
daily total traded amount and the strategic pricing decision for firms differs from the one
Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) propose.
Secondly, Bagwell and Staiger (1997) allow for serial correlation in the business cycles
by using a Markov process. They allow for transitory identically independent distributed
shocks additionally. Stochastic fluctuations coming from different weather conditions
significantly influence demand for conventional electricity. From a strategic perspective
this stochastic fluctuations are of great importance for pricing behavior of firms, since
they cannot be anticipated in advance. Tables 2.10, 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13 illustrate serial
correlation of demand for conventionally generated electricity and show that demand for
electricity is serially correlated. However, this serial correlation declines rapidly.
Thirdly, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) assume identically independent distributed
118 CHAPTER 3. FORWARD TRADING AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURE
shocks, which cannot be directly supported by the evaluation of serial correlation. How-
ever, the model of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) is used as a starting point for the up-
coming analysis. Allowing for serial correlation would lead to a significant increase in
complexity of the model without the generation of a significantly better understanding of
the German electricity market. The empirical analysis of serial correlation of necessary
conventional load has shown that fluctuations are rather transitory. Combined with the
findings of Bagwell and Staiger (1997) that for transitory shocks their results are equiva-
lent to Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), this approach seems to be justified. Therefore the
model of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) is taken as a starting point.
The model, that is presented on the next pages, has been published in the series Uni-
versity of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance (Aichele, 2014a). Results
were additionally presented on the "Jahrestagung 2012 des Vereins für Socialpolitik in
Göttingen" as well as on the GEABA conference 2012 in Graz. Results about aspects
of semi-collusive strategies were presented on the "Jahrestagung 2013 des Vereins für
Socialpolitik in Düsseldorf" as well a on the annual meeting 2013 of the European Asso-
ciation of Research in Industrial Economics (Aichele, 2013)
3.3 The model
3.3.1 Assumptions and General Remarks
Collusive behavior of firms can occur, if and only if, there is no incentive for any firm
to deviate from the collusive agreement unilaterally. If the net present value of profits
gained by collusion is greater or equal than the net present value of profits gained by
ending collusion, no incentive for any firm to break the collusive agreement unilaterally
exists. The highest profit that can be earned in each period is the monopoly profit, which
is shared equally by both (symmetric) firms.
It is assumed that firms face a linear demand function (D = a − p) and bear constant
marginal costs c. The exact outcome of prices, quantities and profits is stochastic and
depends on the difference between the reservation price a and marginal costs c. I do not
distinguish between demand and supply shocks. The difference between the reservation
price and marginal costs (γ = a − c) will be denoted "spread" in the analysis. The first
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two moments of this “spread” are given by E[γ] and V [γ]. In order to give comparative
static results, the König-Huygens theorem is used later in this paper to decompose the
expectation of the squared “spread” into its variance and its squared expectation (E [γ2] =
V [γ] + E[γ]2).
Whenever I use monopoly prices, quantities and profits for the argumentation, I refer to
monopoly prices, quantities and profits for a given realization of the stochastic difference
between reservation price and marginal costs. As shown by Liski and Montero (2006, p.
226) assuming a linear demand function is possible without loss of generality. I denote the
price, quantity and profit associated with the one-period monopoly solution by pM = a+c
2
,
qM = a−c
2
and ΠM = (pM − c)qM = (a−c)2
4
.
The spot and the forward market are connected as follows: During the first period, both
firms simultaneously choose the amount of forward contracts they want to trade (for-
ward market period). During the second period, contracts are settled and firms choose
the amount they additionally want to sell on the spot market (spot market period). The
forward market opens in the even periods (t = 0, 2, . . . ) and the spot market in the odd
periods (t = 1, 3, . . . ). To maintain comparability with pure-spot market games the per
period discount factor is given by
√
δ. Alternatively the spot market opens for a marginal
unit of time right after the forward market and the discount factor is given by δ. The
important fact is that discounting only takes place between two spot markets, two forward
markets or the forward market in t and the spot market in t + 1. Hence, no discounting
takes place between consecutive forward and spot markets. The structure of trading ini-
tially on the forward market and settling contracts afterwards as well as meeting residual
demand on the spot market is infinitely repeated. One can think of firms deciding around
Christmas each year about forward contracts to be delivered in the following year.
Firms compete in prices and sell a homogenous product, which seems a valid assump-
tion especially for electricity markets. Whenever firm i sets a price lower than its com-
petitor j firm i meets the whole spot market demand. However, this spot market demand
is decreased by the total amount of forward contracts that have been sold before by firm i
and by firm j (F˜ = f˜i + f˜j). Thus, the demand to serve and the spot market profit can be
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stated as:
DSMi =
(
a− F˜ − pi
)
ΠSMi = (pi − c)
(
a− F˜ − pi
) (3.1)
When prices are equal, firms split the market equally. Consider the following trigger
strategy to ensure collusive behavior: In the first forward market round (period 0), firm
i sells an amount of contracts that are settled right in the next period, f˜ 0,1i , and sells no
contracts that are settled in subsequent periods, f˜ 0,li = 0 for all l > 1, where l denotes
the period of delivery. Hence firms only sell forward contracts that will be settled in
the following spot market, since no forward contracts with delivery in t > 1 are sold
(f˜ 0,li = 0 ∀ l > 1). In this following spot market period firm i sets the monopoly price
(pti = p
M ) if and only if in every period preceding period t both firms have set monopoly
prices in the spot market and have contracted the collusive amount f˜ 0,1i = f˜
0,1
j = f˜ in
the forward market one period ahead. Whenever firm j deviates from this agreement, firm
i sets a price equal to marginal costs in the spot market and sells any arbitrary amount of
forward contracts forever. This can be seen as the grim trigger strategy for games, where
firms are allowed to trade on a spot as well as on a forward market. It corresponds to the
grim trigger strategy analyzed by Friedman (1971), when firms were solely allowed to
trade on a spot market.
Liski and Montero (2006) do not allow forward contracts exceeding monopoly quantity
in their model of forward trading and collusion in a deterministic market structure. How-
ever, in a volatile market, firms do not know in any forward market period the demand
and cost structure they will face in the following spot market period. Hence, firms might
have traded forward more than the quantity they can sell with monopoly prices on spot
market. This may happen e.g. for a relatively small realization of the difference of reser-
vation price and marginal costs. Therefore the critical discount factor will be derived for
the forward traded amount being less than monopoly quantity as well as for the forward
traded amount being larger than monopoly quantity.
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3.3.2 Proﬁts for a Deviating Firm and for a Colluding Firm
In general, two possibilities of deviation exist: Firstly, setting a price lower than the col-
lusive price in the spot market. Secondly, increasing the forward sales in the forward
market. The latter is never profitable, as speculators, which take the counterpart, imme-
diately realize any deviation from collusion in the forward market and are not willing to
pay any price higher than the next period’s spot market price, which is given by marginal
costs. Hence, profitable deviation is restricted to the spot market and a firm trying to
deviate knows the actual state of the economy.
The demand that can be achieved on the spot market for a deviating firm is restricted by
future contracts already sold. Each firm has a secured supply of f˜i. The secured supply
of both firms is given by F˜ = f˜i + f˜j . Total traded amount decreases accessible demand
(a− F˜ instead of a). This results in the (residual) demand function on the spot market:
DRi =

(
a− F˜ − pi
)
if pi < pj,
1
2
(
a− F˜ − pi
)
if pi = pj,
0 if pi > pj
(3.2)
A firm deviating from collusion maximizes its profit over its (deviation) price. This leads
to the following optimal deviation price (pd) and quantity (qd) and profit (Πd):
max
p
Πi = (pi − c)
(
a− F˜ − pi
)
pd =
1
2
[
a+ c− F˜
]
, qd =
1
2
(
a− F˜ − c
)
,Πd =
1
4
[
a− c− F˜
]2 (3.3)
Deviation price, quantity and profit are quite similar to price, quantity and profit in a
deviation from collusion without forward trading. However, the amount already con-
tracted decreases the demand that is reachable on the spot market (∂D
d
i
∂F˜
< 0). Hence,
deviation price, quantity and profit become smaller. When the total contracted amount
exceeds or equals the Bertrand quantity (qB), which is given by twice monopoly quantity
(F˜ ≥ qB = 2qM = a− c), no positive deviation profit can be earned, since any deviation
would require a price that is lower than the Bertrand price on the spot market, which is
given by marginal costs.
As described in section 3.3.1 a deviation yields to zero profits in all following forward
and spot market periods. Consequently, the net present value of deviation is given solely
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by the deterministic deviation profit of this single period:
ENPV [Deviation] =
14
[
a− c− F˜
]2
if F˜ < 2qM
0 if F˜ ≥ 2qM ,
(3.4)
The demand that can be reached by collusive behavior in this period is also restricted by
forward contracts already sold and each firm’s collusive profit on the spot market can be
stated as:
ΠC =
1
2
DRpiC =
1
2
(
a− F˜ − pM
)
(pM − c)
=
1
8
γ2 − 1
4
γF˜ =
1
2
[
1
4
(
γ2 − 2γF˜ + F˜ 2
)
− 1
4
F˜ 2
]
=
1
2
[
1
4
(
a− c− F˜
)2
− 1
4
F˜ 2
]
=
1
2
Πd − 1
8
F˜ 2
(3.5)
Colluding firms set monopoly prices behaving as if no forward trading had occurred
(pM = a−c
2
instead of pM = a−F˜−c
2
). If they would not do so, they would not be able
to sell collusive forward contracts at expected (monopoly) prices as speculators would
anticipate the (expected) price discount on the spot market. When firms set this collusive
price, they split residual demand given by DR = a − F˜ − pM and earn a per-unit-profit
of piC = pM − c.
Whenever the total forward-traded amount does not exceed or equal monopoly quantity
(F˜ < qM ), collusive behavior leads to collusive profits in this period. Additionally col-
lusive profits given by half of the expected monopoly profit are expected in all upcoming
periods.
Whenever the total forward-traded amount exceeds or equals monopoly quantity (F˜ ≥
qM ) no collusive profits can be earned in this period, since the total demand for the
monopoly price has already been satisfied. However, not deviating from collusion promises
half of the expected monopoly profit in all upcoming periods. This defines the net present
value of collusion as a piecewise function:
ENPV [Collusion] =
{
1
2
Πd − 1
8
F˜ 2 + 1
2
δ
1−δE[Π
M ] if F˜ < qM
1
2
δ
1−δE[Π
M ] if qM ≤ F˜ < 2qM (3.6)
The different collusive profits in the period of (possible) deviation lead to two differ-
ent scenarios. In the first scenario (I), the total forward-traded amount is less than the
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monopoly quantity (F˜ < qM ). In the second scenario (II), the total forward-traded
amount exceeds monopoly quantity qM < F˜ . In the third case, the total traded amount
exceeds Bertrand quantity (qB = 2qM < F˜ ). However, the third case is not analyzed
more deeply since neither collusive nor deviation profits can be earned in the correspond-
ing period and a firm is not facing the trade-off between collusion or deviation in the
corresponding period. Hence, both firms will stick to the collusive agreement, since it is
the only way that promises future (collusive or deviation) profits.
3.3.3 Forward Trading and Stability of a Collusive Agreement
A firm that is involved in an (explicit or tacit) collusive agreement with its competitor has
two alternative strategies. Firstly, it can collude and gain a profit in the corresponding
period and in future periods. Secondly, it can deviate and gain an additional profit in the
corresponding period, but forgo all collusive profits in future periods. A firm chooses
the strategy yielding the highest expected net present value of profits. Comparing the net
present values leads to an inequality, which represents the trade-off between collusion
and deviation. This inequality is called the no deviation constraint and will be used to
find the critical discount factor. The concept of the critical discount factor is applied in
supergames to measure the stability of non-cooperative collusive behavior. The two sce-
narios mentioned above will now be discussed in detail.
Scenario I: The monopoly quantity exceeds total forward-traded amount (F˜ < qM )
For a stable collusive agreement, the net present value of collusion must be larger than the
net present value of deviation. Hence, for the forward-traded amount to be lower than the
monopoly quantity, the following no deviation constraint has to be fulfilled for a stable
collusive agreement. See equation A.1 in the appendix for a more detailed derivation:
ENPV [Deviation] ≤ ENPV [Collusion]
Πd ≤ 1
2
Πd − 1
8
F˜ 2 +
1
2
δ
1− δE
[
ΠM
]
Πd ≤ 1
2
Πd − 1
8
F˜ 2 +
1
2
δ
1− δE
[
1
4
γ2
]
1
4
γ2 +
1
2
F˜ 2 − 1
2
F˜ γ ≤ δ
1− δ
1
4
[
E [γ]2 + V ar [γ]
]
(3.7)
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Rearranging leads to the following discount factor for collusive behavior:
δ ≥ δ∗ = 1− E [γ]
2 + V ar [γ]
E [γ]2 + V ar [γ] + γ2 − 2F˜ γ + 2F˜ 2 (3.8)
Scenario II: Total forward-traded amount exceeds the monopoly quantity
(qM < F˜ )
For a stable collusive agreement, the net present value of collusion must be larger than the
net present value of deviation. No collusive profits are earned on the spot market, since
the total forward-traded amount exceeds monopoly quantity (qM < F˜ ). Hence, the net
present value of collusion is restricted to half of the future expected monopoly profits.
For the forward-traded amount exceeding monopoly quantity this results in the following
no deviation constraint for a stable collusion.See equation A.2 in the appendix for a more
detailed derivation:
ENPV [Deviation] ≤ ENPV [Collusion]
Πd ≤ 1
2
δ
1− δE[Π
M ]
Πd ≤ 1
2
δ
1− δE
[
1
4
γ2
]
1
2
γ2 − F˜ γ + 1
2
F˜ 2 ≤ δ
1− δ
1
4
[
E [γ]2 + V ar [γ]
]
(3.9)
Rearranging again yields the critical discount factor for collusive behavior:
δ ≥ δ∗ = 1− E [γ]
2 + V ar [γ]
E [γ]2 + V ar [γ] + 2γ2 − 4F˜ γ + 2F˜ 2 (3.10)
Thus, the critical discount factor for any forward-traded amount under full-collusion is
given by:
δ∗ =

1− E[γ]2+V ar[γ]
E[γ]2+V ar[γ]+γ2−2F˜ γ+2F˜ 2 if F˜ < q
M
1− E[γ]2+V ar[γ]
E[γ]2+V ar[γ]+2γ2−4F˜ γ+2F˜ 2 if q
M ≤ F˜ < 2qM
(3.11)
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In the following I will analyze how the critical discount factor is influenced by the re-
alization of the random difference between reservation price and marginal costs (γ), the
amount of forward contracts (F˜ ), the expected difference between reservation price and
marginal cost (E [γ]) and the variance of the difference between reservation price and
marginal cost (V ar [γ]).
The partial derivative of the critical discount factor with respect to the difference between
reservation price and marginal costs is given by:
∂δ∗
∂γ
=

2 [γ−F ][E[γ]+V ar[γ]]
[E[γ]2+V ar[γ]+γ2−2F˜ γ+2F˜ 2]2
≥ 0 if F˜ < qM
4
[γ−F ][E[γ]2+V ar[γ]]
[E[γ]2+V ar[γ]+2γ2−4F˜ γ+2F˜ 2]2
≥ 0 if qM ≤ F˜ < 2qM
(3.12)
A higher difference between reservation price and marginal costs leads to a higher profit
and is leading to a higher critical discount factor, because deviation becomes more attrac-
tive.
The partial derivative of the critical discount factor due to the amount of contracts is given
by:
∂δ∗
∂F˜
=

−2 [γ−2F˜ ][E[γ]
2+V ar[γ]]
[E[γ]2+V ar[γ]+γ2−2F˜ γ+2F˜ 2]2
≤ 0 if F˜ < qM
− 4 [γ−F˜ ][E[γ]
2+V ar[γ]]
[E[γ]2+V ar[γ]+2γ2−4F˜ γ+2F˜ 2]2
≤ 0 if qM ≤ F˜ < 2qM
(3.13)
A higher forward-contracted amount strictly reduces the critical discount factor, since
for forward-traded amounts less than the monopoly quantity (0 ≤ F˜ < qM = 1
2
γ) the
deviation profit is cut more sharply than the collusive profit in the corresponding period.
This is derived analytically in the appendix (equations A.5 - A.8). If the forward-traded
amount is larger than the monopoly quantity (1
2
γ = qM ≤ F˜ < qM = γ), no collusive
profit can be earned in the corresponding period. Thus, only the deviation profit is reduced
and forward contracts strictly promote collusion.
The partial derivative of the critical discount factor with respect to the expected difference
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between reservation price and marginal costs is given by:
∂δ∗
∂E [γ]
=

−2 [γ
2−2F˜ γ+2F˜ 2]E[γ]
[E[γ]2+V ar[γ]+γ2−2F˜ γ+2F˜ 2]2
≤ 0 if F˜ < qM
−2 [2γ
2−4F˜ γ+2F˜ 2]E[γ]
[E[γ]2+V ar[γ]+2γ2−4F˜ γ+2F˜ 2]2
≤ 0 if qM ≤ F˜ < 2qM
(3.14)
A higher expected difference of reservation price and marginal costs decreases the critical
discount factor. Deviation from collusion becomes less attractive. A higher expected
difference increases future collusive profits, which cannot be earned after a deviation.
Hence, the additional profits earned by deviation become smaller in relative terms.
The partial derivative of the critical discount factor with respect to the variance of the
difference between reservation price and marginal costs is given by:
∂δ∗
∂V ar [γ]
=

− γ2−2F˜ γ+2F˜ 2
[E[γ]2+V ar[γ]+γ2−2F˜ γ+2F˜ 2]2
≤ 0 if F˜ < qM
− 2γ2−4F˜ γ+2F˜ 2
[E[γ]2+V ar[γ]+2γ2−4F˜ γ+2F˜ 2]2
≤ 0 if qM ≤ F˜ < 2qM
(3.15)
A higher variance of the difference of reservation price and marginal costs decreases
the critical discount factor. At a first glance this seems to be counter-intuitive, since
fluctuations are said to threaten collusions. One should keep in mind the relationship
between variance squared, expectation and expectation squared used above (E [γ2] =
E [γ]2 + V ar [γ]). As can be seen, expected profit given by 1
4
E [γ2] ceteris paribus in-
creases by an increasing variance. As presented above, a higher expected profit increases
the stability of collusion. Thus, it is not variance itself that decreases the stability of an
collusive agreement, but more precisely the appearance of a high realization of the ran-
dom difference between reservation price and marginal costs. For a higher variance, this
high realization of the random variable is more likely to be drawn. However, for a given
realization of the random variable, a higher variance decreases the critical discount factor.
Table 3.2 summarizes the partial effects on the critical discount factor. The expected dif-
ference between reservation price and marginal costs and its variance have ceteris paribus
a stabilizing effect on a collusive agreement, as well as the total forward-traded amount.
High realizations of the difference between reservation price and marginal costs have a
destabilizing effect on a collusive agreement.
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I II
Variable Partial Eﬀect Monopoly quantity Contracts exceeding
exceeding contracts monopoly quantity
Expected spread ∂δ
∗
∂E[γ]
⇓ ⇓
Variance of spread ∂δ
∗
∂V ar[γ]
⇓ ⇓
Table 3.2: Total Eﬀects on the Critical Discount Factor
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the critical discount factor due to forward contracts
and due to the ratio of boom and expected profits. The discount factor is plotted for pos-
itive ratios of contracted amount and monopoly quantity. Neither collusive nor deviation
profits can be earned for a higher amount of contracts than the Bertrand quantity, and the
critical discount factor becomes zero. Hence, the graph starts at a ratio of the forward
traded amount and monopoly quantity of zero and stops at a ratio of two. It is known
through Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) that deviation from collusion is more profitable
in booms. The graph in figure 3.1 starts at a ratio of profit over the expected profit of 1,
since in booms per definition profits are higher than the expected ones. In this dimension
it ends at a profit that is ten times the expected one.
The horizontal front-line of figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the discount factor for
expected profit equal to actual profit
(
γ2
E[γ2]+V ar[γ]
= 1
)
. This represents the case of cer-
tainty described by Liski and Montero (2006), since without any forward contracts and
without any volatility the critical discount factor is one half, and when total monopoly
quantity is traded forward, the discount factor is one third. For forward contracts between
these two extreme cases (0 ≤ F
qM
< 1), the critical discount factor strictly decreases in
forward contracts. When firms have contracted more than the monopoly quantity of the
corresponding state (scenario II), the critical discount factor still decreases in forward
contracts. In scenario II the critical discount factor decreases more rapidly than in sce-
nario I , since in scenario II forward trading solely cuts the deviation profit. In contrast
to this in scenario I it cuts the deviation profit as well as the collusive profit.
Introducing a volatile market creates an incentive to deviate from collusion during
booms. Without forward contracts (F = 0) the critical discount factor strictly increases
and is converging to one for boom profits increasing to infinity. The functional form of the
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Figure 3.1: Eﬀects of Forward Trading and Ratio of Boom and Expected Proﬁt on
Discount Factor
critical discount factor depends on the ratio of boom and expected profit and is given by
γ2
E[γ2]+V ar[γ]+γ2
= δ0 ≤ δ, which is equivalent to the findings of Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986). When contracts are traded forward and at the same time boom profits are larger
than expected profits, the evolution of the critical discount factor described above does not
change fundamentally. Other things being equal, a higher amount of contracts decreases
the critical discount factor, whereas boom profits exceeding expected profit increase the
critical discount factor. This is shown graphically in figure 3.1 by the evolution of the
plane between the front-lines described above. When firms contract a sufficiently high
quantity, stable collusion becomes possible for any discount factor.
3.3.4 Forward Trading and Proﬁtability of a Collusive Agree-
ment
Scenario I: The monopoly quantity exceeds the forward-traded amount (F˜ < qM )
The profit of colluding firms that trade a certain amount forward has two sources: Firstly,
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the profit coming from selling production on the spot market. Secondly, the profit coming
from selling production on the forward market. As long as the forward-traded amount
does not exceed the collusive quantity, the spot market profit for colluding firms is given
by equation 3.5. Inserting an arbitrarily collusive price leads to a collusive spot market
profit of:
ΠSMi =
1
2
(
a− pSM) (pSM − c)− 1
2
F˜
(
pSM − c) ∀ F˜ < (a− p) (3.16)
The profit on the forward market is given by each firm’s forward-traded amount multiplied
by the difference of the forward price and marginal costs. As mentioned before, the
forward market price is given by the anticipated spot market price, since speculators build
rational expectations. Thus, the expected profit on the forward market is given by the
expected difference of the spot market price and marginal costs times each firm’s forward-
traded amount
ΠFMi =
1
2
F˜
(
pFM − c) = 1
2
F˜
(
pSM − c) ∀ F˜ ≤ (a− p) (3.17)
The total (semi-)collusive profit for a firm is given by the spot and the forward market
profit:
ΠSCi =
1
2
(
a− pSM) (pSM − c)− 1
2
F˜
(
pSM − c)+ 1
2
F˜
(
pSM − c)
=
1
2
(
a− pSM) (pSM − c) ∀ F˜ < (a− p) (3.18)
Thus, the increase of the expected forward market profit, which comes from forward trad-
ing, is totally offset by a decrease of the expected spot market profit. Therefore, as long
as the forward-traded amount does not exceed the spot market quantity, any firm’s profit
is not changed by forward trading.
Scenario II: The forward-traded amount exceeds monopoly quantity (F˜ > qM )
When firms set a price, for which the amount already forward traded exceeds the spot
market quantity that is associated with this price, firms cannot sell any unit on the spot
market. Speculators always supply the total forward traded amount to the market, since by
assumption they cannot store the commodity. Hence, the price on the spot market is given
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by psm = a − F˜ , which is below the monopoly price (pSM = a − F˜ < pM = 1
2
(a − c))
and colluding firms do not earn any profit on the spot market. However, both firms earn
a profit, that is coming from the amount that they have traded forward. Thus, when firms
have traded forward an amount above the amount that is associated with their price on the
spot market, the profit is solely given by the profit, that is coming of forward trading:
ΠSCi =
1
2
F˜ (pSM − F˜ ) = 1
2
F˜
(
a− F˜ − c
)
=
1
2
(
2qM F˜ − F˜ 2
)
∀ F˜ ≤ (a− p)
(3.19)
The total collusive profit for each firm is given by the profit, when the total forward
traded amount does not exceed the quantity sold by firms on the spot market as well as
the profit, when firms set a price, for which the amount already forward traded exceeds
the spot market quantity. Combining profits derived in equation 3.18 and profits derived
in equation 3.19 leads to each firm’s expected total collusive profit for any distribution
function:
E[ΠSCi ] =
1
2
[
E
[
2qM F˜ − F˜ 2 | F˜ > (a− p)
]
+ E
[
(a− p) (p− c) | F˜ ≤ (a− p)
]]
(3.20)
Scenario I:
Firms set the monopoly price and the monopoly quantity exceeds the forward traded
amount (F˜ < qM )
The expected profit on the forward market is given by each firm’s forward traded amount
multiplied by the difference of the forward price and the marginal costs. As mentioned
before, the forward market price is given by the expected spot market price, since specu-
lators build rational expectations. Thus, the expected profit on the forward market is given
by the expected difference of the spot market price and marginal costs times each firm’s
forward traded amount (E[Πfmi ] =
1
2
F˜
(
pfm − c) = 1
2
F˜E [p− c]).
The expected profit on the spot market is found by calculating the expected value of
the collusive profit (equation 3.5). The spread is distributed according to a continuous
distribution function F̂ (γ) with a density of f̂(γ). The realization of the spread can be
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any real number (−∞ < γ <∞). This states the expected profit in scenario I as:
E
[
Πi | 2F˜ < γ <∞
]
= E
[
Πsmi | 2F˜ < γ <∞
]
+ E
[
Πfmi | 2F˜ < γ <∞
]
= E
[
1
8
γ2 − 1
4
γF˜ +
1
2
F˜ (pM − c) | 2F˜ < γ <∞
]
=
∫ ∞
2F˜
1
8
γ2f̂(γ)dγ
(3.21)
The increase of the expected forward market profit, which is coming from forward trad-
ing, is totally offset by a decrease of the expected spot market profit. As long as firms are
able to collude at the monopoly price and the forward traded amount does not exceed the
monopoly quantity (condition for scenario I), the expected collusive profit equals half of
the expected monopoly profit. Thus, in scenario I the expected profit is not influenced by
the forward traded amount.
Scenario II:
Firms set a collusive price for which the forward traded amount exceeds the collu-
sive quantity
The price on the spot market is solely determined by speculators’ behavior, since col-
luding firms sell no additional quantities on the spot market. Speculators will bring the
total forward traded amount to the market, since by assumption they cannot store the com-
modity. Hence, the price on the spot market is given by psm = a− F˜ , which is below the
monopoly price and above the residual monopoly price (prm = 1
2
(a−c− F˜ )+c < psm =
a − F˜ < pM = 1
2
(a − c)). Colluding firms do not earn any profits on the spot market.
However, they earn a profit, that is coming from their forward-traded amount. Thus, the
expected profit in scenario II is solely given by the profit, which is coming from forward
trading:
E
[
Πi | −∞ < γ < 2F˜
]
= E
[
Πsmi | −∞ < γ < 2F˜
]
+ E
[
Πfmi | −∞ < γ < 2F˜
]
= 0 +
1
2
F˜
∫ 2F˜
−∞
(γ − F˜ )f̂(γ)dγ
(3.22)
The total expected collusive profit can easily be found by summing up the expected for-
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ward and spot market profits of scenario I and scenario II .
E [Πi] = E
[
Πi| −∞ < γ < 2F˜
]
+ E
[
Πi|2F˜ < γ <∞
]
=
1
2
F˜
∫ 2F˜
−∞
(γ − F˜ )f̂(γ)dγ +
∫ ∞
2F˜
1
8
γ2f̂(γ)dγ
= −1
2
F˜ 2F̂
(
2F˜
)
+
1
2
F˜
∫ 2F˜
−∞
γf̂(γ)dγ +
1
8
∫ ∞
2F˜
γ2f̂(γ)dγ
(3.23)
On the following pages this total expected collusive profit is specified using an exponen-
tial distribution as well as a two point distribution. These both distributions are chosen,
since both distributions can illustrate two different scenarios. Firstly, realizations of an
exponential distribution can take any value between zero and infinity. Thus, an expo-
nential distribution is suitable to model a market, on which demand can be close to zero
in heavy recessions as well as very large in booms. A good example is the demand for
conventional electricity in Germany. On the one hand demand can be close to zero (or
theoretically even below), if a small demand occurs together with a high feed-in of elec-
tricity coming from renewable energies. On the other hand demand can be very large,
if a large demand occurs together with a small supply coming from renewable energies.
Secondly, there are exactly two realizations of a two-point distribution. Thus, there exists
a recessive scenario as well as a boom scenario, that is clearly defined. A stylized exam-
ple of this situation is given by the total demand for electricity in Germany, since a clear
lower bound of demand is given, since even if demand is very small it exceeds a certain
threshold. The upcoming analysis will show, that the existence of a lower threshold is
very important from a strategic perspective.
The total expected collusive proﬁt for an exponential distribution
At this point, the exponential distribution is used to specify the total expected profit. See
equations A.9 to A.13 in the appendix for the detailed derivation of the expected collusive
profit for an exponentially distributed spread.
E [Πi] =
1
2
F˜
λ
− 1
2
F˜ 2 +
1
4
1
λ2
e−2λF˜ (3.24)
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The effect of forward trading on the expected collusive profit can easily be found by taking
the first and second order derivatives with respect to the forward traded amount:
∂E [Πi]
∂F˜
=
1
2
1
λ
[
1− e−2λF˜
]
− F˜ < 0 ∀ F˜ > 0
∂2E [Πi]
∂F˜ 2
= −1 + e−2λF˜ < 0 ∀ F˜ > 0
(3.25)
Thus, the total expected profit for colluding firms is concavely decreasing in the contracted
amount. Suppose the colluding firms trade the total expected monopoly quantity forward
(F = 1
2
1
λ
). This leads to a profit of only about 87% of the profit compared to a situation
where firms do not trade any forward contracts, since :
E
[
Πi|F˜ = 12λ
]
E
[
Πi|F˜ = 0
] = 1
2
+ e−1 ≈ 0.8679 (3.26)
Figure 3.2: Eﬀect of the Forward-Traded Amount on the Collusive Proﬁt for δ → 1
Figure 3.2 shows the collusive profit for firms depending on the forward traded amount,
when they could sustain a full collusion at any price (δ → 1). For an exponentially
distributed spread the expected monopoly quantity is given by E
[
qM
]
= 1
2
1
λ
. Thus, in
Figure 3.2 the expected collusive per period profit is drawn for an expected monopoly
quantity of E
[
qM
]
= 1
2
, E
[
qM
]
= 2
3
and E
[
qM
]
= 1.
For moderate amounts traded forward the profit-decreasing effect of forward trading is
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rather small mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, when firms only trade a moderate amount
forward, the probability that the forward traded amount exceeds the collusive monopoly
quantity is rather small. Secondly, even if the forward traded amount exceeds the collusive
monopoly quantity, only rather small monopoly profits on the spot market are crowded out
by forward trading. Higher realizations of the random difference between the reservation
price and marginal costs, which contribute much more to the expected profit, are not
affected. The opposite is true for excessive amounts traded forward. Then, it becomes
rather likely that the forward traded amount exceeds the monopoly quantity and even
relatively large realizations of the spread are affected. This strengthens the fundamental
finding that is in contrast to the deterministic market conditions modeled by Liski and
Montero (2006): Stabilizing a collusive agreement using forward contracts is costly in
volatile markets.
The total expected collusive proﬁt for a two point distribution
At this point, a two-point distribution is used to specify the expected collusive profit. A
recession that is associated with a rather low profit of ΠR occurs with probability µ˜. A
boom that is associated with a rather high profit of ΠB occurs with probability 1− µ˜.
Each firm’s expected collusive profit is given exactly by half of the expected monopoly
profit (E[Πi] = 12
[
µ˜ΠMR + (1− µ˜)ΠMB
]
) as long as firms discount factor is above the
threshold discount factor of:
δ > δ∗ = 1− Π
M
B (1− µ˜) + µ˜ΠMR
ΠMB (2− µ˜) + µ˜ΠMR − qMR qMB + 12qMR
2 (3.27)
See equation A.3 appendix for a detailed derivation.
For a two-state distribution the recessive amount is exactly known. A forward traded
amount less or equal the recession monopoly quantity stabilizes collusion, but is not alter-
ing the profit. Thus, for a discrete distribution colluding firms can trade up to this recessive
monopoly quantity forward, without altering the expected profit. Equation 3.27 gives the
smallest discount factor, that can lead to a "full-collusion"’ associated with monopoly
profits in a boom as well as in a recession. This is in contrast to the findings for an
exponential distribution, where the recessive monopoly amount can be any positive real
number and firms are always in danger of "over-contracting".
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3.3.5 Forward Trading and Semi-Collusion
The next pages are used to derive the best semi-collusive strategy of firms. Unfortunately,
even for the rather simple two-point distribution no closed form solution can be found.
The solution for an exponential is likely to be even much more complex and therefore is
not conducted in this thesis.
When colluding firms trade forward an amount that is above the monopoly quantity in
recession, the expected collusive profit for a two-state distribution is given by:
E[ΠSCi ] =
1
2
[
E
[
2qM F˜ − F˜ 2 | F˜ > (a− p)
]
+ E
[
(a− p) (p− c) | F˜ ≤ (a− p)
]]
=
µ˜
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ˜) (aB − p) (p− cB)
2
<
1
2
E
[
ΠM
] ∀ F˜ > qMR
(3.28)
Equation 3.28 follows straightforward from equation 3.20, since for a two-state distribu-
tion with probability µ˜ a recession and with probability 1 − µ˜ a boom occurs. Thus, the
expected recession profit is given by µ˜
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
, since firms have traded forward a
higher amount than the corresponding monopoly quantity. However, the expected boom
profit remains unaffected and is given by (1− µ˜) (aB − p) (p− cB).
When firms cannot collude by contracting the total recessive quantity forward, firms
adopt their price in boom as well as sell more than the recessive monopoly quantity for-
ward. Then the optimal boom price (pscB ) and forward traded amount (F˜
sc) is found by
using the first order derivatives of equation 3.28:
Maximizing the expected collusive profit due to the forward traded amount leads to:
∂E[Π]
∂F˜
= µ˜
(
2qMR − 2F˜
)
+ (1− µ˜)
(
(a+ c)
∂p
∂F˜
− 2p ∂p
∂F˜
)
!
= 0
F˜ sc = qMR +
1
2
1− µ˜
µ˜
(a− 2p+ c) ∂p
∂F˜
> qMR ∀ p < pMB
(3.29)
Maximizing the expected collusive profit due to the boom price leads to:
∂E[Π]
∂p
= µ˜
(
2qMR
∂F˜
∂p
− 2F ∂F˜
∂p
)
+ (1− µ˜) (a− 2p+ c) != 0
pscB = p
M
B −
µ˜
1− µ˜
(
F˜ − qMR
) ∂F˜
∂p
< pMB ∀ F˜ > qMR
(3.30)
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Firms will choose the forward traded amount F˜ and the boom price p, in the way that
they maximize the expected collusive profit. Unfortunately, optimization of the expected
collusive profit such that the no deviation constraint holds, cannot be solved analytically.
As a consequence the total differential is used to show the structure of optimal collusive
design.
When firms cannot fully collude, firms choose price and forward traded quantity exactly
to match the no deviation constraint (C != 0). The partial effect of the semi-collusive price
on the forward traded amount is:
∂p
∂F˜
=
(a− F˜ − p)(1− δ) + 2δµ˜(qMR − F˜ )
(1− δ)F˜ − (1− δµ˜)(a− 2p+ c) > 0
∂F˜
∂p
=
(1− δ)F˜ − (1− δµ˜)(a− 2p+ c)
(a− F˜ − p)(1− δ) + 2δµ˜(qMR − F˜ )
> 0
(3.31)
For derivation see equation A.21 to A.28 in the appendix. For the upcoming analysis, the
most important partial effects are:
∂p
∂F˜
> 0,
∂F˜
∂p
> 0,
∂ ∂F˜
∂p
∂µ˜
> 0,
∂ ∂p
∂F˜
∂µ˜
< 0 (3.32)
As long as semi-colluding firms set a price below the monopoly boom price, they
choose an forward traded amount above recessive monopoly quantity and vice versa
(psc < pMB ⇔ F˜ > qMR ). Therefore, in recession as well as in booms the optimal strategy
departs from the monopoly outcome.
The effect of the recession probability µ˜ on the semi-collusive outcome is given by the
derivatives of the optimal semi-collusive price and forward traded amount with respect to
the recession probability µ˜
∂F˜ sc
∂µ˜
= (a− 2p+ c)
[
− 1
(1− µ˜)2
∂p
∂F˜
+
1− µ˜
µ˜
∂ ∂p
∂F˜
∂µ˜
]
< 0
∂pscB
∂µ˜
= −
[
F˜ − qMR
] [ 1
(1− µ˜)2
∂F˜
∂p
+
µ˜
1− µ˜
∂ ∂F˜
∂p
∂µ˜
]
< 0
(3.33)
For a given discount factor, which forces firms to semi-collude, firms can either trade
forward more than the corresponding recession monopoly quantity or set a boom price
below the monopoly one. Ceteris paribus a higher recession probability µ˜ leads to a
lower forward traded amount as well as to a lower collusive boom price. This means
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firms stabilize their collusive agreement rather by adopting boom prices than by trading
forward. Quite the opposite is true, when the probability for a boom 1 − µ˜ is increased.
Then firms trade a rather large amount forward, but are reluctant to adopt boom prices.
The economic intuition of this result is straightforward: Semi-colluding firms have
to choose whether they sacrifice a larger amount of boom or of recession profit. When
the expected recession profit increases, they prefer sacrificing more of the boom profit.
When in contrast the expected boom profit increases, firms prefer sacrificing more of the
recession profit.
Another important question is, which discount factor of firms is necessary for such
a semi-collusive agreement. As shown above the semi-collusive strategy consists of a
forward traded amount above the recessive monopoly quantity as well as a boom price
below the monopoly outcome. As shown by Green and Coq (2010, p.23) for a semi-
collusive price below the monopoly outcome two different deviation prices exist. Firstly,
the residual monopoly price (pd = 1
2
(a− f + c)) whenever the semi-collusive price is
close to the monopoly one. Secondly, a price that is slightly below the semi-collusive price
(pd2 = p
sc − ) whenever the semi-collusive price is close to marginal costs. Comparing
the profit of deviation and of collusion for both deviation prices leads to following lower
bound of the critical discount factor for a sustainable semi-collusion.
If it is optimal for a deviating firm to undercut the collusive price infinitesimally (pd =
pd2 = p
sc − ) the trade-off between deviation and collusion leads to following critical
discount factor:
δ2∗ = 1−
µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c)(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c) + µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c)
(3.34)
See equation A.15 and equation A.17 in the appendix for a detailed derivation.
If it is optimal for a deviating firm to set the residual monopoly price (pd = pd1 =
1
2
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
) the trade-off between deviation and collusion leads to following critical
discount factor:
δ1∗ = 1−
µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c)
µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c) + 12
(
a− F˜ − c
)2
−
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c)
(3.35)
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See equation A.18 in the appendix for a detailed derivation.
Thus, the smallest critical discount factor for a semi-collusive can be stated as:
δ∗ =

1− µ(2q
M
R F−F 2)+(1−µ)(a−psc)(psc−c)
µ(2qMR F−F 2)+(1−µ)(a−psc)(psc−c)+ 12 (a−F−c)2−(a−F−psc)(psc−c)
for pd
1− µ(2q
M
R F−F 2)+(1−µ)(a−psc)(psc−c)
µ(2qMR F−F 2)+(1−µ)(a−psc)(psc−c)+(a−F−psc)(psc−c)
for pd2
(3.36)
If firms set a price very close to marginal costs (psc → c), they can decrease the critical
discount factor even to zero. However, the profitability of such a semi-collusive price
critically depends upon the constellation of parameters, since negative expected collusive
profits could occur, too.
See equation A.20 in the appendix for a more detailed derivation.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the three different collusive strategies that depend on the critical
discount factor of each firm. Whenever the critical discount factor of both firms exceeds δ∗
(see equation3.27) each firm can earn half of the the expected monopoly profit by collud-
ing. Whenever each firms critical discount factor is below δ∗ but above δ∗ (see equation
3.36) firms can semi-collude and earn an expected positive collusive profit. Whenever
each firms critical discount factor is below δ∗ firms cannot collude at all. From a theo-
retical perspective firms can decrease δ∗ to zero. However, it critically depends on the
constellation of parameters, whether firms earn a positive collusive profit by doing so.
Figure 3.3: Relationship between the Critical Discount Factor and Collusive Behavior
3.3.6 Forward Trading and Taking a Long Position
In the analysis of collusive incentives above firms always had a short position on the
forward market, which means that firms are committed by forward contracts to sell a
certain amount of their output to speculators. In the upcoming pages collusive incentives
for firms having a short position on the forward market are analyzed. If physical delivery
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is mandatory and firms have a short position on the forward market, they are obliged to
buy output from speculators. In other words: Firms are obliged to buy back parts of their
own output, since speculators do not have any capacities to produce the corresponding
commodity.
Suppose each firm has a long position on the forward market given by f˜. This long
position in the forward market is equivalent to a negative short position in the forward
market (−f˜ = f˜). This variable is introduced to avoid notational confusion associated
with a negative short position.
Deviation Proﬁt
In order to close their short positions, speculators seek the exact quantity that is traded in
both firms’ long positions (DSpec = 2f˜). Speculators buy the product from the firm that
charges the lowest price and sell it to both firms to close all positions. When firms are
long on the forward market, "firm i’s optimal deviation is to charge pM −  as in the pure-
spot case" (Liski and Montero, 2006, p.220). The same holds true for any (profitable)
collusive price below monopoly price pM > pc > c. A deviating firm attracts total
demand induced by speculators. This leads to a profit of DSpec (pc − c) = 2f˜ (pc − c).
However, to close its forward market obligation, the deviating firm has to pay Ω = f˜pc
to speculators. Additionally it gets back f˜ units of the corresponding product. Thus, a
deviating firm earns a profit by the interaction with speculators of:
Π˜D = Ω +DSpec (p
c − c) = −f˜pc + 2f˜ (pc − c)
= f˜ (pc − c)− f˜c
(3.37)
After all positions have been closed, the deviating firm earns a profit by interaction with
speculators of Π˜D. Additionally, the deviating firm owns f˜ units of the product, since it
had to buy back these units from speculators.
When a deviation occurs, the "duped" firm cannot sell any output to the speculators.
However, the duped firm has to meet its forward obligation. Therefore, the duped firm
has to buy f˜ units of the product from speculators, which were originally produced by the
deviating firm. This effect increases the demand that can be met by a deviating firm.
All consumers buy from the deviating firm. As was mentioned above, the deviating
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firm has to buy back f˜ units coming from its forward obligation. These units are sold
immediately to consumers at the deviation price, which undercuts the monopoly price
infinitesimally. After these units have been sold, there is remaining demand coming from
consumers, which is denoted by DR =
(
a− f˜ − pM
)
.
The total profit of a deviating firm can be separated into three different profits: Firstly,
the profit coming from interaction with speculators (Π˜D). Secondly, the profit coming
from firms’ produced amount that is sold on the market (f˜pc). And finally, the profit
coming from serving remaining demand (DR(pc − c)). This states the total profit of a
deviating firm as follows:
ΠD = Π˜D − f˜pc +DR (pc − c)
= f˜ (pc − c)− f˜c+ f˜pc +
(
a− f˜ − pc
)
(pc − c)
= (a− pc) (pc − c) + f˜ (pc − c)
(3.38)
Collusive Proﬁt
For both firms setting the same price (pi = pj = pc), half of the demand induced by
speculators is met by each firm. Each firm has a forward market obligation to pay Ω = f˜pc
and to take f˜ units of the product. Since both transactions are done at the collusive price,
firms and speculators close their positions and neither earn nor lose money. However,
each firm bears production costs of f˜c and owns f˜ units of the product. This leads to a
"profit" from interaction with speculators of:
Π˜C =
1
2
DSpec (p
c − c) + Ω = f˜ (pc − c)− f˜pc
= −f˜c
(3.39)
Both firms own f˜ units of the product, since they had to settle their forward market obli-
gation. These units are sold to consumers by both firms immediately. Thus, the demand
function of remaining demand coming from consumers is given byDR =
(
a− 2f˜ − pc
)
.
The profit of colluding firms can be separated into three different profits: Firstly, the
profit coming from interaction with speculators (Π˜c). Secondly, the profit coming from
firms’ already produced amount sold to consumers (f˜pc). And finally, the profit com-
ing from serving remaining demand (1
2
DR (pc − c)). The total profit function for each
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colluding firm is given by:
ΠC = Π˜C + f˜pc +
1
2
DR (pc − c)
= −f˜c+ f˜pc +
1
2
(
a− 2f˜ − pc
)
(pc − c) = 1
2
Πc
(3.40)
In the end, the collusive profit equals half of the monopoly profit, since "forward posi-
tions do not imply additional output being effectively supplied to the market" (Liski and
Montero, 2006, p.221).
The Critical Discount Factor for a Long Position
When a firm has to decide between collusion and deviation it chooses the strategy that
promises the highest net present value. Collusion is stable whenever:
NPV (Collusion) ≥ NBV (Deviation)
1
2
Πc +
1
2
δ
1− δE
[
ΠC
] ≥ Πc + f˜ (pc − c)
δ
1− δE
[
ΠC
] ≥ Πc + 2f˜ (pc − c)
δ ≥
Πc + 2f˜ (pc − c)
Πc + 2f˜ (pc − c) + E [ΠC ]
= 1− E [Π
c]
Πc + 2f˜ (pc − c) + E [ΠC ]
(3.41)
It is obvious that the critical discount factor derived in equation 3.41 exceeds for any arbi-
trary long position of firms (f˜ > 0 or f˜ < 0) the discount factor without forward trading.
Thus, taking a long position on the forward market destabilizes a collusive agreement and
colluding firms have no incentive to take any long position on the forward market. If
colluding firms decide to trade forward contracts, they will choose a short position, which
means that firms commit to deliver a certain amount to speculators and speculators sell
this amount to consumers.
3.4 Conclusion
Uncertainty, volatility and fluctuations are the most frequent reasons given for forward
trading. The contribution of the presented model has been the simultaneous analysis of
fluctuations and forward contracts on collusive agreements. The incorporation of stochas-
tic market conditions led to a more precise understanding of the effects of forward trading
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and collusion. In terms of the economic literature, the gap between Rotemberg and Sa-
loner (1986) and Liski and Montero (2006) has been closed.
The first part answered the question, whether forward trading can be used in volatile
markets to stabilize a collusive agreement. Therefore, the critical discount factor was
determined and the partial derivatives of the critical discount factor were analyzed. The
main findings were: High realizations of the random difference between reservation price
and marginal costs (“spread”) have a destabilizing effect, whereas a higher expectation
of the “spread” has a stabilizing effect on collusive agreements. The results are totally
in line with the analysis of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). However, decomposition of
the expectation of the squared “spread” into its squared expectation and variance led to
an interesting insight: For a given positive fluctuation (boom), a higher variance increases
the stability of collusion, since a higher variance makes a boom more common. Hence,
it is not the variance itself that decreases the stability of a collusive agreement in volatile
markets, but rather the appearance of high realizations of the “spread” that destabilizes
collusive agreements. However, extraordinary booms only occur if the distribution of the
spread is characterized by a sufficient degree of dispersion. As a further insight I found
that short-term forward contracts can be used by firms to strictly stabilize collusion. This
is in line with the analysis of Liski and Montero (2006) and Green and Coq (2010).
The second part answered the question, how the expected collusive profit is influenced
by forward trading. For deterministic market conditions the profit that is earned by col-
luding firms, is not at all influenced by the forward traded amount (Liski and Montero,
2006). As shown in the presented model for continuous distributed cost and demand pa-
rameters, the expected profit earned by colluding firms strictly decreased concerning the
forward-traded amount. When firms trade forward on a volatile market, they do not know
in advance the demand and cost structure they will face at the date of delivery. For col-
luding firms this always leads to the problem of involuntarily having contracted more or
less than the optimal collusive amount. When firms have contracted less than the opti-
mal collusive amount, colluding firms can sell an additional amount on the spot market,
which gives them the possibility to share the monopoly profit. However, for rather small
contract volumes (in relation to the total accessible demand) a deviation could become
profitable for "impatient firms". When firms have contracted more than the optimal collu-
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sive amount, solely the speculators decide about the price on the spot market, which leads
to a lower price. This lowers the forward price, since the forward price is determined on a
basis of rational expectations. As a consequence, the expected profit by trading forward a
certain amount is beneath the expected profit by selling the same amount on the spot mar-
ket. Therefore, the total expected value of the profit for each colluding firm is decreased
by forward trading. The more forward contracts are sold the more severe is the reduction
of collusive profit by (additional) forward contracts.
The third part described the optimal semi-collusive strategy for a two-state distribution
of cost and demand parameters. Semi-colluding firms choose a forward-traded amount
above recession monopoly quantity and a boom price below the monopoly price. Thus,
neither during a recession nor in a boom the monopoly outcome is generated.
The four main results of the presented model can be stated as follows: Firstly, forward
contracts can be used in deterministic as well as in volatile markets to stabilize collusive
agreements. Secondly, in volatile markets forward trading decreases the expected total
profit of colluding firms, when they "involuntarily" trade forward an amount above the
recession quantity. For a discrete distribution, the lowest recession quantity is known.
Therefore, this is not a severe problem for colluding firms. When in contrast to this for
a continuous distribution the lowest recession monopoly quantity is not known, a firm’s
expected profit is strictly decreasing in forward contracts. Thirdly, semi-colluding firms
will generate neither in times of a boom nor in times of a recession the monopoly outcome.
Fourthly, feeding the theoretical model with data for the German wholesale electricity
market leads to the insight that very strong incentives to collude exist.
3.5 Appendix
No Deviation Constraint and the Critical Discount Factor
To find the critical discount factor, the no deviation constraint (equation 3.7), which rep-
resents the trade-off between collusion and deviation, is solved for the discount factor δ.
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When firms trade less than the monopoly quantity forward, the critical discount factor is:
NPV (Collusion) ≥ NPV (Deviation)
Πd ≤ 1
2
Πd − 1
8
F˜ 2 +
1
2
δ
1− δE[Π
m]
4Πd + F˜ 2 ≤ δ
1− δE[γ
2]
γ2 − 2γF˜ + 2F˜ 2 ≤ δ
1− δ
[
E[γ]2 + V ar [γ]
]
δ ≥ γ
2 − 2γF˜ + 2F˜ 2
E[γ]2 + V ar [γ] + γ2 − 2γF˜ + 2F˜ 2 = 1−
E[γ]2 + V ar [γ]
E[γ]2 + V ar [γ] + γ2 − 2γF˜ + 2F˜ 2
(A.1)
When firms trade more than the monopoly quantity forward, the no deviation constraint
in equation 3.9 has to hold and the critical discount factor is given by:
NPV (Deviation) ≤ NPV (Collusion)
1
4
(
a− F˜ − c
)2
≤ 1
2
δ
1− δE[Π
m]
2γ2 − 4F˜ γ + 2F˜ 2 ≤ δ
1− δ
[
E [γ]2 + V ar [γ]
]
δ ≥ 2γ
2 − 4F˜ γ + 2F˜ 2
E [γ]2 + V ar [γ] + 2γ2 − 4F˜ γ + 2F˜ 2 = 1−
E [γ]2 + V ar [γ]
E [γ]2 + V ar [γ] + 2γ2 − 4F˜ γ + 2F˜ 2
(A.2)
Inserting the two state distribution function into the no deviation constraint when forward
contracted amount not exceeding the monopoly quantity (equation A.1):
1
4
γ2 − 1
2
γF˜ +
1
2
F˜ 2 ≤ δ
1− δE
[
ΠM
]
ΠMB − qMB F˜ +
1
2
F˜ 2 ≤ δ
1− δ
[
µ˜ΠMR + (1− µ˜)ΠMB
]
δ ≥ Π
M
B − F˜ qMB + 12 F˜ 2
µ˜ΠMR + (1− µ˜)ΠMB + ΠMB − F˜ qMB + 12 F˜ 2
δ ≥ 1− µ˜Π
M
R + (1− µ˜)ΠMB
µ˜ΠMR + (2− µ˜)ΠMB − qMR qMB + 12qMR
2
(A.3)
The last line comes from the fact that the highest forward traded amount without a loss in
(recession) profit is given by recession monopoly quantity (F˜ = qMR ).
The critical discount factor for full-collusion without forward trading (δ0) (Rotemberg
and Saloner (1986) in a two state representation according to Tirole (1988)) is above the
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critical discount factor with forward trading, since
δ0 = 1− Π
M
B (1− µ˜) + µ˜ΠMR
µ˜ΠMR + (2− µ˜)ΠMB
> 1− Π
M
B (1− µ˜) + µ˜ΠMR
ΠMB (2− µ˜) + µ˜ΠMR − qMR qMB + 12qMR
2 = δ
∗
ΠMB (1− µ˜) + µ˜ΠMR
µ˜ΠMR + (2− µ˜)ΠMB
<
ΠMB (1− µ˜) + µ˜ΠMR
ΠMB (2− µ˜) + µ˜ΠMR − qMR qMB + 12qMR
2
qMB >
1
2
qMR
(A.4)
Why Does Forward Trading Stabilize Collusive Agreement?
Deviation profit (equation 3.3) can be rearranged to
Πd =
1
4
[
a− c− F˜
]2
=
1
4
[
(a− c)2 − 2F˜ (a− c) + F˜ 2
]
= Πm
[
1− F˜1
2
(a− c) +
1
4
F˜ 2
1
4
(a− c)2
]
= Πm
[
1− 1
2
F˜
qM
]2
(A.5)
Collusive profit in a spot market period (equation 3.5) can be brought to:
Remember: Collusive profits in a spot market period can be earned if and only if F˜ < qm
ΠC =
1
2
[
1
4
(a− c)2 − 1
2
F˜ (a− c)
]
=
1
2
[
Πm − 2
4
(a− c)2 F˜
a− c
]
=
1
2
Πm
[
1− F˜
qM
] (A.6)
As easily can be seen, deviation profit as well as collusive profit in a spot market period is
decreased by forward contracts. However, as long as the total amount of forward contracts
is less than the monopoly quantity, the decreasing effect is stronger on deviation profit.
This is due to the fact that forward trading influences deviation profit squared (ΠD =
Πm
[
1− 1
2
F˜
qM
]2
) whereas collusive profit is influenced linearly (ΠC = 1
2
Πm
[
1− F˜
qM
]
).
Proof:
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Partial derivatives of collusion and deviation profit in a spot market period are given by:
∂ΠC
∂F˜
= −1
2
Πm
qM
∂ΠD
∂F˜
= −Π
m
qM
[
1− 1
2
F˜
qM
] (A.7)
Comparing both partial derivatives leads to
−1
2
Πm
qM
≥ −Π
m
qM
[
1− 1
2
F˜
qM
]
1
2
≥ 1
2
F˜
qM
qM ≥ F˜
(A.8)
If the forward traded amount is less than the respecting monopoly quantity (F˜ < qm),
additional forward contracts decrease deviation profit more sharply than collusive profit.
If the forward traded amount is greater than the respective monopoly quantity (F˜ > qM ),
no collusive profits in the corresponding period can be earned. Additional forward con-
tracts decrease deviation profit. Hence, the effect of additional forward contracts on the
critical discount factor increases.
Exponential Distribution and the Total Expected Collusive Proﬁt
For derivation of the total expected profit for an exponentially distributed spread it is
separated into part A, part B and part C
E [Πi] =
1
2
F˜
∫ 2F˜
0
γf̂(γ)dγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+−1
2
F˜ 2F̂
(
2F˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+
1
8
∫ ∞
2F˜
γ2f̂(γ)dγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
(A.9)
The first part (A) can be brought to:
A =
1
2
F˜ λ
∫ 2F˜
0
γe−λγdγ =
1
2
F˜ λ
[
−2F˜ 1
λ
e−2F˜ λ + 0 +
1
λ
∫ 2F˜
0
e−λγdγ
]
= −F˜ 2e−2F˜ λ + 1
2
F˜
λ
[
1− e−2F˜ λ
] (A.10)
The second part (B) can be brought to:
B = −1
2
F˜ 2
[
1− e−2F˜ λ
]
(A.11)
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The third part (C) can be brought to:
C =
1
8
λ
∫ ∞
2F˜
γ2e−2F˜ λdγ =
1
8
λ
[
1
λ
4F˜ 2e−2F˜ λ + 2
1
λ
∫ ∞
2F˜
e−λγdγ
]
=
1
2
F˜ 2e−2F˜ λ +
1
4
[
1
λ
e−2F˜ λ2F˜ +
1
λ
∫ ∞
2F˜
e−λγdγ
]
=
1
2
F˜ 2e−2F˜ λ +
1
2
F˜
λ
e−2F˜ λ +
1
4
1
λ2
e−2F˜ λ
(A.12)
Summing up the first (A), the second (B) and the third part (C) yields:
E [Πi] = −F˜ 2e−2F˜ λ + 1
2
F˜
λ
[
1− e−2F˜ λ
]
− 1
2
F˜ 2
[
1− e−2F˜ λ
]
+
1
2
F˜ 2e−2F˜ λ +
1
2
F˜
λ
e−2F˜ λ
+
1
4
1
λ2
e−2F˜ λ
=
1
2
F˜
λ
− 1
2
F˜ 2 +
1
4
1
λ2
e−2F˜ λ
(A.13)
Representation of the critical discount factor used for plotting in figure 3.1:
δ∗ = 1− E [γ]
2 + V ar [γ]
E [γ]2 + V ar [γ] + γ2 − 2F˜ γ + 2F˜ 2
= 1− 2
2 + γ
2
E[γ]2+V ar[γ]
[
2− 2 F˜1
2
γ
+ F˜
2
1
4
γ2
] = 1− 2
2 + γ
2
E[γ]2+V ar[γ]
[
2− 2 F˜
qM
+ F˜
2
qM 2
]
(A.14)
Derivation of the Necessary Discount Factor for Semi-Collusion
Derivation of the necessary discount factor for semi-collusion in equation 3.36. A firm
that is deviating from a semi-collusive agreement chooses following deviation price:
pd = min
{
pd1 =
1
2
(
a− F˜ + c
)
, pd2 = p
sc − 
}
(A.15)
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If it is optimal for a deviating firm to set the residual monopoly price (pd = pd1 =
1
2
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
) the trade-off between deviation and collusion can be stated as follows:
NPV (Deviation) ≤ NPV (Collusion)
1
4
(
a− F˜ − c
)2
≤ 1
2
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c) + 1
2
δ
1− δE [Π
sc]
1
4
(
a− F˜ − c
)2
≤ 1
2
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c)
+
1
2
δ
1− δ
(
µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c)
)
(1− δ)
(
1
2
(
a− F˜ − c
)2
−
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c)
)
≤
δ
(
µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c)
)
(A.16)
δ ≥
1
2
(
a− F˜ − c
)2
−
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c)
1
2
(
a− F˜ − c
)2
−
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc) + µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c)
δ1∗ = 1−
µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c)
µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c) + 12
(
a− F˜ − c
)2
−
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c)
(A.17)
If it is optimal for a deviating firm to undercut the collusive price infinitesimally (pd =
pd2 = p
sc − ) the trade-off between deviation and collusion can be stated as follows:
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NPV (Deviation) ≤ NPV (Collusion)(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c) ≤ 1
2
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
+
+
1
2
δ
1− δ
(
µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c)
)
(1− δ)
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c) ≤ δ
(
µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c)
)
δ ≥
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c)(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c) + µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c)
δ2∗ = 1−
µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c)(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c) + µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c)
(A.18)
The critical discount factor, that makes a semi-collusion to fail, is higher, when the op-
timal deviation price is given by the residual monopoly price of pd1 =
1
2
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
,
than the critical discount factor, when it is optimal to undercut the semi-collusive price
infinitesimally. This easily can be seen by comparing equation A.17 and A.18. They
only differ in one term in the denominator. A higher value in the denominator leads to
a smaller value of the fraction. A smaller value of the corresponding fraction leads to a
higher value of the discount factor, since a smaller value is deducted from 1. For δ1∗ the
term 1
2
(
a− F˜ − c
)2
−
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c) stands in the denominator and exceeds
the corresponding value in the denominator of δ2∗ of
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c), since
1
2
(
a− F˜ − c
)2
−
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc) ≥
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c)
1
4
(
a− F˜ − c
)2
≥
(
a− F˜ − psc
)
Πd
(
pd1 =
1
2
(
a− F˜ + c
))
≥ Πd (pd2 = psc − )
(A.19)
This means, that when firms set a very small semi-collusive price the critical discount
factor becomes minimal. For a semi-collusive price close to marginal costs, this enables
firms to reduce the critical discount to zero, since:
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lim
psc→c δ
2
∗ = lim
psc→c 1−
µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c)(
a− F˜ − psc
)
(psc − c) + µ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ) (a− psc) (psc − c)
= 0
(A.20)
Derivation of the Optimal Semi-Collusive Strategy
When firms trade more than the recessive monopoly quantity forward, the no deviation
constraint looks as follows:
1
4
(
a− F˜ − c
)2 ≤ 1
2
(a− F˜ − p)(p− c) + 1
2
δ
1− δ
[
µ˜(2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2) + (1− µ˜) (a− p)(p− c)
]
0 ≤ −1
2
(
a− F˜ − c
)2
+
(
a− F˜ − p
)
(p− c) + δ
1− δ
[
µ˜
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
+ (1− µ˜) (a− p) (p− c)
]
C := −1
2
(
a− F˜ − c
)2
+ (a− p) (p− c) 1− δµ˜
1− δ − F˜ (p− c) +
δµ˜
1− δ
(
2qMR F˜ − F˜ 2
)
!
= 0
(A.21)
Firms that collude and need to adopt forward traded amount above the recessive monopoly
quantity and/or set a price during booms below monopoly price, choose the contracted
amount and the price exactly to match no deviation constraint.
Lowering the boom price stabilizes a collusive agreement, if, and only if, the partial
derivative according to the price is negative (∂C
∂p
< 0):
∂C
∂p
= (a− 2p+ c) 1− δµ˜
1− δ − F˜ < 0
p >
1
2
(a+ c)− F˜ 1− δ
1− δµ˜
(A.22)
The partial derivative of the constraint according to the price is negative for all prices
above the residual monopoly price (∂C
∂p
≤ 0 ∀ p ≥ 1
2
(a− F˜ − c)), as long as:
1− δ
1− δµ˜ >
1
2
⇔ δ < 1
2− µ˜ (A.23)
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This condition is fulfilled for any discount factor that forces firms to semi-collude (see
equation A.4 for the condition of semi-collusion without forward trading), since:
1
2− µ˜ > δ
0 =
ΠMB
µ˜ΠMR + (2− µ˜)ΠMB
µ˜
2− µ˜Π
M
R + Π
M
B > Π
M
B ⇒
µ˜
2− µ˜Π
M
R > 0
(A.24)
Selling a higher amount than the recessive monopoly quantity forward, stabilizes a col-
lusive agreement, if, and only if, the partial derivative according to forward contracts is
positive (∂C
∂F
> 0):
∂C
∂F˜
= (a− F˜ − c)− (p− c) + δµ˜
1− δ
(
2qMR − 2F˜
)
> 0
(1− δ) (a− p)
1− δ(1− 2µ˜) +
2δµ˜
1− δ(1− 2µ˜)q
M
R > F˜
(A.25)
The first part of the condition is given by a factor depending on the discount factor and the
recession probability multiplied with the boom quantity ( (1−δ)(a−p)
1−δ(1−2µ˜) ). The second part is
given by a factor depending on the discount factor and the recession probability multiplied
with the recession quantity ( 2δµ˜
1−δ(1−2µ˜)q
M
R ). This condition is fulfilled for forward-traded
quantities that do not "exceed too much" the recessive collusive quantity. If the condition
was negative, firms exactly would choose F˜ = (1−δ)(a−p)
1−δ(1−2µ˜) +
2δµ˜
1−δ(1−2µ˜)q
M
R , since a higher
amount would decrease the stability of a collusive agreement and decrease the profit.
To identify the partial effect of the forward-traded amount and the boom price the total
differential of the no deviation constraint is used.
∂F˜
∂p
= −
∂C
∂p
∂C
∂F˜
=
(1− δ)F˜ − (1− δµ˜)(a− 2p+ c)
(a− F˜ − p)(1− δ) + 2δµ˜(qMR − F˜ )
> 0
∂p
∂F˜
= −
∂C
∂F˜
∂C
∂p
=
(a− F˜ − p)(1− δ) + 2δµ˜(qMR − F˜ )
(1− δ)F˜ − (1− δµ˜)(a− 2p+ c) > 0
(A.26)
This leads to the following optimal forward-traded amount and boom price:
F˜sc = q
M
R +
1
2
1− µ˜
µ˜
(a− 2p+ c)(a− F˜ − p)(1− δ) + 2δµ˜(q
M
R − F˜ )
(1− δ)F − (1− δµ˜)(a− 2p+ c) > q
M
R
psc = p
M
B −
µ˜
1− µ˜(F˜ − q
M
R )
(1− δ)F˜ − (1− δµ˜)(a− 2p+ c)
(a− F˜ − p)(1− δ) + 2δµ˜(qMR − F˜ )
< pMB
(A.27)
The partial derivatives of the relationship between forward traded amount and semi-
collusive boom price with respect to recession probability µ are:
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∂p
∂F˜
∂µ˜
=
2δ
(
qMR − F˜
)(
(1− δ)F˜ − (1− δµ˜)(a− 2p+ c)
)
− δ (a− 2p+ c)
(
(a− F˜ − p)(1− δ) + 2δµ˜(qMR − F˜ )
)
(
(1− δ)F˜ − (1− δµ˜)(a− 2p+ c)
)2 < 0
∂F˜
∂p
∂µ˜
=
δ (a− 2p+ c)
(
(a− F˜ − p)(1− δ) + 2δµ˜(qMR − F˜ )
)
− 2δ
[
qMR − F˜
] (
(1− δ)F˜ − (1− δµ˜)(a− 2p+ c)
)
(
(a− F˜ − p)(1− δ) + 2δµ˜(qMR − F˜ )
)2 > 0
(A.28)
Here the signs can easily be deducted from the fact that the forward traded amount ex-
ceeds recessive monopoly quantity F˜ > qMR , that (1 − δ)F˜ − (1 − δµ˜)(a − 2p + c) > 0
(see equation A.22) and (a− F˜ − p)(1− δ) + 2δµ˜(qMR − F˜ ) > 0 (see equation A.25)
Negligible uncertainty as a special case
Under certainty, firms never trade more than the monopoly quantity in a full collusive
agreement, since trading forward more than (a priori known) monopoly quantity would
decrease profits. The total traded amount is given by summing up the single (symmet-
rically) traded amount where x gives the proportion of monopoly quantity that is traded
forward (F˜ = f˜i + f˜j = 2f˜ = qMx = 12γx). Under certainty, the “spread” equals its
expectation and the variance of the “spread” is equal to zero. Then the critical discount
factor (equation 3.8) can be brought to:
δ ≥ δ∗ = 1− E [γ]
2 + V [γ]
E [γ]2 + V [γ] + γ2 − 2F˜ γ + 2F˜ 2
= 1− γ
2
2γ2 − xγ2 + 1
2
x2γ2
= 1− 2
(2− x)2 + 2x
(A.29)
The partial derivative of the critical discount factor due to proportion of monopoly quan-
tity traded forward is given by:
∂δ∗
∂x
=
−4 [1− x]
(2− x)2 + 2x ≤ 0 (A.30)
The partial derivative of the critical discount factor due to proportion of monopoly quan-
tity traded forward is strictly negative. Hence, in a deterministic market structure, trading
forward helps to stabilize collusive agreements, too.
Chapter 4
Forward Trading and Strategic
Investment
4.1 Introduction
Especially on electricity markets investment decisions play a crucial role for strategic
competition. There are very long-lasting investments like building up a plant or intro-
ducing a cost-reducing new technology for electricity generation. Other investments like
developing capacities in an existing plant, distributing electricity or marketing campaigns
have a much shorter time horizon. The presented model contributes to the economic lit-
erature in modeling simultaneously two, especially for commodity markets, important
strategic decisions: The decisions on investment and on forward trading.
The importance of investment decisions can be illustrated by the German power mar-
ket and the investment costs for the ongoing turnaround towards a sustainable energy
supply. The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) (Blazejczak, Diek-
mann, Edler, Kemfert, Neuhoff, and Schill, 2013) estimated these investment costs up to
38 billion euros for the years between 2014 and 2020. From this total amount of 38 bil-
lion euros approximately 26 billion euros are needed for investments in power and heating
supply and 7 billion euros for investments in the electricity network.
The German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy collected investment
data for renewable energies installations from the years 2000 until 2014 (BMWi, 2014a,
p.37). This data, which is presented in figure 4.1, shows the increasing importance of
investments in renewable energies. Total investments in renewable energies were rather
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moderate in the year 2000 (3.2 billion euros). Investments were even five times higher in
2014 (16 billion euros). This clearly illustrates the importance of investment decisions on
the German electricity market.
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Figure 4.1: Investment in Renewable Energies Installations from 2000 until 2014
To what extent imperfectly competing firms invest depends mainly on whether the de-
cision variables such as quantity, price and investment are seen as strategic complements
or substitutes (see the influential contributions of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Bu-
low, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985)). As will be shown in the presented model, the
market performance significantly depends on the time horizon of firms’ investment deci-
sion. For a long-lasting investment decision that takes place before firms trade forward
and compete in quantities competition is rather weak and rather a low social welfare is
achieved. In contrast to this, for shorter investment decisions, which take place after firms
have traded forward, but before firms compete in quantities, competition becomes fierce
and social welfare becomes rather high.
The next pages are organized as follows: In section 4.3.1 the main assumptions and
the structure of the model are presented. In section 4.3.2 a long term strategic investment
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is modeled. Therefore in a first stage firms choose their investments before in a second
stage, firms engage in forward contracts and, in a third stage, they compete in quantities.
In section 4.3.3 a mid-term strategic investment is modeled. Therefore in the first stage
firms engage in forward contracts before they decide about an investment in the second
stage and then compete in quantities in the third stage.
In section 4.3.4 the results of both decision structures are compared to one another.
They are also compared to the results of a two-stage game consisting of a forward trad-
ing stage followed by quantity competition as well as to a two stage game consisting of
an investment decision followed by quantity competition. The results of both two-stage
games are derived in a simple and concise form in the appendix. Section 4.4 concludes.
The model, that is presented on the next pages, has been published in the series Uni-
versity of Tüebingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance (Aichele, 2014b).
4.2 Literature on Strategic Forward Trading and
Investment
The Economic Analysis of Investment Incentives
In the very beginning of industrial organization authors like Flaherty (1980), Spence
(1977) and Dixit (1980) already worked out the strategic dimension of investment de-
cisions for olipolistic firms. These first contributions mainly focused on the possibility
of a certain level of investment to deter market entry of competitors. Then Brander and
Spencer (1983) analyzed strategic dimensions of investment decisions for two firms that
already serve a certain market. Therefore they use a two-stage decision structure for two
competing firms: In a a first step, firms have to decide about their R&D expenditure that
decreases marginal costs of production. In a second step, firms can choose for a given
cost structure that has been determined by R&D expenditure, about quantities supplied to
consumers. They compare this two-stage strategic decision setting to a simultaneous and
therefore non strategic decision setting and conclude: "In the strategic setting firms use
more R&D, they do not minimize the cost of producing output, and there is a tendency for
the total output of each firm to be larger" (Brander and Spencer, 1983, p.232). This leads
to lower firm profits. However, "net welfare, as measured by the sum of consumer surplus
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and profit, is likely to rise" (Brander and Spencer, 1983, p.232). Thus, the strategic effect
of commitment by R&D expenditures is socially beneficial.
The influential contributions of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow, Geanakoplos,
and Klemperer (1985) followed. They break down the question to what extent imper-
fectly competing firms invest on the question whether the type of decision variables such
as quantity and price are seen as strategic complements or substitutes and whether an in-
vestment makes competitors "tough" or "soft". Whether a strategic variable is said to be a
strategic complement or a strategic substitute depends on the slope of its reaction function.
A reaction function shows the best action of a firm for each given action of its competitor.
For a positive slope of the reaction function a firm chooses c.p. a higher realization of its
own variable, whenever a competitor chooses a higher realization of its variable. For a
positive slope of the reaction function variables are strategic complements. For a negative
slope of the reaction function a firm chooses c.p. a lower realization of its own variable
whenever a competitor chooses a higher realization of its variable. For a negative slope
of the reaction function variables are strategic substitutes. In industrial organization a
classical example of strategic substitutes and completes are prices and capacities. "Prices
are often strategic complements and capacities are often strategic substitutes" (Tirole,
1988, p.208). An investment makes a competitor "tough", if this investment decreases
competitors profit. An investment makes a competitor "soft", if this investment increases
competitors profit.
Combining the concept of strategic complements and substitutes with the idea of in-
vestment that makes firms "tough" or "soft" leads to the famous taxonomy of strategic
competition. Four different strategies for competing firms, in which "the strategy names
are related to the incentive for the strategic firm to overinvest or underinvest in equilib-
rium, relative to a nonstrategic firm playing the same game" (Church and Ware, 2000,
p.534) can be distinguished. Firstly, there is the top dog strategy, which describes aggres-
sive overinvestment. This strategy is optimal if an investment makes competitors tough
and if there are strategic substitutes. The rationale of this strategy is to (heavily) overin-
vest in order to discourage a competitor and to decrease its market share. As an example
for this setting cost cutting investments for firms that compete in quantities can be given.
Secondly, there is the puppy dog strategy, which describes a peaceful underinvestment.
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This strategy is optimal if an investment makes competitors tough and if there are strate-
gic complements. The rationale of this strategy is to invest reluctantly in order to avoid
aggressive reaction of a competitor thus may leading to low profits, for example due to a
price war. As an example for this product differentiation for firms that compete in prices
can be given. Thirdly, there is the lean and hungry strategy, which describes aggressive
underinvestment. This strategy is optimal if an investment makes competitors soft and
there are strategic substitutes. The rationale of this strategy is to (heavily) underinvest in
order to make the market environment less attractive for a competitor, which leads to a
decreased market share of the competitor. As an example for this advertising (with ad-
vertising spillovers) for firms that compete in quantities can be given. Fourthly, there is
the fat cat strategy, which describes a peaceful overinvestment. This strategy is optimal if
an investment makes competitors soft and there are strategic complements. The rationale
of this strategy is to overinvest (heavily) in order to induce a less aggressive behavior of
the competitor. As an example for this advertising for firms that produce a heterogenous
product and compete in prices can be given.
Publications about investment incentives in complex market structures of network in-
dustries have recently been presented. Especially three contributions should be men-
tioned here. Choi and Kim (2010) focus on the interaction between net neutrality and
investment incentives for internet service providers and conclude "that the relationship
between the net neutrality regulation and investment incentives is subtle" (Choi and Kim,
2010, p.34). Valletti and Cambini (2005) model the interaction between investments and
network competition for telecommunication operators and find tendencies for strategic
underinvestment in network quality. Fabra, von der Fehr, and de Frutos (2011) study
the interaction between market design and investment incentives for electricity markets.
Therefore, they model the investment incentives for a discriminatory and for a uniform-
price auction. Even though their contribution leads to important insights about investment
decisions on electricity markets, the important strategic interaction of forward contracts
and investment cannot be analyzed.
For an analysis of the German electricity market all these models about strategic in-
vestment in certain respects show similarities to the German electricity market. However,
one very important instrument that could interact strategically with investment decisions,
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is missing: Forward Trading!
My theoretical model about the interaction of forward trading and investment incentives
is based on the market characteristics presented in table 3.1, too. However, three important
different assumptions are made. Firstly, investment is incorporated by the possibility to
reduce marginal costs by paying a certain amount of money in an earlier stage. Secondly,
in contrast to the model presented above firms compete in quantities. This assumption
is made to show, that even when firms do not collude on the German electricity market,
forward trading leads to important strategic consequences. Thirdly, firms compete in
quantities. As Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) showed, there exists a strong relationship
between quantity competition and capacity building. Thus, quantity competition gives the
possibility to reflect another important feature on electricity markets: Capacity building!
4.3 The Model
4.3.1 Assumptions and General Remarks
The model that is presented adds an additional third stage of investment decision to the
two-stage model of Allaz and Villa (1993). Concerning the contribution of Allaz and
Villa (1993), in a first stage firms can engage in contracts (forward market stage) and in a
second stage firms serve these contracts and sell an additional quantity to the customers
(spot market stage). In order to compare the results of the presented model with the
results of Allaz and Villa (1993) all underlying assumptions are chosen very closely to
the assumptions made by Allaz and Villa (1993).
Firms compete in quantities and face a linear (inverse) demand function p = a−xi−xj ,
where the production that is sold by firm i either via forward contracts or directly on the
spot market is denoted by xi, xj respectively. There is perfect foresight of all market
participants and in equilibrium the forward market has to be efficient, which means "the
forward price as a function of the forward positions must be equal to the price that will
result from cournot competition on the spot market given these positions" (Allaz and
Villa, 1993, p.3). The total production xi of each firm i can either be sold via a binding
and observable forward contract denoted by f˜i or directly on the spot market. Thus, the
amount that is sold on the spot market by firm i is given by the difference of the total
4.3. THE MODEL 159
production and the amount already traded forward before (xsmi = xi − ˜˜fi).
To focus on the strategic aspects of investment decisions, forward trading and quantity
competition on the spot market, the presented model works with deterministic market
conditions. Alternatively the results could be interpreted as the results of a model with
risk-neutral agents competing under uncertainty.
In the presented model firms decide about an investment Ii, that increases their contri-
bution margin linearly by exactly Ii but produces quadratic costs of I2i . This investment
Ii can either be interpreted as a level of technology that decreases marginal costs (c− Ii)
or as an advertising campaign that increases the prohibitive price (a+ Ii).
In section 4.3.2 the market results from competition of a long term strategic investment
are derived. Therefore the following three-stage game is solved by backward induction:
Structure of decision making for a long-term strategic investment
Stage 1. (Cost reducing) Investment:
Firms decide about an (cost reducing) investment. They anticipate the effect on the
quantities being delivered on the forward market as well as on the spot market.
Stage 2. Forward market:
Firms decide about the quantity they contract forward. They take the investment of
both firms as given and anticipate all effects on the quantity competition on the spot
market.
Stage 3. Quantity competition:
Firms take the investment as well as the forward contracts of both firms as given
and decide about the (additional) quantity they want to supply on the spot market.
In section 4.3.3 the market results from competition of a mid term strategic investment is
derived. Again the, following three-stage game is solved by backward induction:
Structure of decision making for a mid term strategic investment
Stage 1. Forward market:
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Firms decide about the quantity they contract forward. They anticipate the effects
on the investment decisions as well as on the quantities delivered on the spot market.
Stage 2. (Demand increasing) Investment:
Firms decide about their investment. They take as given the forward contracted
amount in the first stage and anticipate all effects on the quantity competition on
the spot market.
Stage 3. Quantity competition:
Firms take the forward contracts as well as the investment of both firms as given
and decide about the (additional) quantity they want to supply on the spot market.
4.3.2 Long-Term Strategic Investment Like Cost Cutting
Quantity competition, in which ﬁrms take costs and forward contracts as
given
In the third stage, each firm’s investment as well as the forward contracted amount is
given. Thus, the profit of each firm can be stated as:
Πi = (a− xi − xj)
(
xi − f˜i
)
− (c− Ii)xi (4.1)
In the third stage, each firm i decides about the quantity it supplies on the spot market
(xsmi = xi − f˜i), where the forward traded amount f˜i is given from the decision made
in the first stage. The costs for each unit sold (either to consumers or to speculators)
are given by the marginal cost less the level of technology c − Ii. The marginal costs,
which have been reduced by the level of technology c − Ii, incur to the total output xi.
Maximizing the spot market profit of each firm, given by equation 4.1, in respect to the
total quantity xi, yields the best quantity response of a firm. This reaction function of firm
i depends on the prohibitive price a, the marginal costs c the amount traded forward by
each firm f˜i, f˜j , its own investment Ii and the quantity set by the rival firm xj . For the
reaction function of firm j the same holds true except that i has to be changed in j and
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vice versa.
∂Πi
∂xi
= a− 2xi − xj + fi − c+ Ii != 0
=⇒ xi = 1
2
(
a+ f˜i − c+ Ii − xj
) (4.2)
Both firms perfectly take into account the quantity set by the rival. The Nash-equilibrium
(x∗), in which neither firm has an incentive to set another quantity, is found in the inter-
section point of both reaction functions.
xi =
1
2
(
a+ f˜i − c+ Ii − xj
)
, xj =
1
2
(
a+ f˜j − c+ Ij − xi
)
x∗i =
1
2
(
a+ f˜i − c+ Ii
)
− 1
2
1
2
(
a+ f˜j − c+ Ij − x∗i
)
=
1
3
(
a+ 2f˜i − f˜j + 2Ii − Ij − c
) (4.3)
The quantity set in equilibrium by firm i depends positively on the prohibitive price a, the
own forward contracted amount f˜i and its own investment Ii. The quantity depends neg-
atively on the competitor’s forward traded amount f˜j , the competitor’s investment Ij and
marginal cost c. The same functional form holds true for the quantity set by firm j. With
these optimal quantities in the third stage the (reduced form) spot-market equilibrium
price p∗sm can easily be determined as:
psm∗ = a− x∗i − x∗j
=
1
3
(
a+ 2c− f˜i − f˜j − Ii − Ij
) (4.4)
The (reduced form) spot-market equilibrium price p∗sm depends positively on the pro-
hibitive price a as well as on marginal costs c. It depends negatively on each firm’s
forward traded amount f˜i, f˜j and each firm’s investment Ii, Ij .
Decision on forward contracts, in which ﬁrms take cost structure as given
In the second stage, firms anticipate the spot market quantities that are additionally sup-
plied to the forward contracted amount (xsmi = x∗ − f˜i, xsmj = x∗ − f˜j). This reduces
the problem of profit maximization to the optimal choice of one’s own forward traded
amount f˜i, for a given own investment Ii, for a given investment of the competitor Ij as
well as for a given competitor’s forward traded amount f˜j . In the second stage firms take
the investment decision as given, since it was made in the first stage.
162 CHAPTER 4. FORWARD TRADING AND STRATEGIC INVESTMENT
The price for each firm’s forward traded amount is given by the anticipated spot market
price, since speculators, taking the counterpart on the forward market, have perfect fore-
sight and build rational expectations. Thus, no additional arbitrage profit or loss is made
by a firm when it is trading forward. Therefore, all forward sales are perfectly offset by
the same amount that cannot be delivered on the spot market and both firms’ profit func-
tions in the second stage look as follows:
Πi = (p
∗
sm − c+ Ii) (x∗i − f˜i) + f˜i (p∗sm − c+ Ii)
=
(
1
3
(
a+ 2c− f˜i − f˜j − Ii − Ij
)
− c+ Ii
)
1
3
(
a+ 2f˜i − f˜j + 2Ii − Ij − c
)
=
1
9
(
a− c− f˜i − f˜j + 2Ii − Ij
)(
a+ 2f˜i − f˜j + 2Ii − Ij − c
)
(4.5)
In the second stage the firms decide about their contracted amount. Thus, the optimal
forward traded amount is found by maximizing both firms’ (reduced) profit function with
respect to the forward contracted amount:
∂Πi
∂fi
=
1
9
(
−
(
a+ 2f˜i − f˜j + 2Ii − Ij − c
)
+ 2
(
a− c− f˜i − f˜j + 2Ii − Ij
))
!
= 0
=⇒ f˜i = 1
4
(a− c− f˜j + 2Ii − Ij)
(4.6)
The optimal forward traded amount of each firm in the second stage depends positively
on the prohibition price a but negatively on the marginal costs c, the competitor’s forward
traded amount f˜j and the investments made by each firm in the first stage Ii, Ij . The
equilibrium forward positions are found in the intersection of both firms’ best response
functions.
f˜i =
1
4
(
a− c− f˜j + 2Ii − Ij
)
, f˜j =
1
4
(
a− c− f˜i + 2Ij − Ii
)
f˜i =
1
4
(a− c+ 2Ii − Ij)− 1
4
1
4
(
a− c− f˜i + 2Ij − Ii
)
f˜i =
1
5
(a− c+ 3Ii − 2Ij)
(4.7)
4.3. THE MODEL 163
Using the equilibrium forward contracts the quantities that emerge from the forward and
the spot market game can be determined as:
xi =
1
3
(
a− c+ 2Ii − Ij + 2f˜i − f˜j
)
=
1
3
(
a− c+ 2Ii − Ij + 1
5
(a− c) + 8
5
Ii − 7
5
Ij
)
=
1
5
(2 (a− c) + 6Ii − 4Ij)
(4.8)
The equilibrium price in the second stage is easily determined either by setting these
quantities into the inverse linear demand function or by setting the second stage forward
traded amount into the equilibrium spot market price (equation 4.4):
pfm = a− xi − xj
= a− 1
5
(2 (a− c) + 6Ii − 4Ij)− 1
5
(2 (a− c) + 6Ij − 4Ii)
=
1
5
(a+ 4c− 2Ii − 2Ij)
(4.9)
When firms are trading forward and subsequently compete in quantities, a classical pris-
oners’ dilemma forces firms to sell forward contracts, even though in equilibrium this
makes both firms worse off (Allaz and Villa, 1993, p.5). This is not changed, when firms
have to decide on an earlier stage about the level of technology they choose.
Decision on the level of technology, under anticipation of the forward and
the spot market amount
In the first stage firms perfectly anticipate the forward and spot market decisions made by
both firms. The first stage profit for each firm is found by putting the quantity resulting
from the forward and spot market competition into the first stage profit function. The first
stage reduced form profit function looks as follows:
Πi = (p
fm − c+ Ii) ∗ xi − I2i
=
(
1
5
(a+ 4c− 2Ii − 2Ij)− c+ Ii
)
1
5
(2 (a− c) + 6Ii − 4Ij)− I2i
=
1
25
(a− c+ 3Ii − 2Ij) (2 (a− c) + 6Ii − 4Ij)− I2i
(4.10)
In the first stage the firms decide about their investments. Thus, the optimal investment
of each firm is found by maximizing both firms’ (reduced) profit function with respect to
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their investment:
∂Πi
∂Ii
=
1
25
[3 (2 (a− c) + 6Ii − 4Ij) + 6 (a− c+ 3Ii − 2Ij)]− 2Ii != 0
=⇒ 1
25
[12 (a− c) + 36Ii − 24Ij] = 2Ii
=⇒ Ii = 1
7
(6 (a− c)− 12Ij)
(4.11)
The optimal investment of each firm in the second stage depends positively on the pro-
hibition price a but negatively on the marginal costs c and the investments made by a
competitor Ij . This leads to following investment of each firm in the first stage:
Ii =
1
7
(6 (a− c)− 12Ij) , Ij = 1
7
(6 (a− c)− 12Ii)
Ii =
1
7
(6 (a− c))− 12
7
(6 (a− c)− 12Ii)
Ii =
6
19
(a− c) ≈ 0.3159 (a− c)
(4.12)
Remark: To avoid negative marginal costs after the decision on the level of technology
(c− Ii = c− 619(a− c) > 0) it has to be assumed that c > 625a. For the interpretation of
the investment as an advertising campaign this assumption is not needed.
The subgame-perfect quantity is found by inserting the subgame-perfect investment in
stage one (4.12) into the subgame-perfect quantity in stage two (equation 4.8):
xi =
1
5
(2 (a− c) + 6Ii − 4Ij)
=
1
5
(
2 (a− c) + 2 ∗ 6
19
(a− c)
)
=
10
19
(a− c) ≈ 0.5263 (a− c)
(4.13)
Forward traded amount is found by inserting subgame-perfect investment in stage one
into the subgame-perfect forward traded amount in stage two (equation 4.7):
fi =
1
5
(a− c+ 3Ii − 2Ij)
=
1
5
(
a− c+ 6
19
(a− c)
)
=
5
19
(a− c) ≈ 0.2632 (a− c)
(4.14)
Inserting the optimal investment into the subgame-perfect price function in stage two
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(equation 4.9) leads to:
p∗ =
1
5
(a+ 4c− 2Ii − 2Ij)
=
1
5
(
a+ 4c− 4 6
19
(a− c)
)
= − 1
19
(a− c) + c ≈ −0.0523 (a− c) + c
(4.15)
Each firms’ profit is found by inserting the subgame-perfect price (equation 4.15), invest-
ment (equation 4.12) and quantity (equation 4.13) in stage one into the profit function
(equation 4.10):
Πi = (p
∗ − c+ Ii)xi − I2i
=
(
− 1
19
(a− c) + c− c+ 6
19
(a− c)
)
10
19
(a− c)−
(
6
19
(a− c)
)2
=
50
361
(a− c)2 −
(
6
19
(a− c)
)2
=
14
361
(a− c)2 ≈ 0.0388 (a− c)2
(4.16)
Consumer surplus can be determined using optimal price (equation 4.15) and quantity
(equation 4.13):
σ =
1
2
(a− p∗)(xi + xj)
=
1
2
(
a+
1
19
(a− c)− c
)(
10
19
(a− c) + 10
19
(a− c)
)
=
200
361
(a− c)2 ≈ 0.5540 (a− c)2
(4.17)
Welfare is found by adding each firms’ profit to the consumer surplus:
ω = Πi + Πj + σ
=
14
361
(a− c)2 + 14
361
(a− c)2 + 200
361
(a− c)2
=
12
19
(a− c)2 ≈ 0.6316 (a− c)2
(4.18)
For each subgame-perfect outcome of the decision structure investment, forward trad-
ing and quantity competition the letters I,F,Q are added. This will be helpful to compare
the market results with the results for other structures of decision. For example pI,F,Q
means the price that emerges, when (as described in this section) first the investment,
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then forward trading, and afterwards quantity competition takes place.
xI,F˜ ,Q =
10
19
(a− c) , pI,F˜ ,Q = −
1
19
(a− c) + c fI,F˜ ,Q =
5
19
(a− c)
II,F˜ ,Q =
6
19
(a− c) ΠI,F˜ ,Q =
14
361
(a− c)2, σI,F˜ ,Q =
200
361
(a− c)2
ωI,F˜ ,Q =
26
45
(a− c)2
(4.19)
4.3.3 Mid-Term Strategic Investment Like Advertising
Quantity competition, in which ﬁrms take demand and forward contracts as
given
In the third stage, each firm’s prohibitive price and forward contracted amount is given.
Thus, the profit of each firm can be stated as:
Πi = (a− xi − xj)
(
xi − f˜i
)
− (c− Ii)xi (4.20)
Remark: In the context of advertising, the profit function should rather look like Πi = (a+
Ii−xi−xj)(xi−f˜i)−cxi. To ensure comparability with the long-term investment decision,
the profit function used above is taken. This can be done without loss of generality, since
both profit functions are equivalent.
The best quantity response of a firm due to the quantity set by the competitor is found by
maximizing the profit function with respect to the quantity xi.
∂Πi
∂xi
= a− 2xi − xj + fi − c+ Ii != 0
=⇒ xi = 1
2
(
a+ f˜i − c+ Ii − xj
) (4.21)
The quantities set by each firm in Nash-equilibrium is given by x∗i,j . The quantities depend
on both firms’ forward contracted amount and both firms’ investment.
xi =
1
2
(
a+ f˜i − c+ Ii − xj
)
, xj =
1
2
(
a+ f˜j − c+ Ij − xi
)
xi =
1
2
(
a+ f˜i − c+ Ii
)
− 1
2
1
2
(
a+ f˜j − c+ Ij − xi
)
x∗i =
1
3
(
a+ 2f˜i − f˜j + 2Ii − Ij − c
) (4.22)
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With the equilibrium quantities x∗i , x
∗
j the spot market price p
∗
sm in the third stage can be
determined as:
p∗sm = a−
1
3
(
a+ 2f˜i − f˜j + 2Ii − Ij − c
)
− 1
3
(
a+ 2f˜j − f˜i + 2Ij − Ii − c
)
=
1
3
(
a+ 2c− f˜i − f˜j − Ii − Ij
)
(4.23)
Investment decision, in which ﬁrms take forward contracts as given
In the second stage firms decide about their investments, knowing each firm’s forward
contracted amount and anticipating the quantity decision each firm makes in the third
stage. Thus, the profit functions can be reduced to a relationship of forward contracts,
amount of investment, marginal costs and the prohibitive price and look as follows:
Πi = (p
∗
sm − c+ Ii)x∗i − I2i
=
(
1
3
(
a+ 2c− f˜i − f˜j − Ii − Ij
)
− c+ Ii
)
1
3
(
a+ 2f˜i − f˜j + 2Ii − Ij − c
)
− I2i
=
1
9
(
a− c− f˜i − f˜j + 2Ii − Ij
)(
a− c+ 2f˜i − f˜j + 2Ii − Ij
)
− I2i
(4.24)
The best investment response of each firm in the second stage due to the investment of the
competitor is given by:
∂Πi
∂Ii
=
1
9
[
2
(
a+ 2f˜i − f˜j + 2Ii − Ij − c
)
+ 2
(
a− c− f˜i − f˜j + 2Ii − Ij
)]
− 2Ii != 0
1
9
[4 (a− c) + 2fi − 4fj − 4Ij] = 2Ii − 8
9
Ii
Ii =
1
5
(
2a− 2c+ f˜i − 2f˜j − 2Ij
)
(4.25)
Each firm’s investment depends positively on the prohibitive price a and on its own for-
ward traded amount f˜i. Each firm’s investment depends negatively on the competitor’s
forward traded amount f˜i, the competitor’s investment Ij and on marginal costs c.
Remark: Again, for the cost-cutting interpretation positive marginal costs after the
investment have to be ensured. When interpreting the investment decision in the second
stage as advertising, this is not necessary. Therefore and to ensure comparability with the
results of section 4.3.2, this is not explicitly modeled in the presented model.
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The investment chosen by each firm in Nash-equilibrium is given by I∗i , I
∗
j and found in
the intersection of the best investment reaction functions.
Ii =
1
5
(
2a− 2c+ f˜i − 2f˜j − 2Ij
)
, Ij =
1
5
(
2a− 2c+ f˜j − 2f˜i − 2Ii
)
I∗i =
1
5
(
2a− 2c+ f˜i − 2f˜j
)
− 2
5
1
5
(
2a− 2c+ f˜j − 2f˜i − 2I∗i
)
21
25
I∗i =
1
25
(6(a− c) + 9fi − 12fj)
I∗i =
1
7
(2a− 2c+ 3f˜i − 4f˜j)
(4.26)
Each firm’s investment depends positively on the prohibitive price a and its own forward
traded amount f˜i. It depends negatively on the competitor’s forward traded amount f˜j .
With the equilibrium of investments the quantities of each firms can easily be determined
as:
xi =
1
3
(
a+ 2f˜i − f˜j + 2Ii − Ij − c
)
=
1
3
(
a− c+ 2fi − fj + 2
7
(2(a− c) + 3fi − 4Ij)− 1
7
(2(a− c) + 3Ij − 4Ii)
)
=
1
21
(9(a− c) + 24fi − 18fj)
=
1
7
(3a− 3c+ 8f˜i − 6f˜j)
(4.27)
Each firm’s quantity xi depends positively on the prohibitive price a and positively on its
own forward traded amountf˜i. It depends negatively on the competitor’s forward traded
amount f˜j and marginal costs c.
The equilibrium price in the second stage is easily determined either by inserting these
quantities into the inverse linear demand function or by inserting the second-stage forward
traded amount into the equilibrium spot market price (equation 4.23).
p∗ = a− x∗i − x∗j
= a− 1
7
(3a− 3c+ 8f˜i − 6f˜j)− 1
7
(3a− 3c+ 8f˜j − 6f˜i)
=
1
7
(a− c− 2f˜i − 2f˜j) + c
(4.28)
The price in the second stage depends positively on the prohibitive price a and the marginal
costs c. It depends negatively on each firm’s forward traded amount f˜i, f˜j .
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Decision on forward contracts, under anticipation of investment and spot
market competition
In the first stage firms decide about the amount of forward contracts they supply on the
market. In doing so they perfectly anticipate the consequences on both firms’ investments
as well as on the quantity supplied on the spot market. Thus, the profit can be reduced
to a function solely dependent on each firm’s amount contracted forward as well as the
fundamental market conditions, which are given by marginal costs and the prohibitive
price. The profit function is given by the contribution surplus multiplied by the amount
sold to the market less the investment costs resulting from both firms’ positions on the
forward market.
Πi = (p
∗
I − c+ Ii)xi − I2i
=
(
1
7
(a− c− 2f˜i − 2f˜j) + c− c+ 1
7
(2a− 2c+ 3f˜i − 4f˜j)
)
1
7
(
3a− 3c+ 8f˜i − 6f˜j
)
−
(
1
7
(2a− 2c+ 3f˜i − 4f˜j)
)2
=
1
49
(
3a− 3c+ f˜i − 6f˜j
)(
3a− 3c+ 8f˜i − 6f˜j
)
− 1
49
(
2a− 2c+ 3f˜i − 4f˜j
)2
(4.29)
The optimal amount of forward contracts of each firm in the second stage due to the
forward contracted amount of the rival is given by:
∂Πi
∂fi
=
1
49
[
1
(
3a− 3c+ 8f˜i − 6f˜j
)
+ 8
(
3a− 3c+ f˜i − 6f˜j
)]
− 2
49
(
2a− 2c+ 3f˜i − 4f˜j
)
∗ 3 != 0
=⇒ (27 (a− c) + 16fi − 54fj)− 6 (2(a− c) + 3fi − 4fj) != 0
=⇒ f˜i = 1
2
(
15a− 15c− 30f˜j
)
(4.30)
The Nash-equilibrium forward traded amount is found in the intersection of both firms’
forward contract best response function.
f˜i =
1
2
(
15a− 15c− 30f˜j
)
, f˜j =
1
2
(
15a− 15c− 30f˜i
)
f˜i
∗
=
1
2
(15a− 15c)− 30
2
1
2
f˜j
(
15a− 15c− 30f˜i
)
f˜i
∗
=
15
32
(a− c)
(4.31)
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The subgame-perfect quantity is found by inserting the subgame-perfect forward traded
amount f˜i
∗
(equation 4.31) into the subgame-perfect quantity on the 2 stage (equation
4.27):
xi =
1
7
(3a− 3c+ 8f˜i − 6f˜j)
=
1
7
(
3a− 3c+ 815
32
(a− c)− 615
32
(a− c)
)
=
9
16
(a− c)
(4.32)
The subgame-perfect investment is found by inserting the subgame-perfect forward traded
amount f˜i
∗
(equation 4.31) into the subgame-perfect investment on stage 2 (equation
4.26):
I∗i =
1
7
(2a− 2c+ 3f˜i − 4f˜j)
=
1
7
(2a− 2c+ 315
32
(a− c)− 415
32
(a− c)
=
7
32
(a− c)
(4.33)
The subgame-perfect price is found by inserting the subgame-perfect forward traded
amount f˜i
∗
(equation 4.31) into the inverse demand function:
p∗ = a− xi − xj
= a− 9
16
(a− c)− 9
16
(a− c)
= −1
8
(a− c) + c
(4.34)
The subgame-perfect profit is found by inserting the subgame-perfect price (equation
4.34), investment (equation 4.33) and quantity (equation 4.32) into the profit function
(equation 4.29):
Πi = (p− c+ I∗i )xi − I∗i 2
=
(
−1
8
(a− c) + c− c+ 7
32
(a− c)
)
9
16
(a− c)−
(
7
32
(a− c)
)2
=
27
512
(a− c)2 − 49
322
(a− c)2
=
5
1024
(a− c)2
(4.35)
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The consumer surplus σ can be easily determined using the subgame-perfect price (equa-
tion 4.34) each firms’ quantity (equation 4.32):
σ =
1
2
(a− p∗) (xi + xj)
=
1
2
a−
(
−1
8
+ c
)(
9
16
(a− c) + 9
16
(a− c)
)
=
81
128
(a− c)2
(4.36)
The social welfare ω can be determined by summing up the consumer surplus and each
firms profit:
ω = σ + Πi + Πj
=
81
128
(a− c)2 + 5
1024
(a− c)2 + 5
1024
(a− c)2
=
329
512
(a− c)2
(4.37)
Note: For each subgame-perfect outcome of the decision structure forward trading, in-
vestment and quantity competition the letters F˜ , I, Q are added. This will be helpful to
compare the market results with the results for other structures of decision. For example,
pF˜ ,I,Q means the price that emerges, when (as described in this section) first forward trad-
ing, then the investment, and afterwards quantity competition takes place.
xF˜ ,I,Q =
18
32
(a− c) , pF˜ ,I,Q = −
1
8
(a− c) + c, fF˜ ,I,Q =
15
32
(a− c)
IF˜ ,I,Q =
7
32
(a− c) , ΠF˜ ,I,Q =
5
1024
(a− c)2 , σF˜ ,I,Q =
81
128
(a− c)2
ωF˜ ,I,Q =
329
512
(a− c)2
(4.38)
4.3.4 Comparison of Results
Table 4.1 gives as a benchmark the market outcome for the decision structure, first in-
vestment and then quantity competition, as well as for the decision structure first forward
trading and then quantity competition (Allaz and Villa, 1993). The derivation of all re-
sults for the case of investment and then quantity competition is shown by equation B.1 to
equation B.7 in the appendix. The derivation of all results for the case of forward trading
and then quantity competition is shown by equation B.8 to equation B.14 in the appendix.
Table 4.2 gives the market outcome for the decision structure, first forward trading,
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Investment, Competition Forwards, Competition
Price pI,Q = 0.1429 (a− c) + c pF˜ ,Q = 0.2 (a− c) + c
Quantity xI,Q = 0.4286 (a− c) xF˜ ,Q = 0.4 (a− c)
Forwards fI,Q = 0 fF˜ ,Q = 0.2 (a− c)
Investment II,Q = 0.2857(a− c) IF˜ ,Q = 0
Cons. surplus σI,Q = 0.3673 (a− c)2 σF˜ ,Q = 0.32 (a− c)2
Proﬁt ΠI,Q = 0.1020 (a− c)2 ΠF˜ ,Q = 0.08 (a− c)2
Welfare ωI,Q = 0.5714 (a− c)2 ωF˜ ,Q = 0.48 (a− c)2
Table 4.1: Benchmark Prices, Quantities etc.
then investment, and then quantity competition as well as for the decision structure, first
investment, then forward trading, and then quantity competition. The results for the de-
cision structure forward trading, then investment and subsequently quantity competition
have been derived in section 4.3.2 and can be found in a concentrated form in equation
4.19.
The results for the decision structure, investment, forward trading and then quantity
competition have been derived in section 4.3.3 and can be found in a concentrated form
in equation 4.38. For the sake of comparability all results in table 4.1 and 4.2 are shown
in decimal numeration.
Forwards, Investment, Com-
petition
Investment, Forwards, Com-
petition
Price pF,I,Q = −0.125 (a− c) + c pI,F,Q = −0.0526 (a− c) + c
Quantity xF,I,Q = 0.5625 (a− c) xI,F,Q = 0.5263 (a− c)
Forwards fF,I,Q = 0.4686 (a− c) fI,F,Q = 0.2632 (a− c)
Investment IF,I,Q = 0.2188 (a− c) II,F,Q = 0.3158 (a− c)
Cons. surplus σF,I,Q = 0.6328 (a− c)2 σI,F,Q = 0.4986 (a− c)2
Proﬁt ΠF,I,Q = 0.0049 (a− c)2 ΠI,F,Q = 0.0388 (a− c)2
Welfare ωF,I,Q = 0.6425 (a− c)2 ωI,F,Q = 0.6316 (a− c)2
Table 4.2: New results: Forward Trading, Investment and Quantity
The price chosen by each firm, when firms are able to trade forward and compete in
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quantities pF˜ ,Q =
1
5
(a − c) + c is above the price when they invest and compete in
quantities: pI,Q = 17(a − c). This price is above the price resulting from competition
with an investment decision before forward trading and quantity competition (pI,F,Q =
− 1
19
(a − c). The lowest price results from forward trading, decision on investment and
quantity competition of pI,F˜ ,Q = −18 (a− c) + c.
Thus, the resulting prices can be ordered as:
pF˜ ,I,Q < pI,F˜ ,Q < pI,Q < pF˜ ,Q (4.39)
For the quantities supplied by both firms the order is the other way round. The quan-
tity, when both firms decide about forward contracts and then compete in quantities
(xF˜ ,Q =
2
5
(a− c)) is below the quantity chosen by firms, when both firms decide about
their investments and compete in quantities (xI,Q = 37 (a− c)). Larger quantities are
chosen, when firms decide about their investments, choose their forward contracts, and
compete in quantities (xI,F˜ ,Q =
10
19
(a− c)). The highest quantity results from forward
trading, decision on investment and quantity competition (xF˜ ,I,Q =
18
32
(a− c)).
Thus, the resulting quantities can be ordered as:
xF,Q < xI,Q < xI,F˜ ,Q < xF˜ ,I,Q (4.40)
When firms solely decide about their investment and compete in quantities, by definition
the amount traded forward is zero (fI,Q = 0). Then the smallest (positive) amount is
traded forward when firms solely decide about forward contracts and compete in quan-
tities (fF,Q = 25 (a− c)). A larger amount is traded forward when firms decide about
their investment, trade forward and compete in quantities (fI,F˜ ,Q =
5
19
(a− c)). When
firms first decide about the amount traded forward, then decide about their investments,
and subsequently compete in quantities, the largest amount is traded forward (fF˜ ,I,Q =
15
32
(a− c)).
Thus, the forward-traded amount can be ordered as:
fI,Q < fF,Q < fI,F˜ ,Q < fF˜ ,I,Q (4.41)
For strategic reasons firms choose a relatively low forward traded-amount, when the in-
vestment decision takes place in the first round, whereas firms choose a relatively high
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amount traded forward, when the decision on the forward-traded amount takes place in
the first round. Following the strategic taxonomy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) one can
state: Firms under-invest in the strategic variable (forward-traded amount), when the in-
vestment decision takes place in the first round. Firms over-invest in the strategic variable
(forward-traded amount), when the decision on the forward traded amount takes place in
the first round.
When firms solely decide about their forward traded amount and compete in quanti-
ties, by definition the investment is zero (IF˜ ,Q = 0). Then the smallest (positive) amount
is invested when firms first decide about the amount traded forward, then decide about
their investments, and subsequently compete in quantities (IF˜ ,I,Q =
7
32
(a− c)). A larger
investment is done when firms solely decide about their investment and compete in quan-
tities (II,Q = 27 (a− c)). The highest investment is done when firms decide about their
investment, trade forward and compete in quantities (II,F˜ ,Q =
6
19
(a− c)).
Thus, the resulting investment can be ordered as:
IF˜ ,Q < IF˜ ,I,Q < II,Q < II,F˜ ,Q (4.42)
For strategic reasons firms choose a relatively low investment, when the decision on the
forward traded amount takes place in the first round, whereas firms choose a relatively
high investment, when the investment decision takes place in the first round. Due to the
strategic taxonomy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) one can state in turn: Firms under-
invest in the strategic variable (investment), when the decision on forwards takes place in
the first round. Firms over-invest in the strategic variable (investment), when the decision
on the investment takes place in the first round.
Thus, firms choose a high amount of forwards and a rather low investment, when the
investment decision takes place in the first round. In contrast firms choose a high amount
of investment and a rather low forward traded amount, when the investment decision takes
place in the first round. The different strategic behavior of the competitors can mainly be
explained by the cost of their investment and the anticipation of (fierce) competition.
The smallest consumer surplus results when firms solely trade forward and compete
in quantities (σF,Q = 825(a − c)2). A larger consumer surplus results, when firms solely
decide about their investment and compete in quantities (σI,Q = 1849(a − c)2). A larger
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consumer surplus occurs when firms decide about their investment, trade forward and
then compete in quantities (σI,F˜ ,Q =
200
361
(a− c)2). The highest consumer surplus results
when firms trade forward, then decide about their investments, and subsequently compete
in quantities (σF˜ ,I,Q =
81
128
(a− c)2). Thus, the resulting consumer surplus can be ranked
as:
σF,Q < σI,Q < σI,F˜ ,Q < σF˜ ,I,Q (4.43)
The lowest profit is realized by firms when they trade forward, decide about their invest-
ment and subsequently compete in quantities (ΠF˜ ,I,Q =
5
1024
(a − c)2). A higher profit
is realized by firms when firms invest, then trade forward and subsequently compete in
quantities (ΠI,F˜ ,Q =
14
361
(a− c)2). When they trade forward and compete in quantities
(ΠF˜ ,Q =
2
25
(a− c)2) they earn a higher profit. The highest profit is earned by each firm,
when firms invest and subsequently compete in quantities (ΠI,Q = 549 (a− c)). Thus, the
resulting profits can be ordered as:
ΠF˜ ,I,Q < ΠI,F˜ ,Q < ΠF˜ ,Q < ΠI,Q (4.44)
The lowest welfare results when firms first decide about forward contracts and then com-
pete in quantities (ωF˜ ,Q =
12
25
(a− c)2). A higher welfare is realized, when firms decide
about their investments and then compete in quantities (ωI,Q = 47 (a− c)2). When firms
invest, then trade forward and subsequently compete in quantities, the welfare is slightly
higher (ωI,F˜ ,Q =
12
19
(a−c)2). The highest welfare is realized, when firms first decide about
their forward contracts, then decide about their investments and subsequently compete in
quantities (ωF˜ ,I,Q =
329
512
(a− c)). Thus, the resulting welfare can be ordered as:
ωF˜ ,Q < ωI,Q < ωI,F˜ ,Q < ωF˜ ,I,Q (4.45)
4.4 Conclusion
The aim of this model is to identify the strategic interaction between competing firms and
its influence on their investment decisions, on their forward-traded amount and on spot
market competition. Therefore, in section 4.3.2 a long-term strategic investment decision
that takes place before firms engage in forward contracts and compete in quantities on
the spot market has been modeled. For this kind of long-term investment decision, firms
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choose a combination of small forward traded amount and high investment.
In section 4.3.3 a mid-term strategic investment decision that takes place after firms
have chosen their forward contracts, but before firms compete in quantities on the spot
market, has been modeled. For this kind of mid-term investment decision, firms choose a
combination of large forward traded amount and small investment.
Section 4.3.4 compared the results found in section 4.3.2 and section 4.3.3 with each
other as well as with the results of a two-stage game, where in the first stage firms either
decide about investment or on the amount traded forward and in a second stage firms
compete in quantities.
For a long-term investment decision a rather small forward-traded amount but larger
investment led to a smaller amount supplied to the market, a higher price, higher profits
of firms, a lower consumer surplus and smaller social welfare. Therefore, when firms’
investments can mainly be viewed as long-term, introduction of a forward market has a
smaller welfare increasing effect.
For a mid-term investment decision a large forward traded amount but smaller invest-
ment led to a higher amount supplied to the market, a relatively low price, relatively low
profits of firms, a higher consumer surplus and a relatively large social welfare. Therefore,
when firms’ investments can mainly be viewed as mid-term, introduction of a forward
market has a large welfare-enhancing effect.
Looking at strategic aspects, forward trading and competition one can conclude: The
social desirability of a forward market, where firms additionally to the spot market supply
their commodities, depends on the typical time horizon of the investments made by firms:
For investment decisions, which mainly have a mid-term time horizon, the introduction
of a forward market is socially most favorable. However, for investment decisions, which
mainly have a long-term time horizon, the introduction of a forward market only leads to
a smaller increase in social welfare.
For the policymakers of the German energy turnaround there is the following general in-
sight: The overall effect of a pro-competitive instrument critically depends on its influence
on other strategic decisions and their time horizons.
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4.5 Appendix
Investment Decision and Quantity Competition
When firms have to decide in the first stage on an investment decision, and in the sec-
ond stage on the quantity they supply to the market, the market results can be found by
backward induction again.
Stage 1. Cost reducing investment:
Firms decide about a cost reducing investment. They anticipate the effect on the
quantities being delivered on the spot market.
Stage 2. Quantity competition:
Firms take the cost structure of both firms as given and decide about the quantity
they want to supply on the spot market
Stage 1. profit function:
Πi = (a− xi − xj − c+ Ii)xi − I2i (B.1)
Stage 2. profit function:
Πi = (a− xi − xj − c+ Ii)xi (B.2)
Stage 2. reaction function:
xi =
1
2
(a− xj − c+ Ii) (B.3)
Stage 2. Nash-Equilibrium
x∗i =
1
3
(a− c+ 2Ii − Ij)
p∗ =
1
3
(a− c− Ii − Ij) + c
(B.4)
Stage 1. reduced profit function
Πi =
1
9
(a− c+ 2Ii − Ij)2 − I2i (B.5)
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Stage 1. reaction function:
Ii =
2
5
(a− c− Ii) (B.6)
Stage 1. Nash-Equilibrium
I∗i = I
∗
j =
2
7
(a− c) p∗ = 1
7
(a− c) + c, xi = xj = 3
7
(a− c)
Πi = Πj =
5
49
(a− c)2 , σ = 18
49
(a− c)2 , ω = 4
7
(a− c)2
(B.7)
Forward Trading and Quantity Competition
Stage 1. Forward trading:
Firms decide about the amount they want to trade on the forward market. They
anticipate the effect on the quantities being delivered on the spot market.
Stage 2. Quantity competition:
Firms take the forward traded amount as given and decide about the quantity they
want to supply on the spot market
Stage 1. profit function:
Πi = (a− xi − xj − c)xi (B.8)
Stage 2. profit function:
Πi = (a− xi − xj − c) (xi − f˜i)− cxi (B.9)
Stage 2. reaction functions
xi =
1
2
(
a− c+ f˜i − xj
)
(B.10)
Stage 2. Nash-Equilibrium
x∗i =
1
3
(
a− c+ 2f˜i − f˜j
)
p∗ =
1
3
(
a− c− f˜i − f˜j
)
+ c
(B.11)
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Stage 1. reduced profit function
Πi =
1
9
(
a− c− f˜i − f˜j
)(
a− c+ 2f˜i − f˜j
)
(B.12)
Stage 1. reaction function:
f˜i =
1
4
(
a− c− f˜j
)
(B.13)
Stage 1. Nash-Equilibrium
fF˜ ,Q∗ =
1
5
(a− c) pF˜ ,Q =
1
5
(a− c) + c, xF˜ ,Q =
2
5
(a− c)
ΠF˜ ,Q =
2
25
(a− c)2 , σF˜ ,Q =
8
25
(a− c)2 , ωF˜ ,Q =
12
25
(a− c)2
(B.14)
In stage 2 and in stage 3 the costs of investments do not influence any result, since the
level of technology Ii is taken as given. In stage 1 firms decide about their investments in
technology. The profit function looks as follows:
Chapter 5
Summary and Discussion
The purpose of this thesis has been to take a closer look at strategic effects of forward
trading on the German electricity market. It contributes to the economic literature by ana-
lyzing the market structure of the German electricity market empirically and by presenting
two distinct micro-economic models: The first model focuses on effects of forward trad-
ing on competitive pressures. The second model focuses on effects of forward trading on
investment incentives.
Chapter 2 described the competitive setting of the German electricity market, evalu-
ated fluctuations, due to stochastic feed-in of renewable energy sources and figured out
fluctuations coming from consumer behavior. Chapter 3 added to the micro-economic
literature about forward trading and competitive pressure by allowing for volatile market
conditions. Chapter 4 contributed to the existing economic literature by simultaneously
modeling forward trading and investment incentives.
This final chapter summarizes the most noteworthy results and presents an outlook on
possible future research.
Analysis of the German Electricity Market
In a first step the vertical structure of the German electricity market was described. Start-
ing with electricity generation up to electricity consumption three distinct markets could
be identified. Firstly, there is the market for electricity generation, which is dominated
by four electricity generators (E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall, EnBW and Vattenfall), and can be
seen as an oligopolistic market with strategic interaction. Secondly, there is the transmis-
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sion of electricity from plants to regional suppliers being organized as regulated regional
monopolies. These regulated regional monopolies are operated by the following four
Transmission System Operators: Tennet, 50 Hertz, Amprion and TransnetBW. Thirdly,
the market for electricity supplied to households and industrial consumers, which is char-
acterized by the interaction of many electricity sellers and buyers and quite effective com-
petition. Indeed strategic interaction of firms is an important factor on the market for elec-
tricity generation, since oligopolistic firms can easily monitor behavior of all competitors.
Thus, especially the electricity wholesale market has been studied for further analysis of
strategic behavior.
On the electricity wholesale market electricity can either be traded on an electricity
exchange or by bilateral contracts. Trading electricity on bilateral contracts, which is
often called over-the-counter-trading (OTC), is not based on standardized rules, whereas
when trading electricity on an exchange clear rules have to be applied.
Referring to data collected by the Bundesnetzagentur and the Bundeskartellamt (2014)
it was shown that electricity sales are highly concentrated, since about 50% of the sales
volume is traded by only 5 firms. Electricity purchases are concentrated, too. However,
purchases are slightly less concentrated, since 40% of the purchased volume comes from
5 firms.
An overview of the most important contracts traded on the European Energy Exchange
(EEX) as well as the most important contracts traded over-the-counter bilaterally was
given. The three most important markets are the day-ahead spot market, the futures market
and the intraday spot market. Taking the market volume as a signal for the importance of
a corresponding market, markets could be ranked as follows: The futures market seems to
be most important for electricity trading by far, since 72% of the total market volume was
traded on the futures market in 2013. The day-ahead spot market followed with a clear
distance, since it accounts for about 26% of market volume. The intraday spot market had
a minor importance, since it only accounts for about 2% of the market volume.
Futures contracts with different maturities can be traded on the European Energy Ex-
change. Most popular was the futures contract with maturity in 2014, since 54% of futures
contracts traded in 2013 had a maturity of one year. Futures contracts that expired in 2013
or 2015 followed with clear distance, since they had a market share of 17% and 18% of all
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futures contracts. Futures contracts with a maturity of three years and more had a market
share of only 11%. Over-the-counter trading was most popular for futures contracts that
expired in 2014, too. This clearly shows the importance of 1-year-futures contracts for
electricity trading. Evaluation of prices paid for electricity traded in futures contracts or
on the day-ahead spot market led to an first interesting insight. Price of PHELIX futures
contracts are rather stable over time, whereas day-ahead- spot prices as well as intraday
spot prices are approximately normally distributed. This can be easily explained by the
fact that a futures contract obliges to deliver/purchase electricity for all time blocks of
all days until maturity. Thus, price fluctuations that result from differences in time, from
seasonal factors or from changing weather conditions are smoothed. In contrast the day-
ahead spot market price tends to fluctuate due to different times of delivery and stochastic
weather conditions.
The energy mix used for electricity generation in Germany consists mainly of the fol-
lowing five different energy sources: Soft coal, hard coal, nuclear energy, natural gas and
renewable energies. The composition of this electricity generating mix was shown for all
years between 1990 and 2013 and explanations for fundamental changes of the energy
mix were given.
Of particular note was the significant increase of electricity production from renew-
able energies. This increase followed from a significant increase of electricity production
from wind power, from solar power and from biomass. It led to an increase of volatil-
ity in electricity supply, since wind power and solar power depend on stochastic weather
conditions and cannot easily be dispatched. Electricity generated by renewable energy
sources is subsidized by feed-in tariffs, which lead to a compensation for the suppliers.
This compensation is calculated in the way that a constant amount of money is earned
by a supplier. Thus, electricity generated by solar power and wind power feeds power
into the German grid independently of market conditions. Renewable energies feed-in
data, which is collected by the four German Transmission Operators and provided by the
European Energy Exchange, was used to quantify feed-in fluctuations of solar power and
wind power as well as fluctuations coming from simultaneous feed-in of wind and solar
power.
In general feed-in fluctuations of renewable energies feed-in can be decomposed in a
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time-dependent component and a purely stochastic component. For feed-in of electricity
generated by solar power the time-dependent component was very dominant, since sun-
shine very much depends on time intervals. This resulted in no feed-in of solar energy
during the night, a small feed-in during morning hours, a peak of feed-in during noon,
declining feed-in during afternoon and no feed-in from late evening until next morning.
However, this time-dependent component goes along with an additional strong stochas-
tic component. In contrast, feed-in from wind energy did not show any time dependent
component. Thus, its feed-in solely is depended on stochastic wind conditions.
An evaluation of simultaneous feed-in of wind and solar energy led to the following
three insights. Firstly, on an average wind energy fed round about 5 GW into the German
grid without any time pattern. Additionally, solar energy fed into the German grid accord-
ing to its clear time pattern between 0 GW during night up to 10 GW at noon. Thus, the
average feed-in of renewable energies is fluctuating according to its time pattern between
5 GW an 15 GW. Looking at the 5% highest feed-in from renewable energies the same
time pattern could be found. However, extremal values for feed-in of solar and wind were
negatively correlated, since wind and sunshine rarely show up together. Thus, the 5%
highest feed-in of renewable energy sources consequently was below the sum of the 5%
highest feed-in of each energy source. Looking at the 5% lowest feed-in from renewable
energy drew a different picture, since lack of wind and sunshine more often occur. This
led to the 5% lowest feed-in from renewable energy sources fluctuating between 0.5 GW
during nights and 4 GW at noon. Thus, conventional capacity is still needed as a back-up.
Correlation coefficients for renewable energies feed-in and net-exports of electricity of
Germany were computed. Pearson’s as well as Spearman’s correlation showed a positive
relationship between feed-in from renewable energies and electricity exports. However,
feed-in of renewable energy was mainly consumed in Germany, since in 2013 the amount
of correlation according to Pearson (0.39) as well as Spearman (0.36) can be seen as rather
moderate.
Demand for electricity showed high fluctuations, too. Data provided by the European
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) has been eval-
uated to analyze demand fluctuations. Demand for electricity showed a strong pattern,
since during nights and morning hours demand for electricity is rather small. Demand for
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electricity increased until noon. After a decrease during the afternoon an increase occurs
in the early evening hours. Then demand for electricity decreased until next morning.
This pattern was generally the same for all week days, even though on business days total
demand is larger than on Saturdays or on Sundays. However, differences between work-
ing days, Saturdays and Sundays mainly shifted this pattern, but do not led to fundamental
changes of the corresponding pattern.
In order to estimate the amount of electricity that had to be generated by conventional
power plants, demand data set provided by ENTSO-E has been combined with renew-
able energy supply data set provided by the European Energy Exchange. More precisely
renewable energy supply was deducted from demand for electricity to find necessary con-
ventional generated load for Germany in 2013. This necessary conventional load can
be seen as total amount of electricity that has to be supplied by all electricity providers.
Again a clear daily pattern emerged, since during night and in the early morning hours
demand was rather low. However, the former demand peak at noon has been compensated
normally by an increasing solar feed-in. Thus, necessary conventional load had a peak
in the afternoon, since during the afternoon supply of solar energy was decreasing much
faster than demand for electricity.
Data provided by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Elec-
tricity (ENTSO-E) contains day-ahead forecasts of demand for electricity as well as in-
deed realized demand for electricity. In combination with day-ahead forecasts of renew-
able energies feed-in this allowed to calculate day-ahead forecast errors of necessary con-
ventional load. Histograms were used to visualize day-ahead forecast error. Forecast
error approximately followed a normal distribution that is located around 0 GW. In gen-
eral day-ahead forecasts of necessary conventional load matched realizations of necessary
conventional load on the next day quite well. However, for few trading blocks very high
over- or underestimations of about 10 GW could be found.
Another important question about necessary conventional load was, whether its stochas-
tic component followed a daily, weekly or seasonal trend. This question has been an-
swered by calculating serial correlation of the time series of necessary conventional load.
More precisely, serial correlation for first, second and third lag has been calculated. This
had been done for each of the 24 trading blocks separately, since otherwise computation of
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serial correlation would had been distorted by the daily pattern of necessary conventional
load. Serial correlation of necessary conventional load seemed to be moderate, since the
average first lag serial correlation of all trading trading blocks was about 0.65, the average
second lag serial correlation was about 0.5 and the average third lag serial correlation was
about 0.4. Of course, these values of serial correlation reflected a certain persistency, but
decreased clearly over time. Thus, it could be concluded that there was some trend in the
time series of necessary conventional load to expire over time.
In order to show the effect of necessary conventional load on day-ahead spot prices
scatter plots were illustrated. For most combinations of day-ahead spot prices and neces-
sary conventional load a clear linear relationship emerged. This linear relationship held
for realized necessary conventional load as well as for day-ahead forecast of necessary
conventional load. However, for extreme low or high realizations of the necessary con-
ventional load this linear relationship broke down. For very low realizations of necessary
conventional load the day-ahead spot price seemed to be rather incidental, since for com-
parable values of necessary conventional load positive prices of about 40 EUR/MWh as
well as negative prices of about -100 EUR/MWh were realized. This unclear price pattern
may reflect missing experience of electricity market stakeholders with low demand for
conventionally generated electricity.
The analysis of the German electricity market was helpful to explain behavior of many
stakeholders as well as market outcomes. However, it leads to at least three further ques-
tions:
Firstly, within the German debate about subsidies for renewable energies it is often
claimed, that highly subsidized electricity is exported to other countries, whenever weather
conditions are positive and feed-in of electricity from renewable energy sources is high.
It is claimed additionally that electricity generated by ecologically unfavorable energy
sources, such as nuclear energy and brown coal, is imported from other countries, when-
ever weather conditions are negative and feed-in of electricity from renewable energy
sources is low. Correlation between feed-in of electricity generated by renewable ener-
gies and exports did not support this hypothesis, since positive correlation of feed-in and
exports was rather moderate. Thus, renewable energies were largely used in the German
grid. However, to give a precise answer to this question a more detailed analysis incor-
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porating feed-in and demand data of other countries could be presented. However, such
a detailed analysis of this specific question seemed beyond the scope of the presented
analysis of the German electricity market.
Secondly, feed-in of electricity generated by renewable energy sources will keep in-
creasing in the next years and periods, in which only a little or no electricity generated
by conventional energy sources is needed, will more often occur. It has been shown
that whenever demand for conventionally generated electricity is low, no clear pattern
of electricity prices could be identified. Comparable values of demand for conventional
electricity can lead either to quite normal (positive) spot prices or to strongly negative
spot prices. Thus, additional parameters of the electricity market could be used to explain
this price differences. Gaining a deeper understanding of economic consequences coming
from very low demand for conventionally generated electricity, is left for further research,
since more and more data of this phenomenon can be expected in the next years.
Thirdly, control energy is used to compensate for short term positive and negative dif-
ferences of demand and supply for electricity. Control energy is managed by each Trans-
mission Operator for its regional area. Whenever a Transmission System Operator notices
differences of demand and supply it has to order additional electricity or to force suppli-
ers not to feed into the grid respectively. For both interventions Transmission System
Operator have to pay a compensation. Depending on the profitability of such an inter-
vention for electricity suppliers there might be an incentive to stimulate such differences
strategically. Thus, an evaluation of profitability of control energy in Germany would be
of specific interest, since it may help to explain forecast errors of necessary conventional
load as well as decisions of power plant owners. However, an evaluation of profitability
of control energy seems to be a very extensive research question, since contracts, costs
and technical aspects of control energy have to be considered. Thus, this evaluation is left
for further research.
Forward Trading and Competitive Pressure
Based on the previous findings about the German electricity market a theoretical model
was presented. This model investigated the relationship between forward contracts, volatile
market conditions and competitive pressure simultaneously.
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The trade-off between current profits as well as future expected profits was shown for
firms that are engaged in forward contracts. Using the "critical discount factor" as a
concept it was shown that forward contracts lead to a decreased incentive to undercut the
price set by a competitor. This result, which was firstly shown by Liski and Montero
(2006) under deterministic market conditions, holds under stochastic market conditions,
too.
However, under volatile market conditions firms that rely on stabilizing a collusive
agreement by forward trading face another problem. They never know the profit maximiz-
ing quantity in advance and always have a threat of involuntarily having traded forward
more than the optimal quantity. Thus, profitability of a collusive agreement is reduced by
(excessive) forward trading.
Firms can trade a certain amount forward to stabilize a collusive agreement. As long
as the forward-traded amount does not exceed monopoly quantity, this does not reduce
collusive profit. Another way to stabilize a collusive agreement is to set a lower collusive
price, since this reduces the profit of a firm, which is undercutting this price more sharply
than collusive profit. In contrast to forward contracts this directly leads to decreasing pro-
fits. If firms cannot stabilize a collusive agreement by trading less than monopoly quantity
forward, they have two ways to stabilize their collusive agreement, either by trading for-
ward more than respective monopoly quantity or by setting a price below the monopoly
price. The optimal semi-collusive strategy of collusive firms was derived for a stylized
world, in which either a boom or a recession occurs. This optimal semi-collusive strat-
egy is given by a combination of trading forward more than recessive monopoly outcome
and in booms setting a price below the monopoly price. It mainly depends on the prob-
ability of a recession or boom to what extent additional forward contracts, which reduce
profits in a recession or lower spot market prices, are used to stabilize a collusive agree-
ment. Ceteris paribus a higher boom probability leads to more forward contracts, which
reduces recession profit, whereas ceteris paribus a higher recession probability leads to
less forward contracts and a stronger adaption of the collusive boom price.
From a theoretical point of view there is another interesting question. What happens if
firms decide to take a long position on the forward market? This means firms oblige to
partly buy their own production (back) from speculators. A destabilizing effect of long
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positions on a collusive agreement was shown, which does not make any long positions
interesting for colluding firms.
The micro-economic model presented above provides interesting insights into the in-
terdependence of forward trading and competitive pressure. However, some more as-
sumptions could be relaxed to give a more detailed description of the German electricity
market:
The model assumes linear marginal costs that do not vary between competitors. This
clearly gives the possibility to adapt this model in two ways: Firstly, the cost structure for
an electricity supplier has a convex shape, since for a while electricity can be generated
by power plants with low marginal cost. If additional electricity is needed, electricity is
generated by power plants with higher marginal costs. Competitors have different power
plants, which are generating electricity from different energy sources. Thus, allowing
for convex cost patterns, which differ between competitors, could lead to further insights
about competitive effects of forward trading.
Another assumption of the presented model taken into consideration is perfect observ-
ability of forward and spot market positions. Economic research (Green and Porter, 1984)
has shown that imperfect observability of spot and forward market positions leads to dif-
ferent behavior of colluding firms, since they never know whether their competitor has
decreased its price or unfortunately a recession has occurred. After each recession a price
war happens that will last for some periods. This price war is necessary to avoid hidden
price reduction. It could be very interesting to find out how forward contracts could be
used in such a setting to decrease competitive incentives.
In the empirical analysis necessary conventional load is found to be serially correlated.
The presented theoretical model is stochastic, but does not allow for serial correlation. For
the analysis of competitive pressure on the German electricity market this does not seem
to be necessary, since serial correlation seemed to decline fast. However, for markets that
show a large serial correlation, which is not declining immediately, this extension could
be more important.
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Forward Trading and Strategic Investment
On the electricity market investment decisions play a crucial role in strategic competition.
There are very long-lasting investments like those for building up a plant or introducing a
cost-reducing new technology. Other investments like those for building up capacities in
an existing plant, distributing or advertising the product have a shorter time horizon.
Depending on the time horizon of an investment incentive, the theoretical model pre-
sented above showed very different strategic effects of forward trading on investment
incentives: For a long-term investment decision a rather small forward traded amount and
moderate investments led to a smaller amount supplied to the market, higher prices, higher
profits of firms, lower consumer surplus, and smaller social welfare. Thus, if firms’s in-
vestments mainly can be viewed as long-term, introduction of a forward market has only
a slightly welfare-enhancing effect. For a mid-term investment decision a rather large
forward traded amount, moderate investments, a relatively high amount supplied to the
market, a relatively low price, relatively low profits of firms, a higher consumer surplus
and a relatively large social welfare, was chosen by firms in equilibrium. Thus, if firms’s
investments can be mainly viewed as mid-term, introduction of a forward market has a
stronger welfare-enhancing effect.
Thus, for strategic aspects of forward-trading on investment decisions one could con-
clude: The social desirability of a forward market critically depends on the typical time
horizon of the investments made by firms:
For investment decisions that mainly have a mid-term time horizon the introduction
of a forward market is socially most favorable. However, for investment decisions that
mainly have a long-term time horizon, the introduction of a forward market only leads to
a small increase in social welfare!
This is bad news for the policymakers of the German energy turnaround, since most
investment decision on the German electricity market have a long-lasting time horizon.
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